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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the question, why do some insurgent groups use female 
suicide bombers while others avoid this tactic? Afghanistan is an example of a conflict 
zone where the propensity for female suicide terrorism is lower than other conflict 
regions, such as Iraq and Sri Lanka. Strategic calculations and materialist gains play a 
unique role in influencing organizational behavior, but deeper structural considerations, 
such as norms, institutional barriers, and the dynamics of conflict also influence the 
agency of actors.  Realist approaches provide limited explanatory power in addressing the 
variation in the use of female suicide terrorism; constructivism provides a better model 
toward addressing individual, organizational and societal acceptance of this tactic, 
particularly as it relates to women. The case of the Taliban insurgency and its limited use 
of female suicide bombers suggest that factors other than materialist imperatives are at 
play. The comparative study of female suicide bombings has immediate policy and 
counterterrorism implications, but it can also shed light on the debate between materialist 
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I. RESEARCH QUESTION AND APPROACH  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The incidence of suicide terrorism, with its associated global implications, has 
increased exponentially since the 1980s.1 Since 1981, there have been over 1,944 suicide 
attacks globally,2 most emanating from Islamic fundamentalist organizations.3  Suicide 
terrorism attempts to achieve its objective through its brutish nature, widespread physical 
and psychological impacts, and the socio-political ramifications it generates.  While male 
suicide missions tend to represent the norm of these kinds of attacks, female suicide 
missions bring much stronger reverberations on the psyche of societies.  Suicide attacks 
involving women have been organized by groups such as Hamas and Fatah in Israel, 
Chechen separatists in Russia, Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey, Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party in 
Lebanon, and many others.  Many of the most recent female suicide missions have been 
organized with the assistance of Al Qaeda, particularly in Iraq and Somalia.  There are a 
variety of motives, influences and drivers behind the organizational use of female suicide 
bombers to include shock-and-awe publicity, shaming the enemy, enhancing the 
recruitment pool, adaptive tactics, changing the profile set of attackers, and other 
intentions that will be closely analyzed in this thesis. 
                                                 
1. This thesis will use the terms suicide attack, suicide mission and suicide terrorism in order to 
represent insurgents, militants, criminals and terrorists who conduct suicide operations. This thesis includes 
operatives who may have unknowingly become suicide bombers (e.g., children or the handicapped), since 
post-attack analysis of bombings is limited and must assume the assailants were aware of their actions. 
Suicide attacks are, as Robert Pape defines, a mission in which “the method of attack … requires his or her 
death in order to succeed.” See: Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism 
(New York: Random House, 2005), 10.  
2. Dataset records from 1981 to June 30, 2008, were compiled by Assaf Moghadam using the National 
Counterterrorism Center Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (NCTC) and data from the University of 
Haifa Suicide Terrorism Database.  Unless otherwise stated, all suicide attack data in this thesis is derived 
from this source. 
3. Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of 
Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: 
Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 
2008/09): 46–78. 
 2
There have been over 320 suicide bombings in Afghanistan since 2001.4 This 
phenomenon was unmentioned during the Soviet invasion and occupation of the 1980s, 
an era in Afghanistan that did not experience a single suicide bombing.5  In comparison, 
there have been over 1,200 suicide attacks in Iraq since 2003, over 50 of which were 
conducted by women.6  In Sri Lanka, at least 21 percent of suicide attacks have involved 
women.7 As some contend, female participation in suicide attacks is expanding 
“ideologically, logistically and regionally” across the world.8  However, to date in 
Afghanistan, 100 percent of suicide attacks have been planned and orchestrated by men. 
What explains the absence of female suicide bombers in Afghanistan?  Why have we 
seen female suicide bombers in Sri Lanka and several Middle Eastern countries but not in 
this conflict region?  Most studies of suicide terrorism analyze the factors that explain the 
occurrence of this phenomenon.  This thesis takes a unique approach by pinpointing and 
analyzing the components that tend to inhibit the use of female suicide bombers in 
Afghanistan.  Particularly, why has Afghanistan, a country plagued with over 30 years of 
conflict, not experienced a similar path of martyrdom that other Islamic and some non-





                                                 
4. From 2004 to end of 2008, there were 323 suicide bombings in Afghanistan.  Data available from 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), National Counterterrorism Center Database, 
http://wits.nctc.gov/Main.do.   
5. The first suicide attack in Afghanistan was an attack on the famous mujahideen commander Ahmed 
Shah Massoud at Khwaja Bahauddin on September 9, 2001, by Arab al-Qaeda members.  See: Steve Coll, 
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 
September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 582–584. 
6. From 2004 to end of 2008, there were 1211 suicide attacks in Iraq, according to WITS.  Since 2003, 
there have been over 50 female suicide bombers in Iraq, according to the Iraqi Internal Ministry.  See: Al 
Shabah Al-Jadid, “Number of Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq Increased,” in Middle East Media Research 
Institute, May 20, 2009, http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/16552.htm. 
7. From 1987 to May 2009, there have been 109 suicide attacks involving the Tamil Tigers, 23 of 
which were done by women.  See: the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), “Suicide attacks by the 
LTTE,” http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/data_suicide_killings.htm. 
8. Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 26 (2003): 171–195. 
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study does not deny that women in Afghanistan could carry out attacks in the future, 
these are likely to be few and would reflect idiosyncratic motivations as opposed to an 
emerging pattern.  
The utility of suicide bombing as a tactic is not unique to any particular 
movement; it has been utilized as a prime method by nearly every organization choosing 
to implement women as suicide bombers.  However, behind every tactic an organization 
uses, larger societal issues are at stake. The purpose of this thesis is to understand why 
this tactic has largely been absent among insurgents in Afghanistan.  It will identify and 
analyze antecedent conditions; specifically social elements of agency and structure 
present in Afghanistan that affects the propensity of individuals and organizations to 
implement a female suicide bomber campaign.9  
B. APPROACH 
This thesis uses the conceptualizations and assumptions of the constructivist 
approach to understand the causes of the dependent variables. The relationship between 
the individual and the social structure is viewed differently between rationalists and 
constructivists.10  Rationalists view structure as a “function of competition and the 
distribution of material capabilities” and view rational acts as those that produce 
outcomes that maximize the interests of the state.11  Constructivists recognize the utility 
of material factors in the process of agency, but they focus more on “norms and shared 
understandings of legitimate behavior.” Rather than being driven purely by self-interest, 
actors make choices based on what is considered legitimate within the structure of 
                                                 
9. Agency refers to the role of individuals (or organizations) and their actions, beliefs and interests.  
Structure refers to the systems or institutions a society and its agents construct, such as religion, politics, or 
economies (all with various identities and interests), which affect an agent’s norms and behavior. It is 
assumed that structure and agency are inherently intertwined.  While structure on agency is “constitutive 
and causal,” actor’s interests and beliefs also play a significant role in influencing structure.  See: 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 184–189, 
and Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425; Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political 
Terrorism: Toward a Causal Model,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 317–329. 
10. K.M. Fierke, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. 
Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, 2007), 166–184. 
11. Ibid., 171. 
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society’s values, norms and other institutions.  Structures or institutions restrict and also 
compose the identity of individuals, organizations and states. Relationships and norms 
form around political, social and cultural factors thus developing an evolving structure, 
one that creates space for agency, or the ability of individuals to influence the 
environment they live in.12   
A central proposition of this thesis is that the presence of certain structural 
inhibitors in the society may affect insurgent decisions to use female suicide bombers.  
These structures may also affect women’s agency and thus their propensity to embrace 
martyrdom. Structural factors are not universal across cultures and may involve 
institutions that are unique to only one society, such as the social code ethnic Pashtuns in 
Afghanistan abide by—Pashtunwali. The presence or absence of structural factors and 
women’s agency evolving from these factors could pinpoint an increased or decreased 
propensity of insurgent groups to utilize female suicide bombers in their range of 
strategic or operational tactics. This paper does not seek to discount rational material 
objectives behind organizations implementing suicide attacks; these are certainly 
prevalent and part of the overall military strategy. However, it is the primary argument of 
this thesis that a constructivist approach, as opposed to a realist approach, provides a 
more comprehensive explanation behind the potential emergence of female suicide 
terrorism in Afghanistan.  That the Taliban have yet to implement a female suicide 
campaign reflects larger considerations at hand than mere materialist imperatives.   
This study can help analysts understand the structural characteristics that lead 
societies in conflict toward accepting the use of female suicide bombers.  While realist 
strategies and tactics play a unique role in influencing organizational behavior, deeper 
structural considerations such as norms, institutional barriers, the role of conflict and how 
they influence ideological and normative considerations of individuals and society are 
important.  Indeed societies value certain behaviors over others and suicide terrorism is a 
paradigm that should not last longer than the conflict it’s associated with.  Ultimately, 
this study helps us understand the conflict in Afghanistan.  It enables us better to 
                                                 
12. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. 
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understand the causes of a dangerous terrorist phenomenon and how to effectively 
combat it.13  It can also shed light on the debate between materialist and constructivist 
approaches in international relations theory, particularly as they apply to the formulation 
of military doctrine.  
C. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THREE CONFLICT REGIONS 
This thesis, in part, represents a comparative analysis of three conflict regions: Sri 
Lanka (1987–08), Iraq (2003–08), and Afghanistan (1979–89 and 2002–2008).14  The 
primary question these case studies address is why do some conflict regions experience 
female suicide bombers while Afghanistan has not?  These case studies are chosen 
primarily for their diversity in ethnic and religious makeup, levels of development, 
variety in geographical regions, political and operational nature of insurgent 
organizations, and the variety of time spans.  While there are valuable similarities to each 
case study, each also brings unique conditions to the overall comparative analysis of 
women’s agency in conflict.   
The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka began a suicide bombing campaign in 1987 and 
continued until their defeat in 2009. They are a secular, “equal opportunity organization,” 
employing nearly as many female bombers as they do men.  There have been at least 23 
female suicide operations in Sri Lanka versus 86 male suicide operations since 1987.15 
                                                 
13. While there has not been a female suicide attack in Afghanistan to date, the Taliban has threatened 
(but not proven) that a “significant number of women have joined the ranks of the Taliban.” See: “Taliban 
Vows Suicide Attacks by Women,” MEMRI, October 14, 2008, 
http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/10497.htm. 
14. One of the weaknesses of this thesis is the absence of first-person interviews of women in each 
conflict region.  One gains a much more nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in warfare 
and how individuals are affected by it through personal interviews.  A combination of constraints including 
time, resources and the reality of strictly conservative societies makes first-person interviews impractical 
for this endeavour. The author anticipates that an understanding of scholarly literature, events in the region 
and a review of interviews by other researchers will provide sufficient background toward the thesis 
argument.    
15. The number of suicide attacks varies depending on which database one uses. These particular 
numbers were derived from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), “Suicide attacks by the LTTE,” 
http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/data_suicide_killings.htm; the National 
Counterterrorism Center places the count at 108, while Hoffman and McCormick place the number at least 
200. See: “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, No. 4 (2004): 
256. How one distinguishes a suicide mission can affect the numbers. For example, if three bombers 
detonate in one location, that could be counted as one suicide mission or three. 
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Insurgent groups in Iraq began using female suicide bombers only a few months after the 
U.S. invasion in 2003.  In 2008, the country experienced an enormous increase of female 
volunteers, with 32 killing themselves by year’s end.16 Afghanistan, under the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) along with its Soviet occupying patron 
experienced a bloody insurgency from 1979–1989.  Many of the cultural and structural 
factors present in Afghanistan today were evident then.  Prior to 2001, there were no 
recorded male or female suicide bombers in Afghanistan.17   
Each case study will be analyzed under three propositions with supportive 
indicators serving as research parameters to develop correlation and determine how 
structure affects the propensity of sub-state actors to implement female suicide bombers. 
These propositions are based on Jeffrey Ian Ross’ Model of Structural Causes of 
Oppositional Political Terrorism, which outlines ten structural variables that lead to 
political terrorism.18 
D. PROPOSITIONS 
Each proposition has the same dependent variable and will be measured in the 
same way as shown below.  The first proposition is concerned with structural conditions 
insurgent organizations face, specifically, are insurgent groups supported by society and 
other organizations that provide consistent resources, refuge and freedom of movement.   
P.1: Generally, the less an insurgent organization finds the operational 
environment permissible, the more likely it will rely upon female suicide bombers as 
a tactic. 
Dependent Variable: Insurgent organizations’ use of female suicide bombers. 
Indicators: 
                                                 
16. Iraqi Interior Ministry Data, Al-Sabah Al-Jadid, May 20, 2009, published on The Memri Blog, 
http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/16552.htm.  
17. Waliullah Rahmani, “Combating the Ideology of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Terrorism 
Monitor 4, No. 21 (November 2, 2006).  For background on the first recorded suicide bombing in 
Afghanistan, see: Steve Coll, 582–584. 
18. Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Toward a Causal Model,” 
Journal of Peace Research 30, No. 3 (1993): 317–329. 
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• Use of female suicide bombers 
• Social support of female suicide bombers 
Independent Variable: A non-permissive security environment for insurgents 
Indicators 
• A geographic environment which fails to offer refuge and support for insurgent 
mobility and actions 
• A social environment which fails to offer refuge and support for insurgent 
mobility and actions 
• External support provided to insurgent organizations is high 
• Success of counter-terrorist / insurgency organizations is high 
The doctrine of security dilemma argues that perceived external threats on a 
group’s security will generate a successive buildup of hostility that provokes further 
action by external groups, thus provoking another reaction by the former, and so on.19  
This argument is frequently addressed to explain the escalating relationships between 
states, but the idea also applies to the relationship between individuals, clans, tribes and 
political organizations.  This question looks at whether a significant security dilemma 
exists within the conflict region, which may escalate or alter insurgent group tactics to 
include the implementation of female suicide bombers. The proposition focuses on the 
level of physical pressure emanating from the state security apparatus,20 such as 
containment of resources (weapons, recruits and funding) from external suppliers, 
constraints placed on mobility and amount of offensive attacks carried out on the 
organization.  This question will be answered by analyzing the body of literature related 
to the insurgency, assessing the frequency of attacks carried out by insurgent groups and 
                                                 
19. Philop G. Cerny, “Terrorism and the new security dilemma,” Naval War College Review (Winter, 
2005): 11-33 and John Herz, “Idealist Internalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, No. 2 
(January 1950): 157–80. 
20. The state’s security apparatus could also include any support it receives from international military 
organizations (NATO) or peacekeeping troops. 
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whether their tactics have changed from complex to simple.21 As studies have shown, 
insurgent groups conduct thorough cost-benefit analyses of operations, thus one would 
expect that a more complex attack would require a higher quality militant, more in-depth 
planning and training, and greater freedom of movement than simple attacks require.22 
This proposition also seeks to address what level of support insurgent 
organizations hold within the society in which they operate.  A primary indicator of this 
level of support will come from survey data and empirical analysis of conflict literature.   
Do insurgent groups have a relative level of freedom from counterinsurgent forces?  Are 
areas cut off from counterinsurgent mobility that gives insurgents a place of refuge?    
Jeffrey Record argues there has not been a successful insurgency where foreign 
support was absent.23 Support to insurgencies is generally referred to (though not 
exclusively) as financial, logistical or ideological in nature. It is assumed that groups 
receiving assistance from foreign organizations endorsing female suicide bombers may 
also participate in female suicide operations.24  In some areas the demographics of female 
suicide bomber participants tend to differ from their male counterparts particularly in 
terms of country of origin. Among radical Islamist groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq the trend 
is that more female suicide operatives participate in martyrdom within their host country, 
whereas male suicide bombers tend to be foreign.25  Therefore, foreign influence would 
likely need to extend to some form of leverage on local women in order to facilitate 
                                                 
21. It will be assumed that more complex attacks (asymmetric ambushes, high explosive IEDs, etc.) 
suggest greater freedom of operation for insurgent groups, while simpler attacks (grenade throwing) 
suggest less freedom of action. 
22. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Quality of Terror,” American Journal of Political Science 49, No. 
3 (July 2005): 515-530; C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and 
Other Organizations,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 3 (November/December 2004): 489-504 
and C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah 
Connection,” Asia Policy, no. 4 (July 2007): 107–134. 
23. Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath Why Insurgencies Win (Washington: Potomac Books, 2007), 23. 
24. The endorsement of female suicide bombers is defined here as some form of legal or scholarly 
affirmation by religious or other legitimating authorities even if tacitly, which the insurgent group abides 
by. 
25. This trend has been the case for groups in Palestine, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Uzbekistan.  As 
Chapter II will show, it has also been a trend among Al Qaeda-affiliated groups operating in Iraq, Pakistan, 
Chechnya and Somalia.  There are a few incidents in which European women have participated in 
martyrdom operations outside their home country under the auspice of Al Qaeda. 
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female suicide bombers.  This will be assessed by a review of relevant literature 
addressing foreign organizations in the conflict regions. 
The second proposition is concerned with the structural foundation of the state 
and women’s involvement within that structure: 
P.2:   Generally, if structural conditions inhibit female participation in the 
state and encourage participation in sub-state insurgent organizations, the 
insurgency is more likely to produce female suicide bombers.  
Independent Variable: Structural processes that inhibit female participation in the 
state but further sub-state insurgent involvement 
Indicators 
• High level of societal grievances focused on structural conditions 
• Structures that fail to provide employment and economic opportunities for women 
• Structure of government fails to further political participation of women 
• Structural processes increase female support or participation in insurgent 
organizations 
• Insurgent organizations are recruiting women 
This proposition assesses the level of structural support afforded women in the 
governing system, such as economic and political opportunities.  One study has shown 
that female participants in national parliaments play a strong role in strengthening the 
position of women.26  This proposition will assess women’s position in society and 
whether rights have been established affording women greater opportunities and 
participation in the central government.  This information will be collected by 
qualitatively assessing the status of women in each case.  
 
                                                 
26. Lena Wangnerud, “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 12 (June 2009): 51–69. 
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This proposition also looks at what role women are given within insurgent 
groups—organizational, combat or operational roles, logistical or other support capacity.  
It will assess whether access to these roles are decreasing or increasing compared with 
women’s roles provided by the state bureaucracy.  This will be examined through the 
empirical analysis of women’s roles within insurgent groups, analysis of insurgent 
statements in regards to women’s roles and existing relevant literature. The level of 
violent participation by women will be analyzed to determine whether incidents are 
sporadic, localized or systemic within a nation.  While systemic violence may show 
hostilities are an acceptable alternative, sporadic and localized events could also indicate 
the same if the events provoke significant follow-on actions by other women. 
The third proposition is concerned with the identity of martyrdom and women’s 
participation in it. 
P.3:  Generally, if a sub-culture of martyrdom incorporates women, then 
there will be a higher propensity for women to engage in suicide missions. 
Independent Variable: A sub-culture of martyrdom with involvement of women. 
Indicators 
• Cultural narratives, discourses and propaganda that venerate women as martyrs 
• Individual women or women’s organizations openly endorsing martyrdom 
• Traditional rules defining the role of women are temporarily relaxed or adjusted 
• Legitimate leaders endorse female participation in martyrdom operations 
This proposition looks broadly at historical traditions, narratives, symbols and 
other cultural tools that are used to create a sub-culture of martyrdom in a society. It will 
assess the expanse of what it means to be a martyr and who is given the right to 
participate. What constitutes a female hero?  Do organizations endorse the concept?  
Does society embrace it?  Society may honor female martyrs, but insurgent organizations 
may not, and vice versa. This question will be answered by looking at the historical 
context of martyrdom in each society and whether women play a substantial role in these 
traditions.  Obvious signs of this will be whether women who participate in combat 
 11
operations are characterized, endorsed and emulated; the existence of women’s 
battalions, women’s networks or other sub-organizations exist to promote the insurgency; 
and the recruitment of female martyrs via insurgent propaganda.  Assuming that women 
have not always been granted social consent to martyr themselves, this question looks at 
traditionally male-dominated spaces in society (i.e., insurgent leadership, operations and 
organizations) to assess whether these have relaxed to allow for female involvement.  Has 
society reframed traditional rhetoric to endorse female participation in conflict? If 
historical traditions speak of heroic female martyrs, have present cultural barriers 
continued to restrict women from participation?  Has religious and cultural language 
exposed new openings for women in society that makes their involvement socially 
acceptable? 
In the following chapters, these propositions and their corresponding indicators 
will serve as a roadmap to assess each case study.  The propositions will represent 
questions to be answered for each conflict region with the indicators serving as a 
framework to guide the analysis. The indicators will be assessed with a simple Boolean 
Yes (Y) / No (N) rating system (see Table 1) which will be incorporated in Chapter VI.  
The following values apply:   
(Y)  Yes / True.   
(N) No / False.   









Table 1.   Comparative Case Study Questions 
Propositions Variable Indicators Iraq Sri Lanka PDPA GIRoA 
Use of female suicide 
bombers 




use of female 
suicide bombers. 
 
Societal support of female 
suicide bombers 
    
A geographic environment 
which fails to offer refuge 
and support for insurgent 
mobility and actions 
    
A social environment which 
fails to offer refuge and 
support for insurgent 
mobility and actions 
    
External support provided to 
insurgent organizations is 
high 
    






more likely it will 
rely upon female 








Success of counter-terrorist / 
insurgent organizations is 
high 
    
Dependent Variable and Indicators same as above 
High level of societal 
grievances focused on 
structural conditions 
    
Structure that fails to 
provide employment and 
economic opportunities for 
women 
    
Structure of government 
fails to further political 
participation of women 
    
Structural processes increase 
female support or 
participation in insurgent 
organizations 










insurgency is more 












Insurgent organizations are 
recruiting women     
Dependent Variable and Indicators same as above 
Cultural narratives, 
discourses and propaganda 
that venerates women as 
martyrs 
    
Individual women or 
women’s organizations 
openly endorse martyrdom 
    
Traditional rules defining 
the role of women are 
temporarily relaxed or 
adjusted 
    




women, then there 
will be a higher 
propensity for 
women to engage 
in suicide missions. 
Independent 




Legitimate leaders endorse 
female participation in 
martyrdom operations 




This thesis utilizes a comparative case study of three conflict regions. Chapter II 
establishes the thesis argument with a detailed assessment of relevant literature on suicide 
terrorism.  Chapter III embarks on the case study analysis, starting with the separatist 
Tamil movement in Sri Lanka from 1987–2009.  Chapter IV looks at the Iraq insurgency 
from 2003–2008.  Chapter V looks at the period covering the Afghan Mujahedeen against 
Soviet occupation (1979–1989) as well as the Taliban insurgency from 2002–2009.  A 
brief historical overview will be presented of each country and its conflict, and then 
followed by a detailed analysis of structural factors and the agency of actors in each case 
study.  Chapter VI provides a comparative analysis and findings of the three conflict 
regions using a constructivist model assessing structural factors leading to political 
terrorism, before concluding with a section on implications and policy recommendations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much has been written on 
suicide missions; however, few analysts focus specifically on the role of women.27  This 
review of literature will address three levels of theoretical consensus among scholars on 
the causes of suicide missions and how these theories are relevant to female involvement. 
The three levels of analysis are:  (1) motivations on the individual level; (2) community 
and political concerns at the societal level; and (3) strategic and tactical imperatives at the 
organizational level. Each of these levels provides relevance to this thesis, which will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
While many theories have evolved to explain the rise of suicide operations,28 
most tend to focus on a single level of analysis.  Mohammed Hafez and Assaf 
Moghadam, influenced by scholars before them, have developed a similar framework for 
understanding suicide operations.29  In attempting to deconstruct the Palestinian suicide 
phenomenon, Hafez developed a theoretical framework that analyzed the role of suicide 
attacks from multiple, interdependent levels of analyses.30  Moghadam furthered this 
contribution by applying multiple levels of analysis to the global rise of suicide 
                                                 
27. Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different 
Reaons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (April 2008): 304–326. 
28. Pape believes that in understanding suicide operations as an organizational tactic we must look at it 
through the lens of a strategic “protracted suicide terrorist campaign.” A suicide campaign could be limited 
to one target at one time, while others could be spread out at multiple targets over an extended period of 
time.  In Pape’s study, and for the purpose of this research, any organized suicide operation with a network 
of foot soldiers, trainers and leaders will constitute a suicide campaign. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The 
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House Trade, 2005), 20. 
29. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379–
399; Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (June 
2003): 473–507. 
30. Operating dependent of each other, he dissected suicide operations onto individual, societal and 
organizational levels of analysis. Mohammed M. Hafez, “Rationalisty, Culture, and Structure in the 
Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 165-185; Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The 
making of Palestinian suicide bombers (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2006). 
 16
terrorism.31  These authors understood that individuals and organizations coordinating 
and conducting suicide operations do not operate independent of each other, but require 
involvement on both levels and must be understood within the context of the structural 
and cultural surroundings of society.  Any attempt to explain suicide missions should be 
filtered through these interdependent levels of analysis.  The following sections introduce 
these in the context of female involvement. 
B. INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATIONS 
There are a variety of individual reasons women join groups and conduct suicide 
operations.  They may not join an organization planning to become suicide bombers; 
many are reluctant volunteers, pressured by peers or driven by personal crisis, such as the 
death of a family member.32  Many are compelled for altruistic reasons,33 and conduct a 
rational, cost-benefit analysis toward their final sacrificial act.34  While others claim 
rationale cannot be easily assessed in terms of one sacrificing their life.35  Some argue 
suicide attacks are motivated by a personal commitment to a larger ideological cause.36 
Among women, nationalist or religious ideologies play less of a motivating role, 
according to Jacques and Taylor.37  They argue that women tend to be less influenced by 
ideology and more by personal issues (i.e., broken social codes, family disagreements or 
a desire to end their life).  In addition, the authors argue that measures of recruiting 
women into suicide cells are driven less by religious and nationalist factors and more by 
                                                 
31. Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach,” in Pedahzur, ed., 
Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 81–
107; Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom.  
32. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses (London: Constable & Robinson, 2006). 
33. Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger, and Leonard Weinberg, “Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics 
of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists,” Deviant Behavior 24, No. 4 (July 2003): 405–423. 
34. Hoffman and McCormick (2004); Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, No. 2 (March 
2003): 65–92; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 83–85. 
35. Mohammed M. Hafez, “Rationalisty, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A 
Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006): 
165–185. 
36. Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (London: Polity, 2005), 126–134. 
37. Jacques and Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers,” 321. 
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women proactively seeking a way to end their lives, pressured to follow a loved-one into 
the afterlife, or simply exploited by an organization.38 In many cases women first support 
the cause by encouraging their husbands and family and only volunteer for suicide 
operations when extreme personal loss occurs. The case of Chechnya is a good example.  
When the nation was under threat, women were pressured to embrace historical collective 
identities, as front-line participants in the affairs of their nation.39 
It is generally assumed that all suicide attacks have a greater personal meaning 
then the mere violent event portrays.  Establishing this meaning and the context around it 
can help in determining the ideology influencing individuals to embrace suicide 
missions.40 Adrian Mirvish argues that suicide bombers, as individuals, represent a shell 
around an empty mind – the “product of absolute, authoritarian” manipulation.41  Others 
write of the sense of despair, humiliation, and defeat many suicide bombers experience 
and the mere ability to choose life or death for themselves and other innocents provides a 
sense of power and control where none otherwise exists.42  Therefore, psychological 
responses to traumatic events, such as rape or death in the family, can have a powerful 
impact on a woman’s choice to end her life.  It could also be the factor that organizations 
                                                 
38. Jacques and Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers,” 314–315. 
39. Speckhard and Akhedova interviewed numerous family members of female suicide bombers in 
Chechnya and found most of the perpetrators were distraught over the loss of a loved one, were seeking 
revenge, and to rid their homeland of occupation. These underlying issues were wrapped in a moral 
narrative of fard ‘ayn (the individual obligation to jihad) that has been conceptualized by Al Qaeda 
leadership and legitimized by legal scholars. The lack of a viable resistance force in Chechnya compelled 
many to accept fard ‘ayn endorsed by the Salafi Jihad movement. Women took on the Islamic identity 
offered by militant jihadists in Chechnya and the roles that defined them – wearing of the hijab, piety, and 
the rejection of secular values helped merge religious and nationalist intentions with personal trauma. See: 
Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows and beyond: Understanding the motivations and 
life trajectories of Chechen female terrorists,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and 
Organization, ed. Cindy D. Ness, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 100–121.  
40. However, one scholar theorizes that suicide attacks could be the ultimate in existential warfare—to 
kill as many innocent humans as possible. See: Israel W. Charny, Fighting Suicide Bombing (Westport: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 93. 
41 Adrian Mirvish, “Suicide bombers, authoritarian minds, and the denial of others,” Judaism 50, no. 
4, (Fall 2001): 387–397. 
42. Anne Speckhard, “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
31, no. 11 (November 2008): 1023–1051; Speckhard and Akhmedova (2008), 100–122; Interview with Dr. 
Eyad Sarraj, Gaza Psychiatric Centre, shown on Suicide Killers, Peirre Rehov (City Lights Pictures, 2007). 
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exploit in order to recruit a woman.  This was the case for many female recruits serving 
in Al Nitaqayn (the women’s battalion in Al Qaeda in Iraq).43   
Others argue that agency is not even a factor for individuals, as Ohnuki-Tierney 
exemplifies in her work on Japanese Kamikaze pilots in WWII.44  She argues that many 
were forced into becoming “martyrs” for the nation and would be executed if they backed 
out of it.  The absence of rationale behind their destiny to become martyrs forced many 
pilots to turn toward Nihilism for their inspiration. Like Kamikaze pilots, the oppression 
many women live through compels them to reconstruct “the normative ideals of the 
society,” which often involves a reinterpretation of one’s values and judgments.45 The act 
of a suicide attack is often considered a means to regain one’s control over fate.46 While 
these features provide insight into individual drivers for suicide operations, their real 
asset is establishing contextual markers that organizations attempt to exploit within the 
suicide evolutionary chain.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES 
A second level of analysis focuses on material incentives at the organizational 
level. Suicide attacks are a logical tactic or strategy for a weaker organization to employ, 
particularly since most suicide operations create more casualties and damage than direct 
assaults, ambushes or any other type of insurgent attack.  Outside of attacks such as those 
on September 11, 2001, suicide missions generally require little in terms of resources, 
manpower and military training but they inflict more physical and psychological damage 
than other attacks. They are often an extension of an organization’s larger political 
strategy and survival.47 A suicide attack is coordinated days or weeks in advance, 
                                                 
43. Many were pressured into choosing service as suicide bombers or recruiters of future bombers, 
such as Samira Ahmed Jassim, captured in January 2009 for attempting to persuade women into joining the 
cell. Tuty Raihanah Mostarom, “Al Qaeda’s Female Jihadists: The Islamist Ideological View,” RSIS 
Commentary, no. 15 (February 2009), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0142009.pdf.  
44. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese Student Soldiers (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
45. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 147. 
46. Rosemarie Skaine, Female Suicide Bombers (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2006), 33. 
47. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 27; Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs. 
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planned with detail, and often implemented with precision accuracy. Large attacks at 
popular foreign resorts or institutions of prestige may seek to target the sentiment of 
foreign political bodies.48  Smaller attacks may seek to undermine the semblance of 
stability and normalcy, thus undermining the confidence in that nation’s government.   
While men coordinate most suicide operations, recent trends show that global 
terrorist groups are becoming more dependent upon women in their strategic efforts.49 
Organizations take into account the myriad of risks and vulnerabilities involved with 
implementing a suicide campaign.  Due to individual, societal and ideological constraints, 
organizations must assess the strategic versus the tactical value in conducting a male or 
female suicide operation. Pedahzur suggests three stages organizations go through prior 
to going forward with a suicide attack.  First, elites make a rational decision to use 
suicide terrorism with the clear risk of losing public support.  The second stage involves 
recruitment of individuals motivated on an ideological basis.  The third stage represents 
the training of the individual, bringing him/her to a mental state of “fully reconciled with 
the purpose.”50 This stage may appear similar to a cult, sequestering an individual until 
they are completely brainwashed;51 others suggest this stage brings legitimate social 
benefits to the individual—of belonging to a community—and is likely a feature 
organizations will exploit in their information campaign.52 Female suicide bombers are a 
growing advantage for insurgent and terrorist organizations as they can strike at larger 
military units, influence international public perceptions, and employ immediate, cost-
effective, tactical successes.  However, they can also have long-term strategic 
implications that states can easily address through information operations—the 
controversial exploitation of women carried out by insurgents.  
                                                 
48. Pape, Dying to Win, 9; Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The Atlantic Monthly 
291, no. 5 (June 2003): 1–10. 
49. Debra Zedalis, “Beyond the Bombings: Analyzing female suicide bombers,” in Female Terrorism 
and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization, ed. Cindy D. Ness, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 49–
68. 
50. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 26. 
51. Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terorrism,” 3. 
52. Mario Ferrero, “Martyrdom Contracts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6 (December 2006): 
855–877. 
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Models of organizational imperatives often revolve around realist objectives such 
as signaling to the enemy the extent of future attacks;53 coercive bargaining or 
negotiation through violence;54 competitive outbidding—where insurgent groups 
compete amongst each other for primacy;55 and internal recruiting.56 Nick Ayers studied 
organizations in Iraq and found that most suicide attacks did not follow these objectives; 
instead suicide operations were used for short-term tactical payoffs.57 While some 
organizations may use female suicide bombers for the mentioned strategic payoffs they 
also realize the more immediate tactical benefits: delivering mass casualties and 
structural damages by utilizing the “smart bomb” precision a female suicide agent can 
provide; generating intense psychological effects on civilian population; acquiring access 
to areas direct assaults cannot provide; and minimizing material and human risks 
offensive operations require.58  
Ideology can act as a bridge, linking individual with organizational and societal 
concerns.  Authors tend to disagree on the level of influence any particular ideology plays 
in suicide terrorism.  Robert Pape focuses upon nationalist concerns and discounts the 
primacy of Islamic fundamentalism, while Assaf Moghadam argues that along with the 
spread of Al Qaeda, their particular ideology—Salafi Jihad—has played an essential role 
in the recent increase of global attacks.59  Pape argues that suicide terror campaigns are 
aimed directly at democratic nations occupying a terrorist group’s perceived homeland.60 
                                                 
53. Pape, Dying to Win, 30; Bruce Hoffman and GH McCormick, “Terrorism, signaling and suicide 
attack,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 4 (2004): 243–281. 
54. Pape, Dying to Win, 20–24. 
55. Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” 
Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 61–88. 
56. Jon Elster, “Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions,” in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense 
of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford Press, 2005), 234–258. 
57. Nick Ayers, “Ghost Martyrs in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist Models to 
Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 9 (September 2008): 856–882. 
58. For more on tactical utility of suicide attacks see Luis de la Corte and Andrea Gilmenez-Salinas, 
“Suicide Terrorism as a Tool of Insurgency Campaigns: Functions, Risk Factors, and Countermeasures,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 1 (April 2009): 11–19. 
59. Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” 
International Security  33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/09): 46–78. 
60. Pape, Dying to Win, 23. 
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For example, the 1983 U.S. Embassy car bombing in Lebanon was directed at the United 
States for its alliance with Israel, a democratic nation occupying areas of Lebanon.  
However, this explanation fails to explain the use of suicide terrorism by non-state and 
transnational actors such as Al Qaeda.  Moghadam agrees that localized, traditional 
conflicts represent a fight against occupation, but global patterns of suicide operations 
like Al Qaeda, embody the contemporary tactical and strategic utility of martyrdom.61 
Partly as a necessity, partly for strategic value, global Salafi Jihad62 organizations have 
modeled themselves on past nationalist groups like Fatah and Hezbollah and even 
embraced some of their nationalist aims.  Al Qaeda’s spread encompasses suicide bomber 
technology, instruction, and facilitators in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya. 
Whether conducted by secular nationalists or the Global Jihadi Movement (GJM), these 
are rational acts often perceived as desperate, but highly coordinated by weaker 
organizations, assuming a “strategy of necessity” against much stronger states.63 As the 
Egyptian scholar Sheik Yusuf al Qaradawi admits in response to condoning suicide 
terrorism, “I cannot confront the enemy’s point of strength, only it’s weakness.”64   
Due to strategic imperatives such as limited resources and the inability to fight 
conventionally against state security forces, organizations such as Al Qaeda are 
compelled to recruit and train female operatives.  In order to do so, social approval and 
cultural legitimacy are required. These social and cultural pressures are what 
instrumentalist leaders and organizations must come to grips with when harnessing and 
controlling social movements.65 Just as women are members of the organization, they 
also belong to a family and social sphere facing extreme violence. Therefore, the choice 
to engage women in violent jihad will test the viability of an organization’s ideology as 
well as that of the social movement behind it. However, organizations and societies have 
                                                 
61. Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A 
Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (December 2006): 707–729. 
62. Salafi Jihad is a radical Islamic ideology embraced by Al Qaeda that endorses strict interpretations 
of jihad and the Quran.  
63. Pape, Dying to Win, 13; Record, Beating Goliath, 132. 
64. Ilan Ziv and Serge Gordey, Human Weapon (First Run / Icarus Films, 2002). 
65. Cindy D. Ness, “In the Name of the Cause: Women’s Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005): 353–373. 
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a mutual relationship of exploitation. A society in peril needs the organization to facilitate 
martyrdom operations and the organization needs society’s approval to carry them out. 
The following will explain how society influences the process of female suicide 
terrorism.  Society delivers physical and moral support, grants legitimacy, and provides 
essential context of the conflict requiring extreme measures. 
D. SOCIETAL MOTIVATIONS 
A third theory that arises from the literature on suicide operations involves 
community and political concerns at the societal level. The radical organizations and 
individuals involved in female suicide operations are initially products of social 
movements.  Social movements are structures that provide pathways for organizations to 
indulge in violent acts such as martyrdom operations that would otherwise be considered 
outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior.66 Legitimate authorities, under intense 
pressure from the shifting pattern of societal norms, tend to promote or celebrate the 
violent events.67 Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade are examples of groups 
implementing suicidal violence partly in response to extreme social pressures placed on 
them by society faced with occupation and the external threat from Israel.68 From 
marketing campaigns that employ multimedia technology to clever rhetorical strategies, 
the cult of martyrdom becomes ingrained in children and adults. Martyrs are made 
national heroes in Palestine and Lebanon, with institutions built to provide services for 
family members left behind.69 Religious and legal statements by prominent figures 
including martyrs themselves provide the legitimacy society needs to accept female 
suicide operations. This is important, since prior to the first female martyr in Palestine in 
2002, women played very minor roles in terrorism.  Approval is granted by society in a 
 
                                                 
66. Ami Pedahzur, “Toward an analytical model of suicide terrorism—a comment.” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 16 (2004): 841–844. 
67. Mohammed M. Hafez, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 165–185. 
68. Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufactoring Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 53.  
69. The Living Martyr: Inside the Hezbollah (Princeton: Films for the Humanities & Sciences, 2001). 
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variety of ways to include religious consent, temporary justification, access to willing 
recruits, construction of networks and cells, and most importantly—the societal logic that 
supports suicide terrorism.70  
Social movements such as these can be characterized by three foundational 
principles: identity, opposition, and totality.71 Similar to labor movements, religious and 
nationalist aims take on a mythic ideal of historical oppression that become larger 
collective identities. Islamic fundamentalist movements have characteristics that often 
parallel those seen in Europe, such as the French Revolution, which had liberation 
ideology on top of traditional Catholic principles; they had saints, heroes and “martyrs of 
liberty.”72 The principal of opposition is a way for anger, discontent and frustration 
realized in all facets of society to be redirected at the other side. Opposition fuels a cult of 
paranoia in which social groups perceive everyone else as a potential enemy. Palestinians 
frequently cite that all Israelis are soldiers, including women and children, and thus 
worthy of targeting.73 The principle of totality is the idea that every facet of life must be 
directed at overthrowing the opposition. The purpose of life becomes resistance, and 
every means available is legitimate, including suicide bombings. Even civilian targets 
become publicly acceptable in cultures suffering extreme repression.74  Religious 
ideology helps society embrace the totality of struggle, as if it were a cosmic undertaking 
that requires any means necessary.75  Social movements can easily become totalitarian 
when language and actions commit to using extreme violence to eliminate the opposition.   
                                                 
70. David Cook, “Women Fighting in Jihad?” (2005); Cindy Ness, “In the Name of the Cause” (2005); 
Debra Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), June 2004); 
Susan McKay, “Girls as ‘weapons of terror’ in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean rebel fighting forces,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 385–397; Carolyn Nordstrom, “Gendered War,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 399–411. 
71. Michel Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism, trans., David Gordon White (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 5. 
72. Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1932), 155. 
73. Ziv and Gordev, Human Weapon (2002). 
74. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 68, 81, 90. 
75. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000). 
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As previously mentioned, Al Qaeda and Salafi Jihadist groups modeled their 
operations off of the successes in Lebanon and Palestine. These groups observed the 
success female suicide bombers had tactically, as well as in motivating others to join the 
movement. In Palestine, most female operations were done by secular groups like the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) during the first and second Intifada. Prior to 2002, society was 
unclear of the role women should have in violent resistance movements against Israel.  
When Wafa Idris (sent by the Fatah military wing, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade) detonated 
her explosives in 2002, perceptions changed dramatically. She was immediately hailed as 
a national hero: 
It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you 
the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death. It is a woman 
who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body… It is 
a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about 
women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement. … It is a woman 
who has now proven that the meaning of (women’s) liberation is the 
liberations of the body from the trials and tribulations of this world … and 
the acceptance of death with a powerful, courageous embrace.76 
While official reactions were reluctant, pressure from society compelled 
organizations like Hamas to embrace female suicide bombing. In the weeks after the 
bombing, hundreds of women volunteered to become martyrs: “We have 200 young 
women from the Bethlehem area alone ready to sacrifice themselves for the homeland,” 
said one leader of Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.77 Religious organizations like Hamas were 
far behind secular groups like Fatah in organizing female bombers. Part of the problem 
was that religious organizations were slow to realize society’s demands calling for greater 
violence. Once realized, organizations needed to ensure legitimate authorities vetted the 
process, and then groups could harness the momentum of society.  
 
                                                 
76. Al-Sha’ab (Egypt: February 1, 2002) as quoted in Bloom, Dying to Kill, 148. 
77. Graham Usher, “At 18, Bomber Became a Martyr and Murderer,” The Guardian, March 30, 2002. 
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Since the mid-1990s, a rise in Palestinian public support for terrorist activities 
against Israel had gone up from one-third in 1994–1999 to over two-thirds after the start 
of the Second Intifada in 2001.78 That year, the Saudi High Islamic Council gave the 
legal justification for female suicide attacks against Israel.79 Some scholars even 
promoted official preparation for the inevitable inclusion of women on the front lines of 
war, such as Muhammad Khayr Haykal when the conditions were subject to fard ‘ayn: 
From this we believe it is incumbent upon the Islamic state to prepare 
training centers for women so that they can learn the use of arms and 
methods of fighting in them.80 
Prior to the Second Intifada, most religious scholars asserted that women were 
ineligible for martyrdom operations.81  Suicide attacks did not fit the traditional role of 
women, who were generally restricted to the home.  After the first suicide attack, Hamas 
was faced with hundreds of female volunteers seeking to become martyrs.  By 2007, six 
fatawas had been identified allowing women to conduct martyrdom operations.82  From 
these official pronouncements came the need for a structured language, history and 
collective memory devoted to explaining female martyrdom to the Islamic world. 
Narratives were woven to remind society of the direct role women previously held in 
supporting jihad, such as inspiring men through rituals and chants and leading them into 
battle.  Names such as Salaym Bint Malhand, Umm Omara, and the youngest wife of the 
Prophet Muhammad—Ayesha, who led troops at the Battle of the Camel in 656—
decorate the history of female heroines and continue to inspire many.83  One jihadi 
magazine makes a direct link to the past:  
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My sister you might hear these stories and think that they have been 
fabricated … but once you will learn that even today there are women 
similar to those of the past, you will believe the stories about the past.84  
These stories provide valuable information and personal connection to the collective 
memory and help organizations develop contemporary frames and ideologies. But as one 
author writes, these collective histories are a social construction.85  While these events 
may have occurred, consensus is that most tales of female participation in jihad are 
examples of uncommon valor in uncommon circumstances. The importance is not in the 
truth of the stories, but how organizations exploit them and what compels society to 
perceive them as real. These stories provide a framework for individuals to link their 
current struggles with those of the past.  Namely, organizations sought to exploit the role 
of religious symbolism and terminology in the context of women’s virtue.86 They 
introduced a narrative of “the sacred” in order to redefine the roles of women in 
society.87 In Lebanon, an elderly woman supportive of Hezbollah stated:  
We are the daughters of Zena and the daughters of Fatima; we are 
advancing with weapons behind the sons of Hussein and the followers of 
Khomeini, behind every holy warrior.88 
Instrumentalists emphasized “mothering and sacrifice” in the same manner as 
secular groups have done in Nicaragua and Colombia.89 Ness argues that secular and 
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traditional, use similar “rhetorical strategies” to justify women’s engagement in violent 
action. For both groups, this presents a challenge to their social orders since it redefines 
the traditional role of women.90  
E. SUMMARY 
This literature review presented three levels of analysis in which to frame 
discussions on the causes of suicide missions. The structural and cultural factors 
examined in each case study will touch upon individual, organizational and societal 
frames of reference in the development of the thesis argument. This review also provides 
value in understanding the absence of female suicide bombers in Afghanistan. While 
women’s roles have been restructured by societal and organizational imperatives in the 
case of Chechnya, Palestine, Sri Lanka and Iraq, they have not in Afghanistan.  Structural 
and cultural factors have limited the ability and inclination of insurgent groups to 
temporarily adjust women’s role in society, thus providing them agency to participate in 
jihad.  The case studies that follow will attempt to develop this logic and the reasons why 
women have not taken a more proactive role in the Taliban insurgency.   
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III. CASE 1: SRI LANKA 1983–2009 
This chapter will outline the history of conflict in Sri Lanka and explain the 
structural factors that were most decisive in creating societal discontent.  It will then 
describe the LTTE organization and its successful attempt at representing the separatist 
aims of the Tamil nation.  Finally, this case study will look at how the organization was 
able to harness and exploit cultural and historical narratives toward instituting a culture of 
martyrdom that venerated the concept of female agency and participation in the conflict. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Sri Lanka has experienced a unique culture of martyrdom distinct from those 
created by Islamic fundamentalists, primarily in its extraordinary use of female suicide 
bombers but also in the homogenous nature of their organization.  While many terrorist 
organizations have non-indigenous volunteers and often use foreigners to conduct suicide 
missions, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are a predominately Tamil-select 
organization.  Since 1987, there have been at least 109 LTTE suicide attacks, 23 of which 
were conducted by women, and many of the latter targeting political and military 
leaders.91  Most analysts agree that Tamil suicide attacks were used primarily as special 
weapons to infiltrate tightly controlled military targets.92 The utility of this tactic is not 
unique to the Tamil movement, and it has been a prime motive for nearly every 
organization choosing to implement women as suicide bombers.  However, behind every 
tactic are larger collectives seeking recognition for their needs.  These social movements 
are driven by norms, identity and social structures that define sub-state actors in turmoil.  
                                                 
91. The number of suicide attacks varies depending on which database one uses, these particular 
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This study of female suicide bombers will seek to address how agency and structure of 
Tamil society were systemic factors influencing the organizational imperatives of the 
LTTE.93 
In the case of Sri Lanka, I argue three primary factors suggest that a constructivist 
interpretation provides a more sufficient tool for understanding the use of female suicide 
bombers.  First, a number of institutional programs promoted discrimination, suppression 
and violence against Tamil society; second, the LTTE organization was able to harness 
discontent and mobilize women as protectors of the Tamil nation; and third, the above 
two factors were skillfully wrapped in a narrative of cultural liberation that outlined the 
necessity of female martyrdom.  As mentioned in the Introduction, realist notions of the 
utility of female suicide bombers as a military tactic provide a valuable explanation; 
however, the tactic’s emergence is better explained by understanding the broader 
spectrum of components developed in this case study. The questions asked here are 
similar in scope to those asked in the Introduction:  how do sub-state organizations 
choose their military strategies?  Why do some insurgent groups implement female 
suicide bombers while others do not?  Closer analysis of Tamil society in Sri Lanka and 
particularly the influence of the LTTE organization show that their approach cannot be 
understood purely by material motivations but must address social dimensions in Sri 
Lanka. 
The conflict in Sri Lanka, one of South Asia’s longest and deadliest since post-
colonial independence, has recently come to a turning point, as the Sri Lanka military 
destroyed Tamil strongholds in the north and east and assassinated the legendary, cult-
like leader of the LTTE movement, Velupillai Prabhakaran.94  Since 1983, over 70,000 
people have been killed from the separatist conflict in Sri Lanka.95 The quarter century 
struggle for Tamil independence now rests on the shoulders of a broken LTTE 
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organization operating outside the island country.96 Whereas the rebel force once held a 
de facto state (including a justice, administrative and full-scale military departments) in 
the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, today authority over the minority Tamil 
population has been restored to the ethnic majority Sinhalese. 97 
There are significant reasons to use female suicide bombers over other tactics. 
Security forces tend to have more difficulty discerning female bombers from males due 
to traditional dress (a long shalwar kameez is often worn by Tamil women in Sri Lanka), 
conservative values that prevent men from touching or looking at women, and the 
LTTE’s ability to create sophisticated bombs hidden in belts, brassieres or a feigned 
pregnancy.98 Women are also able to penetrate hardened structures easier than men by 
using the above techniques.99  Using women also harnesses psychological effects for 
LTTE military strategies via the extraordinary media attention female bombers bring.  
They are also uniquely efficient for they only require the death of one combatant, 
whereas direct assaults risk numerous lives. Thus, female suicide bombers bring 
substantial value to the asymmetric toolkit.100 However, suicide tactics were only a 
temporary measure of a much larger internal struggle in Sri Lanka.  
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Figure 1.   Suicide Attacks in Sri Lanka101 
Insurgent and terrorist organizations are essentially political institutions, 
representing a perceived disenfranchised group, that act out and enforce their political 
views through violence.  Through a “collective rationality” they seek to enact a “radical 
change in the status quo” by forcing amendments to the government structure or deposing 
leaders from their positions.102 In many ways, the LTTE organization represented this 
kind of collective body that experienced and reacted to systemic and institutionalized 
discrimination from the Sri Lankan government. Claudia Brunner writes: “Political 
violence, terrorism, and resistance that take the form of suicide attacks occur in very 
specific contexts of asymmetric power relations.”103  In Sri Lanka, these occurred under a 
highly organized militant organization, borne of limited protection afforded to Tamils 
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from the state. Western history will remember the LTTE as a terrorist organization, but 
Tamils will always consider them a national liberation movement.104  
In practice and ideology, the Sri Lankan state produced and perpetuated a level of 
colonial domination105 over the Tamil nation that strengthened and developed Tamil 
collective identity, particularly among women.106 SJ Tambiah argues that Tamil-
Sinhalese identities are constructions that did not necessarily match reality on the ground.  
For example, the two communities frequently inter-married, spoke both languages and 
often converted to Buddhism or Hinduism.  Tambiah calls recent conflicts 
“manufactured—a truly twentieth century phenomenon.”107  This phenomenon was an 
inherited aspect of Portuguese, Dutch and British occupations.  The first two colonizers 
pushed religious intolerance by favoring certain groups over others.108 A Sinhalese 
community developed in the north and southwestern parts of Sri Lanka while a Tamil 
community consolidated in the north and east (see Figure 2).109  Under British colonial 
rule, the minority Tamils were given a disproportionate share of authority.  The limited 
agricultural yield in the Tamil territory forced Tamils to take part in civil service and 
administrative jobs, while the Sinhalese were employed in low-paying agricultural work. 
Structural barriers established by British and Tamil administrators prevented Sinhalese 
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entrance into the professional classes; Tamils flooded the upper and middle classes, while 
Sinhalese made up most of the lower class. With independence in 1948, the new 
government dominated by Sinhalese nationalists sought to restructure the colonial 




Figure 2.   Map of Ethnic Communities and religions in Sri Lanka, 1976.110 
B. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
This section will look at a number of structural factors within the Sri Lanka state 
that suppressed Tamil identity and facilitated ethnic violence.  It will look at political and 
constitutional policies that discriminated against Tamils in an effort to suppress their 
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identity while promoting Sinhalese identity.  These factors contributed to the 
development of a radicalized generation of youth willing to use terrorism to uphold their 
ethnic identity. 
A major structural factor in Sri Lanka was the encouragement of ethnic 
outbidding instituted by Sinhalese and Buddhist elites eager to recreate a Sinhalese-only 
state.  In 1956, the Official Language Act (“Sinhalese Only Act”) was established that 
made Sinhalese the only official language in Sri Lanka.  It was instituted with strong 
lobbying by pro-Sinhalese and pro-Buddhist institutions seeking to reconstitute the 
country on ethnic lines, calling for a “Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese.”111  Despite significant 
rioting by Tamils in the north, the policy was enshrined and became a mechanism for 
alienating Tamils from civil service jobs and the government.  Within twenty years, the 
government developed an “institutional culture negating minority rights.”112  State jobs 
employing Tamil speakers declined from 30 percent to 5.9 percent by 1990.113  Tamils in 
science-based education curricula fell from 35 percent in 1970 to 19 percent in 1975.114  
Most significant was the drop in Tamil armed forces rolls—from 1956 to 1970, it 
decreased from 40 percent to 1 percent.115  Many of these former soldiers likely brought 
their skills back to Tamil militant organizations including the LTTE. 
Ethnic domination was furthered in May 1972 with the constitution changing 
Ceylon into Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The 1956 language policy was 
enshrined in the 1972 constitution, making it inviolable.  Minority protections previously 
put in place by the British were eliminated.  The legislature was given power over the 
judiciary in order to depose justices that did not support the government. In 1976, the 
Sixth Amendment to the constitution “prohibited political parties and individuals from 
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demanding or advocating a separate state for the Tamil-speaking people as a solution to 
the intractable ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.”116 This effectively marginalized Tamil 
political groups and forced them to begin working outside the democratic system, as no 
Tamil political representative could openly espouse separatism and hold a seat in 
parliament. 
Tamil reprisals were met with further crackdowns including The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979, which was a hallmark effort by Sri Lanka to use brutal 
tactics such as torture and indefinite detention to quell violence.  The PTA gave security 
forces the ability to round up anyone, including innocent Tamil civilians and imprison 
them without trial. The effect was an escalation of violence in the 1980s and further 
oppression by security forces.  The inability of Tamil political parties, namely the popular 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to counter the violence led to a new radicalized 
generation of youth.  The 1983 riots against Tamils was the breaking point that erupted 
the nation into all-out ethnic warfare. President Jayewardene in response to the anti-
Tamil violence of 1983 blamed Tamils for Sinhalese actions.   
I am not worried about the opinion of the Tamil people… now we cannot 
think of them, not about their lives or their opinion… the more you put 
pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhalese people will be here… 
Really if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhalese people will be happy.117 
Tamil nationalist fervor has grown at every attempt the Sri Lanka government 
made to undermine national determination. A combination of failures to bridge 
differences between groups through a constitutional process, poor political leadership that 
used Sinhalese nationalism for its own advantages, and a systematic process to 
undermine cultural identity among Tamils were significant structural elements that led to 
Tamil disenfranchisement. Assistance from foreign powers and a strong organizational 
culture brought the LTTE to the foray as the only party that could protect Tamils from the 
ethnic violence beginning in 1983. These structural factors left the Tamil population 
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unsecure from state oppression. Tamils were forced to develop their own security 
mechanisms, of which the LTTE quickly became the group to fill that gap.  
By mid-1989, LTTE was able to fend off security forces and essentially protect 
the Tamil population against their incursions. By mid 1990, it had established a de facto 
state in the north and eastern portions of Sri Lanka, especially outside the main urban 
areas.  Between 1991 and 2000, the LTTE was victorious in a number of battles: 
Pooneryn, Mullaitivu, Puliyankulam, Kanakarayankulam, and Elephant Pass. In 2003, the 
LTTE said that armed struggle for independence (Eelam) was considered:  
A measure of self-defense and as a means for the realization of the Tamil 
right to self-determination [that] arose only after more than four decades 
of nonviolent and peaceful constitutional struggle proved to be futile and 
due to the absence of a means to resolve the conflict peacefully.118   
Political and constitutional structures in Sri Lanka flamed ethnic outbidding and blocked 
the minority Tamil population a respectable place in the democratic process.  The failure 
of political elites to build a balanced approach toward ethnic representation compelled 
groups such as the LTTE to follow a separatist path.  It also forced Tamils to look toward 
the LTTE as their only real political voice in the process.  LTTE would take this one step 
further by using violence to alter the uneven playing field. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND AGENCY  
This section looks at the organization that developed in response to ethnic 
suppression and how it was able to harmonize public rage with the radical LTTE political 
vision and achieve political, strategic and tactical aims.  LTTE was also an institution that 
represented the norms and values of the Tamil populace, which could not be met via the 
democratic process. 
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LTTE was a centralized organization with a top-down command structure.  The 
LTTE had all of the necessary institutions to run a de facto state within a state.119  It had 
a charismatic political leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, who ran a highly centralized 
system of governance outside the urban areas of north and east Sri Lanka with associated 
cabinet and administrative offices.  In areas it controlled, the LTTE collected taxes, 
administered justice, provided social services and had a significant military presence to 
include an air force, amphibious group, airborne group, intelligence group and a suicide 
commando cell. The influence of the LTTE and particularly its leader was clear in the 
cult-like reverence followers had for the leader and organization.  Senior officials in the 
LTTE considered Prabhakaran as “God become man,”120 others refer to him as the “sun 
god.”  Subscribing to the LTTE was not necessarily forced upon Tamils—more often, 
they were supported due to their strong leadership and ability to unite Tamils and the 
variety of Tamil political parties that emerged.  Few Tamils opposed the LTTE; however, 
some have suggested this is a result of LTTE retribution tactics for those that left or did 
not subscribe to their organization.121 
Another structural factor that empowered the LTTE was foreign influence. The 
LTTE had obtained illegal weapons through a variety of arms markets in Burma and 
Singapore where large Tamil communities live.122 They also received up to $300 million 
per year from an established global diaspora involved in licit and illicit businesses.123 
Prior to these transactions, India provided sanctuary, arms and training for Tamil 
guerillas early in the civil war as a way to prevent Sri Lanka from establishing 
relationships with other countries such as Israel and the United States.  India also had a 
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significant Tamil population in southern India’s Tamil Nadu region, which lobbied New 
Delhi to support the Tamils in Sri Lanka.  Backed by foreign support, namely training 
and material aid via the India Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), LTTE was able to 
become a formidable force.124 Not only was India involved with material transfers, but it 
was also a political mediator with the Sri Lankan government in an effort to win greater 
autonomy for Tamils.  This changed when in 1987 LTTE, fearing India’s support to a 
rival Tamil political party would weaken its movement, refused to participate in a peace 
accord to disarm.  According to the dictates of the accord, the Indian Peace-Keeping 
Force (IPKF) was deployed to the northeast. The IPKF was accused of inflicting high 
civilian casualties, rapes, murders, and torture.125 While India’s involvement initially 
empowered the LTTE over other organizations, its human rights abuses also rallied Tamil 
passions toward supporting LTTE violence and terrorism. Furthermore, the presence of 
foreign troops justified arguments that the Tamil nation was being threatened. This 
perception, coupled with the personal experience of persecution and violence, influenced 
many women to join the effort to protect the homeland. 
Initially, women were involved with information operations (including 
propaganda dissemination and intelligence collection), fundraising, logistics, medical 
care and recruitment.  In 1983, as a response to growing pressure, the LTTE created a 
wing for women called the Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers.  The first cadre of 
fighters was trained in 1985 in Tamil Nadu, India and by July 1986, it saw combat 
against the Sri Lankan military.126 More women were recruited into the LTTE as a result 
of Tamil village massacres in the early 1990s.  Representation of Tamil women in 
military, administrative and logistics positions at one time constituted approximately 35 
percent of all LTTE fighters.127 According to one researcher that spent time with LTTE 
women: “many of the women joining the LTTE feel autonomous and able to decide about 
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their destiny for themselves for the first time in their lives.  They retain this feeling and 
this attitude on their return to civil life.”128  Whether most women felt a sense of 
liberation as cadres in the LTTE is unknown, but this seems to be a general feeling 
among many who have been interviewed.  Many women who joined in the mid-1980s 
were raped by Sinhalese or IPKF troops.  According to the Hindu faith, of which many 
Tamils subscribe to, when a woman is raped, she cannot be married or have children.129  
For many Tamil women, redemption of the self and nation was gained through violence.  
As one author writes:  
Violence justified ideologically in the name of politics structures social 
relations and colonizes social space, enabling conditions of 
possibility/impossibility…Violent practice produces oppositional and 
binary bodies, heroic and aggressive, criminal and communal, which are 
hierarchized and celebrated, minoritized and humiliated.130   
In other words, violence on one end produces a reaction of violence on the other end.  
While realists would argue female suicide bombers are products of an organization’s 
material needs, constructivists would suggest the ideational values experienced from 
violence promote the perpetuation of further violence and bring the potential female 
bomber to the point where organizations can realize her utility in their materialist 
objective.  As Nira Wickramasinghe writes: “In situations of violence, therefore, security 
is not only contextual and malleable, it is also fundamentally reactive.”131  The lack of a 
secure environment compelled women to enter a self-help process.  
Massacres in the 1990s in eastern Tamil villages brought even more women into 
the LTTE ranks.  While the LTTE demanded each family give one child to the 
organization, women and many children voluntarily enlisted as soldiers.  This increased 
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the level of female participation in the organization and compelled LTTE leadership to 
relax traditional concepts of womanhood, as Patricia Lawrence writes: “most women can 
easily recite the ‘Four Virtues’ of Tamil women: modesty, charm, coyness, and fear—
now replaced by the new notions of courage, confidence, and thirst for liberation.”132   
Another structural factor that influenced the situation was the failure of 
counterinsurgency forces to effectively safeguard Tamil citizens. In most cases, the 
security forces were the victimizers and instigators of conflict. Violence as a structure 
created considerable levels of fear and insecurity in Tamil society. One Tamil woman 
expressed this fear as such: “As a Tamil in the present day, the biggest threat is the 
security forces—having to produce identification.”133 Many were detained, 
indiscriminately searched, sexually harassed and even tortured by state security forces or 
IPKF troops.  This caused Tamils to seek other mechanisms and organizations to defend 
themselves.   As Nira Wickramasinghe writes: “Thus when the state breaks its contract to 
protect all its citizens, people are left to create their own security.”134  The failure of the 
state to provide security for its people empowered the LTTE as most Tamils sought their 
assistance.   
The LTTE was efficient in harnessing the norms and values that embodied a 
national myth of Tamil nationhood. The threat on the livelihood of the Tamil nation was 
a real fear for Tamils experiencing suppression and violence from Sinhalese and IPKF 
security forces.  The LTTE harnessed these existing fears and rallied women to protect 
the next generation.  To do so, LTTE exploited shared beliefs and narratives that could 
justify and mobilize a culture of martyrdom. 
D. THE MARTYR IDENTITY  
This section looks at the culture of martyrdom in Tamil society, a structural 
characteristic that LTTE harnessed and channeled toward fulfilling its strategic 
objectives. While realists would argue that female suicide violence is a temporary 
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adjustment to achieve strategic or tactical objectives, constructivists would add this 
military strategy must be “made consistent with social norms of female behavior”135 
before it can be implemented, and precedes the discussion of acceptable tactics. Sub-state 
movements like the LTTE used intellectual leaders, cultural themes and historical 
narratives to mobilize an already-frustrated population to support the insurgency, and 
moreover, protect the existence of the nation.  This is exemplified in the pervasive culture 
of martyrdom in Sri Lanka that embraced male and female heroes.  While LTTE may 
have been instrumental in organizing the culture of martyrdom, it was an existing value 
that was wholly embraced by Tamil society and became an institution that inspired 
suicidal violence. 
Identity for Tamil women has generally been restricted by structures based on 
tradition and conservatism. While some examples of female warriors exist in historical 
memory, frontline combat was not given traditional approval.  It’s generally considered a 
new phenomenon that was copied from the struggles led by Gandhi and the Indian 
National Congress as well as the movement led by Suhas Chandra Bose and the Indian 
National Army.136 At first, the LTTE was slow to integrate women into the organization, 
so as not to offend the conservative Tamil culture.  Women were initially given 
supportive roles in the organization as nurses, administrators and caretakers.  Over time, 
restrictions were loosened as the organization needed more recruits and society 
experienced greater oppression from state security forces. 
As the material value of female suicide violence was realized, institutions were 
established to ensure it would be legitimized and maintained. The commitment to 
martyrdom was a unique LTTE trait not readily seen among other insurgent groups in Sri 
Lanka, such as the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) group waging an insurgent movement 
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in the south.  LTTE created a special battalion for their future martyrs known as the 
Black Tigers.  Their first attack was on July 5, 1987, when a bomber drove a truck of 
explosives into an army camp at Nelliyady.  This day was given a sacred marking as an 
official Tamil holiday, called Black Tigers Day.  Holidays have been an essential symbol 
for venerating heroes of the Tamil nation.  On April 19 and September 26, honor is given 
to Annai Pupati (a mother of ten children) and Tiyaki Tilipan, respectively, for fasting to 
death in protest against the Indian Peace-Keeping Force’s occupation of Tamil territory in 
Northern Sri Lanka. In a sense, these women have come to embody the Tamil-mother 
image in a similar way that “Lady Liberty” represents life and liberty in the western 
world.137  Annai Pupati is represented on billboards throughout Tamil territories—
adorned in bright red and gold colors, giving a “religious aura to her action and her 
commemoration.”138 She is often likened to the fierce goddess Durga—a warrior 
archetype of the divine mother. Symbols and their relation to myth are an essential 
component of martyrdom that builds a link to the past. 
While Mia Bloom argues that the LTTE “has never made the conflict about 
religion,” others, like Michael Roberts contend that religion had a significant role in 
LTTE narrative selection.139 The selection of symbols is very important.  Michael 
Roberts argues that LTTE strategically used symbols and ritual to “mobilize supporters 
and legitimize their cause among Tamil speakers, while also cementing the loyalty of 
their personnel.”140 One powerful symbol adopted by LTTE fighters was the adornment 
of a cyanide capsule around the neck.  The vial itself was to be used in case the female 
fighter was captured.  Songs, poems and martyrologies were chanted celebrating the 
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virtue of the slow death cyanide brought.141  One became a “walking witness” by 
wearing the vial proving commitment to the organization, Tamil self-determination and 
the willingness to become a martyr.142 
Underlying every suicide attack are potent religious symbols depicting sacrifice, 
death and resurrection through martyrdom.  Many argue that the LTTE is a secular 
nationalist organization.143 This may be misleading since the organization actually 
venerates, upholds and exploits existing structures, such as the Hindu faith.  While the 
organization has secular-minded goals, its associates have a variety of religious and 
secular motivations.  By merging the sacred with the secular, the organization is able to 
harness societal narratives that venerate the concept of martyrdom. Religious ideology 
helps society embrace the totality of struggle, as if it is a cosmic undertaking that requires 
any means necessary.144  Social movements can easily become totalitarian when 
language and actions commit to using extreme violence to eliminate the opposition. 
Organizations seek to exploit the role of religious symbolism and terminology in the 
context of women’s virtue.145  By introducing a narrative of “the sacred” they redefine 
the roles of women in society from innocent and protected to courageous and 
protectors.146 These narratives become structures in which women’s roles are partially 
defined thus allowing for the realization of martyrdom as an acceptable practice within 
society. 
The historical narrative embraced by Tamils was an invented one that utilized 
prevailing norms and ideational features of Tamil identity. As Ness points out, the logic 
of female suicide bombing in Tamil culture was created around a “trans-historical 
structure” embedded within perceived historical myths, “imagined and embraced 
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communally” and able to create “participation structures” that prompted further suicidal 
violence.147 This narrative- and performance-based ritual which female martyrdom 
embodied was able to unite disenfranchised women against a common enemy they saw as 
the state.  While not all would become martyrs, female Tigers entered into a sacred 
tradition by becoming soldiers and defending their nation. They saw themselves as a 
continuation of the past, and the latest example of those proclaimed by LTTE 
propaganda, such as Sathyabama, wife of Krishna.148  Giving one’s life for the cause, be 
it in terms of service to Prabhakaran or fulfilling an LTTE mission, was considered an 
honor. 
Roberts mentions a goddess, Kannaki that has been incorporated into LTTE 
literature.  Her representation marks Hindu temples in Sri Lanka and she is well known 
among Tamils.  She has “both a chaste dimension as well as the character of an avenging 
goddess.”149 It is little surprise that this provides a provocative image worthy of 
emulation. Adele Balasinghma, a sociologist close to Prabhakaron writes “behind the 
appearance of every uniformed female fighter, is a tender, gentle and passionate young 
women with all the qualities attributed to femininity.”150 The LTTE women hold the 
qualities of the Goddess Kannaki as a model in their aspiration to be accepted as women 
and revered as heroes. 
Much like Palestinian political organizations, the LTTE has harnessed a cult-like 
atmosphere behind suicide operations, but they have also established highly professional 
institutions to ensure the reverence of martyrdom is maintained, such as the Office of 
Great Heroes. Tamils have established immaculate gravestones and cemeteries 
throughout Tamil territory allowing society to pay respect to the fallen.  They have also 
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built specific “hero stones” that are devised to be a continuation of stones erected in the 
first-to-third centuries B.C.E. to commemorate divine individuals.151   
Similar to Hezbollah, Chechen nationalists, and Palestinian organizations, LTTE 
has created “rhetorical strategies” to legitimize and institutionalize martyrdom.152  These 
are ways of reframing the context of suicidal violence to be made acceptable to society.  
A Tamil Catholic priest described the elaborate techniques as follows: 
Heroic death founded within the fire of Tamil nationalism has given birth 
to a new set of terms, almost all derived from the ancient Tamil religion of 
Saivism; indeed, within the North and East Tamil nationalism has the 
appeal of a new religious movement.  Prabhakaran… requests the people 
to venerate those who died in the battle for Eelam as sannyasis (ascetics) 
who renounced their personal desires and transcended egoistic existence 
for a common cause of higher virtue.  I have seen hundreds of shrines 
erected in Jaffna by the friends and relatives of those LTTE cadres who 
have died in various actions; and the rituals performed with offering of 
flowers and lighting of oil lamps are those normally reserved to Saivite 
deities and saints.153 
The use of rhetoric is important since it creates rules and legitimacy for martyrdom, and 
thus a structure in which women can interpret as justification for an otherwise heinous 
act. Transposing religious rationale behind secular goals, LTTE has effectively channeled 
popular perceptions, narratives and myths to legitimize martyrdom in the name of Tamil 
nationalism.  In this sense, LTTE women may embrace martyrdom as a purely political 
act as opposed to psychological, religious or avenging motivations that are often seen in 
other examples of female suicide missions such as Chechnya, Palestine or Iraq.   
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E. SUMMARY 
The Sri Lankan government continues to undermine any opportunity for Tamil 
self-governance, let alone provide significant structural openings in the political, 
economic and state systems for Tamil livelihood.154  Failure to negotiate opportunities 
for Tamils in the current Sri Lanka state could manifest the same structural conditions 
that led to Tamil separatism, conflict, and endorsement of suicide terrorism.  How the Sri 
Lanka government deals with the post-conflict period will determine whether 
reconciliation or violence emerges. 
The Sri Lanka government should understand that these sufficient conditions exist 
in Tamil society and a charismatic leader could harness, re-formulate and operationalize 
them toward achieving political objectives. One area this thesis only briefly touched upon 
was the charisma of Prabhakaran and how this mobilized the Tamil people. Assessing the 
LTTE movement post-Prabhakaran could show that the conditions he helped hold 
together for female martyrdom may be too weak to bring back.  There is an intersection 
between what is tactically useful and what is socially appropriate at any particular time 
and charismatic leaders often act as the lynchpin for that relationship.  This analysis 
suggests that there are realist factors that drove LTTE to use female suicide bombers, but 
these military tactics were only viable options because of the long-term structural barriers  
put in place by Sinhalese politicians, the snowballing effect these structures had on 
creating ethnic separatism, and the deep scars this left in Tamil society which made 
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IV. CASE 2:  IRAQ 2003–2009 
This chapter will outline the recent nature of conflict in Iraq and explain the 
structural factors that were most decisive in facilitating political violence.  It will then 
describe the main groups utilizing female suicide bombers and how they approach the 
controversial subject.  Finally, this case study will look at how organizations were able to 
harness and exploit cultural and historical traditions toward spreading a moral narrative 
embracing martyrdom and the use of women in combat. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2009, Iraq faces the challenge of a resurgent Sunni al-Qaeda-affiliated 
insurgency.155  Insurgent use of IEDs is widespread as they pursue strategic goals, which 
are primarily to undermine stability and reconciliation at all costs. Iraqi women are 
volunteering as weapons in this conflict and pose a significant risk to stability.  Since the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, there have been over 60 suicide bombings attempted or 
carried out by women, most of them in 2007 and 2008.156  One-third of those bombers 
came from Diyala province, where the Islamic State of Iraq—an organization that 
branched off Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia—was the most brutal group of insurgents and 
terrorists in the province, orchestrating kidnappings, beheadings and suicide attacks.157 
The majority of suicide bombings in Iraq involve foreign-born men, but a surge of 
female-led attacks in recent years has marked a new paradigm for Al Qaeda and affiliated 
insurgent groups. 158    
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What explains the sudden use of female suicide bombers by groups in Iraq?  This 
is a particularly important case to analyze as it can show how traditionally conservative 
insurgent groups evolve their military tactics to accept previously forbidden paradigms.  
As in the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, there were many tactical reasons for using 
female suicide bombers in Iraq. Most analysts agree that tactics provide a useful 
explanation for their sudden prominence, however the existence of social barriers and the 
risk of losing popular support tends to initially make groups hesitate in using female 
suicide bombers.159 But in 2006 and 2007, insurgent groups in Iraq came under 
increasing pressure to use women as bombers for a variety of reasons.  Suicide tactics 
became a way for insurgent groups to create space for themselves with an increasingly 
proficient counter-insurgency strategy by coalition forces and the Iraqi government.  U.S. 
Special Forces became exceedingly efficient in eliminating mid-level Al Qaeda 
commanders, breaking apart the structural alignment of the organization to the point that 
then commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, Lt. General Stanley 
McChrystal said, “We sensed that Al Qaeda was going to implode.”160 Female 
combatants were a logical response to an effective COIN strategy that led to the 
elimination of a number of male Al Qaeda fighters and the reduction of their support 
base.161  
One reason to use female bombers is that they are able to continue suicide 
missions when male reserves have been minimized.  American and Iraqi security forces 
were searching in earnest for innovative ways to thwart attackers. While American forces 
were successful in eliminating elements of command and control within Al Qaeda they 
also increased countermeasures against male suicide attackers.    Women in Iraq typically 
wear the long black abaya, which covers the entire body, is heavy, flowing and bulky, 
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and is able to conceal a large suicide vest.162 Thus, the state’s ability to defeat male 
suicide bombers became one primary reason organizations embraced female suicide 
bombers.  However, this behavior needed to be justified against strong normative 
traditions defining the role of women in jihad. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Suicide Attacks in Iraq, 2003–2008163 
Tactical reasons alone do not fully explain how female suicide bombers became a 
mechanism that organizations and social groups in Iraq endorsed. There have been times 
that the tactical utility of a female bomber is not even utilized, such as the first female 
suicide bomber in Iraq who detonated her explosives in Tel Afar, dressed as a man 
instead of as a woman.164 While critically important to the survival of an organization, 
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tactics alone do not define military strategies.165 Societal and individual motivations, 
norms and values play a strong part in crafting insurgent behavior.  Structural variables 
that affect women’s norms and values play a strong part in the emergence of female 
martyrdom in Iraq. Insurgent organizations use suicide bombers to create space in a 
threatening security environment in order to perpetuate their identity and survival, but 
women also embrace martyrdom as a means to create space in a highly patriarchal society 
where identity and appropriate behavior is typically in question.  Thus, the structural 
components discussed in this chapter are a strong factor driving the individual, 
organizational and societal motivations behind female suicide bombers in Iraq.   
In the case of Iraq, this chapter argues three primary factors suggest a 
constructivist interpretation provides a more sufficient explanation for understanding the 
use of female suicide bombers.  First, a structural shift opened up an identity struggle 
between the minority Sunni Arabs and the new Shia political majority; second, extremist 
organizations were able to merge religious and sectarian grievances as part of the identity 
struggle and mobilize women to defend the nation; and third, the above two factors were 
skillfully wrapped in a narrative of jihad that emphasized the necessity of female 
martyrdom for the survival of Sunni Islamic identity.  As posited in Chapter I, realist 
notions of the utility of female suicide bombers as a military tactic provide a valuable 
explanation; however, the tactic’s emergence is better explained by understanding a 
broader spectrum of components developed in this case study.  The questions asked here 
are similar in scope to those asked in the Introduction:  How do sub-state organizations 
choose their military strategies?  Why do some insurgent groups implement female 
suicide bombers while others do not?  Closer analysis of the conflict in Iraq, and 
particularly the Al Qaeda organization, shows that their approach cannot be understood 
purely by material incentives but must address social structures in Iraq and the Islamic 
world. 
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B. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
This section will look at a number of structural factors within Iraq that facilitated 
religious and sectarian violence.  First, it looks at how long-suppressed political identities 
resurfaced in the midst of a collapsed state and generated ethnic and sectarian violence.  
Then it addresses the religious extremist organizations that arose out of a security 
vacuum and used suicide terrorism as a means to impose anarchy and prevent the 
emergence of a new Shia-dominated state.  Finally, it looks at how women were drawn in 
under these structural conditions in the agency of protecting the Sunni-minority and the 
Islamic state. 
Phebe Marr writes that one of the most important shifts in Iraq since 2003 has 
been the transition from an Iraqi identity to ethnic and sectarian loyalties.166 There were 
periods in Iraq’s history where ethnicity held very little influence over the national 
identity, such as the 1950s and 1960s, when global ideologies such as communism, 
socialism and pan-Arabism “emphasized social equity and the irrelevance of ethnic 
identity.”167  But in the transitional phase from authoritarianism to democracy, state 
institutions can be weak, and consensus among competing groups can be difficult to 
form.168  The process of democratization in Iraq brought previously marginalized groups 
and individuals—the Shia and Kurds—on top, and displaced the previous minority 
leaders—the Sunnis—to the bottom.  Appropriate incentives to form coalitions could 
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have been made available, but Mansfield and Snyder argue that in these conditions, 
instrumentalist elites will often “use the control of traditional political institutions to 
shape the political agenda and structure the terms of political business” to ensure their 
special status in the new government.169 As Sunnis realized their loss of power, historical 
narratives were constructed emphasizing sectarian divides and preventing national 
institutions from forming.  The fears of Shia domination were significant enough to 
encourage the formation of a militant insurrection.170 The first legislative election, 
forming the 275-member Iraqi National Assembly, was a critical moment in solidifying 
the new Iraqi government. To represent the impact the election would have on the Sunni 
Arab insurgency, Al Qaeda planned nine suicide attacks in Baghdad on January 30, 2005, 
specifically targeting polling stations.  These attacks were an effort to upset the elections 
process, but also signal to the emerging Shiite government that more catastrophic 
bombings would occur.171    
A fundamental structural shift was under way that ripped open cleavages that had 
been sutured together by the absolute rule of Sadaam Hussein and his Baath Party for 
over 20 years.  The new emerging government in Iraq was absent of the main Sunni-
political vehicle of the last four decades, the Baath Party.  Sunni Arabs saw their 
competitors, the Shiites, mobilizing around religious themes and their clerics taking the 
political lead.  Juan Cole argues that as a result, the historically secular Sunni Arabs 
began turning toward religious parties and leaders, such as the Association of Muslim 
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Scholars and the Iraqi Islamic Party to have their grievances heard.172  The result being 
an Islamicization of politics in which Iraqis voted on ethnic lines in 2005, and probably 
the most important group, the minority Sunni Arabs, boycotted the election, with only 2 
percent voting from the Sunni Anbar Province.  Whereas terrorism against the United 
States and Al Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan could never mobilize the Muslim world to 
oppose western influence, sectarian nationalism could.  The belief among many extremist 
Muslims, according to Vali Nasr, is that “Washington has snatched Iraq from the hands 
of ‘true’ Islam and delivered it to ‘heretical’ Shias.”173  The threat of a dominant Shia 
Iraq mobilized a Sunni extremist rebellion in Iraq and the Muslim world that was 
orchestrated with militancy, bombs and absolutist rhetoric.  It was a convenient wedge 
for jihadist groups to use in upsetting the new government structure. 
Attacks represent both the deep perception of mistrust between Sunni extremists 
and the Shia population as well as the belief that specifically targeting Shia will create 
conditions conducive for sectarian violence.  Recently, as U.S. troops began pulling back 
from forward operations in Iraq, Sunni extremists sought to repeat the 2006-2007 
sectarian conflict. Two female suicide bombers in April 2009 attacked a Shia symbol in 
Iraq, the Imam Moussa al-Kadhim shrine in Baghdad, killing 75 people and injuring 125 
others.174 In January, a woman hiding among Shia pilgrims detonated her explosives 
killing more than three dozen people. Attacks have not only been focused on Shia shrines 
and mosques, but marketplaces, weddings, pilgrimages and hospitals.  An attack in 
February 2009 by a female bomber killed 40 Shia women and children resting from a 
pilgrimage to Karbala.  In July 2008, female suicide bombers struck Shiite pilgrims in 
Baghdad and a Kurdish protest rally in northern Iraq.  In May of that year, a female 
bomber feigning pregnancy killed at least three dozen people at a wedding ceremony. 
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While 2006 saw a degree of retaliation from the Shia community, 2009 has seen restraint 
and patience, as Shia religious and political leadership have spoken out against 
retaliation. 
Compounding the sectarian divide are underlying structural factors driving Sunni-
Islamic extremists in Iraq led by the foreign support of Al Qaeda.  These include the 
perceived occupation of Islamic land by infidels, the demand for sharia law versus 
democracy, and the absolute will to participate in eternal jihad until the Islamic Caliphate 
is reestablished.  First, suicide attackers appear to be motivated by a sense of nationalism 
against perceived U.S. occupation and a defense of Islam which they believe is being 
attacked by western aggression and apostate regimes such as the new Shia dominant 
government. A common theme emanating from extremist propaganda according to 
Mohammed M. Hafez is that “secularism, nationalism, and Shiism are instruments of this 
nefarious plot to divide and conquer Muslims.”175 According to terrorism expert Farhana 
Ali, one Iraqi woman, Wadad Jamil Jassem appeared on an insurgent video in 2003 
stating: “I have devoted myself to Jihad for the sake of God and against the American, 
British, and Israeli infidels and to defend the soil of our precious and dear country.”176 
Underlying many jihadist statements is the historical occupation and humiliation of 
Palestine by Israel and its connection to Al Qaeda’s overall struggle.177  Palestinian and 
Lebanese political violence would become models for Al Qaeda to emulate in Iraq. “Um 
Osama” a leader of the women Mujahedeen of Al Qaeda stated that women were 
following the example of Palestinian women and preparing for martyrdom in Iraq.178   
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Second, female suicide bomber testimonies have stated that sharia law must be 
established in the Muslim world.179  Al Qaeda and affiliated groups view Arab 
governments as corrupted by western occupation and influence.  Bin Laden states: “these 
governments prevent our people from establishing sharia law … give us a taste of 
humiliation, placing us in a large prison of fear and submission.”180 For Al Qaeda, 
democracy represents a system of rule by man.  Ayman al-Zawahiri, referring to the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, wrote in 1991 that: “the stark reality that needs to be 
confronted by Islamic organizations is none other than the regimes ruling Muslim 
lands.”181 Al Qaeda views democracy as a secular religion propagated by the West, 
corrupting Muslim governments and thus preventing Muslims from living under a true 
Islamic government.182  
Third, jihad is debated widely, but interpreted by many in extreme forms.183  The 
literal interpretation is “to strive or exert one’s self.”  Of the 41 mentions of jihad in the 
Qur’an, only ten refer to warfare.184  There are three phases or aspects of jihad in the 
Qur’an: the pacifist, the defensive, and the offensive jihad phase.185  Salafi Jihadist 
groups interpret the occupation of Iraq by infidels as a call for defensive jihad and thus 
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the individual obligation of all Muslims around the world to participate.   Those who do 
not subscribe to these views are labeled as infidel (takfir) and subject to judgment.  Even 
those working with infidel governments are subject to branding as an infidel.  This broad 
interpretation gives Salafi Jihadists the ability to use suicide terrorism even against 
Muslims.186 Groups have utilized a number of media formats to explain their position 
behind the usage of martyrdom operations and the legitimacy of jihad against infidels.  
This ideology has developed into a normative structure upon which insurgent groups base 
their philosophical foundations and from which many women draw inspiration.  While 
martyrdom operations are a weapon for insurgent groups, they are also constructs 
inspired by social values and a global ideology. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND AGENCY 
This section looks at the loosely structured insurgent organizations that developed 
in response to the sudden structural transition in Iraq and how these groups were able to 
exploit sectarian differences to advance their strategic objectives.  The insurgency 
included over 100 different groups, many coming from Saddam Hussein’s former Baath 
Party, foreign Islamists, criminals, tribesmen, and indignant Iraqis.187 The most radical 
Islamist groups and individuals were able to harness and merge existing Sunni grievances 
with their absolutist religious ideology to achieve political, strategic and tactical aims.  
These groups held different grievances but similar structural elements to the LTTE 
insurgent organization described in Chapter III.  In particular, both groups represented the 
norms and values of a minority population disillusioned by the government structure put 
in place.  However, the LTTE was generally the dominant insurgent or political group 
representing Tamils, while there has been a competition for dominance among insurgent 
groups in Iraq. 
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There are at least three types of groups operating in Iraq that use Islam for 
different strategic objectives.188  There are Islamic nationalists seeking to rid Iraq of 
foreign occupation.  There are those, like Ansar al-Islam, seeking to collapse the state and 
create a social revolution.  And there is Al Qaeda in Iraq, a group seeking to use the 
country as a launching pad for terrorist operations around the world.  Most groups 
conducting suicide attacks in Iraq adhere to a strict puritanical version of Islam often 
referred to as Salafi-Jihadist.189 
The presence of a large number of foreign fighters in Iraq and a disproportionate 
number of them conducting suicide attacks could be explained by the level of anti-Shia 
sentiment shared by radicals in the Arab world.  Juan Cole argues that there were actually 
few foreign fighters participating in Iraq and their effectiveness in the overall insurgency 
has been “greatly exaggerated.”190  Instead, he suggests most fighters have been Iraqi but 
have implemented Al Qaeda-like strategies and rhetoric out of expedience.  However, 
General David Petraeus in 2007 said that “eighty to ninety percent of the suicide bombers 
come from outside Iraq,”191 and the Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte 
said that foreign fighters using suicide tactics had a “disproportionate impact” on the 
insurgency.192  Those most concerned with a Shia-aligned Iraq and Iran are Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Kuwait, among the nations most represented by foreign fighters.193 Fighters 
have been supported by wealthy donors in the Arab world and over two dozen religious 
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leaders calling for jihad in Iraq.194  In many ways, the context of the Iraq insurgency is 
mixed in the complex arena of geopolitical affairs, a topic outside the range of this thesis. 
A study by Mohammed Hafez suggests that the strategy behind Salafi Jihadist 
suicide missions in Iraq is to collapse the government system and replace it with an 
Islamic emirate similar to what the Taliban established in Afghanistan in the late 
1990s.195 This group uses suicide missions to pick-away at the system of governance in 
Iraq: infrastructure, economy, religious institutions, and the Iraqi security apparatus.  
Those seeking a reintegration into the Iraqi system tend not to use suicide missions and 
limit their attacks against coalition forces. For example, Sunni politicians have openly 
condemned attacks against Shiites and pointed out these attacks are only trying to create 
sectarian retaliation.196 These groups, primarily made up of Iraqi nationals, tend to be 
focused on Arab nationalism and Sunni Islam but do not wish to inflame the Sunni-Shia 
divide.197 Those implementing a system collapse strategy tend to conduct most suicide 
operations.198 Nick Ayers’ study found that most claimed suicide attacks (94%) were 
carried out by Al Qaeda linked groups.199 Particularly, in 2004 when suicide attacks 
began killing many civilians, groups concerned about their reputation ceased claiming 
responsibility.200  Nick Ayers concluded that groups were not using suicide attacks as a 
means of outbidding each other as Bloom has noted,201 but were instead using them for 
their tactical utility.  Realizing that suicide attacks in Iraq had not reached the type of 
societal support seen in Palestine, groups likely decided it was better not to claim 
                                                 
194. Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom, 225. 
195. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 70. 
196. Rod Nordland, “Iraq’s Shiites Show Restraint After Attacks,” New York Times, August 12, 2009. 
197. Sunni-Nationalist organizations include the Islamic Army of Iraq, the 1920 Revolutionary 
Brigades, and Partisans of the Sunni. 
198. These groups consist of Salafi-Jihadist groups, such as Al Qaeda and Baathist still committed to 
their political ideology.  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, led two Al Qaeda groups in Iraq—Tawhid 
and Tanzim Qaid. 
199. While Sunni-Nationalist organizations have been making claims of conventional attacks against 
Coalition forces, they rarely claim suicide attacks that target coalition forces but typically maim civilians.  
See: Nick Ayers, “Ghost Martyrs in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist Models to 
Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (September 2008): 856–882. 
200. Hafez, Suicide Terrorism in Iraq, 109. 
201. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 78–79, 94–97. 
 61
attacks.202  In some cases, local “revenge brigades” arose in retaliation to Al Qaeda-led 
suicide missions,203 a point which would later aid U.S. forces in their effort to recruit 
Sunni militias. 
1. Women and Agency in Salafi Jihadist Organizations 
Female martyrs generally come from small pockets of tightly organized cells, 
usually in isolated communities of Iraq that have yet to experience or accept the new 
governing structure.  Most female suicide bombers in Iraq were Iraqi citizens, whereas 
most men tend to be foreigners with connections to transnational jihadi networks. An 
extremist Islamic ideology founded upon absolutist demands drives these cells.  While 
women cannot choose who they marry, how many children they have, whether they can 
work or not, they can choose martyrdom.  It is this sole power to control one’s future 
which drives many women in Iraq to choose martyrdom.  Becoming a martyr 
differentiates women and gives one the opportunity to hold a special status outside the 
traditional boundaries of female identity.   
How do Iraqi women then become involved in Salafi Jihadist organizations as 
suicide bombers? There are at least four factors involved.  First, the strategic necessity to 
integrate women in the sectarian and religious conflict in Iraq has taken precedence over 
traditional cultural barriers.  Equally, cultural notions and structural norms have been 
temporarily relaxed in order to allow female participation in the greater cause of jihad. 
Generally, there are three types of women involved with the global Salafi Jihad 
movement: those who support the global movement by raising sons and daughters to be 
future martyrs; those who provide support to terrorists by way of supplies and 
accommodation; and those who perform physical violence such as suicide bombings, 
staging bombs, or armed resistance.204 Organizations exploited societal norms that 
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viewed women as passive and innocent and utilized them as extraordinary weapons, 
which could strike deep inside government walls, such as intelligence and security 
installations. The more often women were engaged with insurgent organizations, the 
more acceptable it became for all involved. Over time, as men were eliminated from the 
battlefield, women became integral participants and traditional social norms were altered 
even further so that jihad could continue.  
Second, some argue that female suicide bombers in Iraq are driven to violence 
because of the cycle of victimization they live through. Insurgents are known to have 
coerced or forced women and even children into becoming suicide bombers.  Some are 
drugged, raped or beaten and live in conditions that promote severe emotional 
problems.205 This kind of victimization is a method of control that places shame on the 
family and may compel her to become a martyr to regain her lost honor. In these cult-like 
cells, many women are in a self-help environment where their options are limited and 
they rely upon the assistance of their abusers. One way insurgent fighters have solidified 
women’s commitment to jihad is through marriage.  Short-term marriages, known as 
muta’a are common in Shia culture, but Sunni groups have also used this as a way to 
recruit and gain the trust of women. In the case of a 15-year-old Iraqi girl named Ranya, 
shortly after marrying her husband she was fitted with a suicide vest and sent on a 
mission that ultimately failed.206  In this sense, marriage is a sacred act, which prepares 
the woman for fulfilling a sacrifice on behalf of the family.  Agency is limited in these 
situations by the structural barriers in place with jihad and martyrdom becoming 
pathways to freedom. 
Third, women’s networks in Iraq have a strong role in the recruitment process, 
transfer of grievances and extremist ideology to other family members, and assuring 
overall logistical support is available to men conducting operations. Salafi Jihadis in Iraq 
                                                 
205. One operation is said to have involved men who would rape young women and then an older 
woman, Samira Ahmed Jassim (aka: The Mother of Believers), would council the victims and persuade 
them to become suicide bombers to regain their honor.  She is said to have recruited more than 80 women, 
under the auspices of Ansar al-Sunnah, to carry out attacks.  See: Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Brian Murphy, 
“Iraq Arrests Female Suicide Bomber Recruiter,” Associated Press, February 3, 2009. 
206. Rubin, “How Baida Wanted to Die.”  
 63
have well-established networks that bring hundreds of brigades together toward common 
operational goals even if they have different strategic objectives.207  Women also 
collaborate through highly structured networks called Sisterhoods that operate in places 
like Diyala province.208 These groups resemble the secular Death Maidens in Sri Lanka, 
the Salafi influenced Black Widows in Chechnya, and the Sisterhood groups in Palestine. 
The leader of one women’s network developing recruits in Iraq goes by the name of 
Umm Fatima. The group tells young women that if they become martyrs they will “go to 
heaven where they will sit by rivers of honey and have lunch with the Prophet 
Mohammad and live in comfort.”209 These are reassuring words for women plagued by 
poverty, conflict and uncertainty for over ten years.  Other tales are woven that describe 
how the family will have all sins forgiven if the woman martyrs herself, how she will 
regain her lost honor, and how she will forever be venerated among men and women 
when the Islamic Caliphate is established. 
Fourth, as Katharina Von Knop explains, the role of women in supporting male 
relatives in the global Salafi Jihad, particularly as logistical necessity warrants, is 
becoming more important for the short and long-term survival of Al Qaeda networks than 
conducting suicide operations.210 Women can provide moral and emotional support to 
husbands, brothers, and other family members. They provide sustenance and security as 
well as education to members of the family. They also provide continual representation of 
the male martyr and thus confidence in the minds of pending martyrs.211 Osama bin 
Laden has emphasized the value women bring to the jihad: “Our women had set a 
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tremendous example for generosity in the cause of Allah; they motivate and encourage 
their sons, brothers and husbands to fight for the cause of Allah.”212   
The increased role of women in the suicide campaign shows signs of 
fragmentation within the insurgency. In most cases, there are plenty of men to conduct 
suicide attacks; however, if there is an increasing trend of female suicide bombers by a 
particular group this could be a sign of decreased male operatives within the organization. 
But what kind of individual motivations would a woman have to embrace the call of 
violent jihad?  Studies show that a variety of reasons are instrumental, but primary among 
them is the urge to protect that, which is most sacred—family and home. 
Many female participants in the Iraqi insurgency come from families enmeshed in 
warfare. Cindy Ness argues that protection for noncombatants is meaningless in conflicts 
that rely upon guerilla tactics provoking an overreaction from counterinsurgent forces 
upon civilians.213  Thus, in areas controlled by anti-government forces, civilians and 
insurgents are drawn together and become co-partners in violence. There is a relaxation 
of traditional male dominance among these families that allow for the participation of 
women in front-line operations.  A level of Islamic feminism, where women feel 
liberated through jihad, is also present among women within small family-based groups 
or networks like the Sisterhood, where political violence is a way of life.  One captured 
bomber, Baida Abdul Karim al-Shammari, from Baquba saw five of her brothers killed 
by U.S. forces.214  Her brothers ran an I.E.D. cell and Baida was part of the 
manufacturing process, purchasing components and putting them together.  She was 
initiated into the jihad on behalf of her family and felt obligated to pursue martyrdom 
when her brothers were killed. Thus, female suicide bombers require some level of 
support from men in order to operate within the Al Qaeda organization.  A 15-year-old 
woman, Ranya was recruited by her husband and cousins to be a bomber.  Both women 
were from a dangerous cell of female martyrs from Diyala Province, where one-third of 
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female bombers originate.215 Female martyrs were provided agency in Iraq to awaken the 
Sunni minority to what they viewed as the takeover of their nation.  They were active 
participants, some martyring themselves for the cause and the community that served as 
their family.  While Al Qaeda manipulated these women to carry out tactical and strategic 
objectives, the women were radical political agents seeking to upset the underlying 
structure of a changing society.  Women are not only accepting of their role within the 
family, but embrace a sense of honor and commitment to the martyr identity that gives 
them a place in the organization and society. 
D. THE MARTYR IDENTITY 
The active participation of women in the Iraq insurgency violates traditional 
gender relations.  However, exceptions have been made to those socialized into jihadist 
groups waging violence in the name of the cause.  While the participation of women in 
jihad does not necessarily suggest an equalization of genders, it does show that 
organizations are willing to relax norms and structures that typically define female roles.  
Cindy Ness argues that it is commonplace that norms and customs can be superseded by 
the immediate political cause, such as the call to jihad, without a fundamental shift in 
society’s principles involving gender relations.216 This section looks at the factors 
underlying the cult of martyrdom among Salafi Jihadist groups in Iraq. The cultural and 
structural factors behind this movement include illustrating the aesthetics of female 
martyrdom via poetry, martyrologies and symbolic representation.  The main theme is 
that terror groups emphasize a simple moral narrative giving legitimacy to martyrdom 
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Relying upon the consumer’s emotional response, namely humiliation and 
redemption, Jihadists present a simple, unified message that builds a compelling image of 
a heroic martyr.217 Hafez argues that Jihadists in Iraq present their message within the 
framework of three interwoven themes: a long line of Muslim humiliation and defeat at 
the hands of Western crusaders, existing Muslim regimes colluding with and serving the 
interests of the West, and the eventual victory of pious Muslims via the heroic acts of 
martyrs and their battlefield success.218  These ideas are wrapped in aesthetically pleasing 
imagery and music that can both shock and appeal to the broader Muslim world.  
Martyrdom is framed as a morally just act, legitimated by proper religious authorities and 
delivered with rhetorical eloquence that helps reshape the boundaries of acceptable 
behavior.  Providing social approval within a culturally appropriate framework ultimately 
gives women agency to become martyrs. 
The first stage in introducing women to the martyrdom is to provide space for 
them to participate in jihad. Whereas male martyrdom mythologies tend to focus on the 
abandonment of the good life, the achievement of happiness and the fulfillment of a 
larger duty in martyrdom, female mythologies focus more on women’s role as a mother.  
It is the mother’s duty to protect the children, the home and the husband and to support 
him in his jihad.  Thus, a woman’s jihad is an extension of the man’s jihad.  Protection of 
the nation becomes an extension of protecting the home and family.  Part of this 
protection requires proper education of children so that they grow up to become good 
Muslims.  A common theme is that women must be prepared to sacrifice their husband 
and children for the greater cause.   
The online journal al-Khansaa, an Al Qaeda publication devoted to women’s 
issues, is one example. Al Khansaa was one of the major female poets of the Jahiliyya, or 
the time preceding Islamic Arabia. Her poetry laments the death of her brothers in battle 
and has been emulated by many women.  The magazine seeks to engage women in jihad 
by compelling them to raise male children who will embrace jihad or female children that 
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will be pious, support their husbands and family, and become martyrs when called 
upon.219 The first journal includes a biography of female mujahedeen, how to raise 
children by the teachings of Jihad, and an article on a women’s training camp.220 Al 
Qaeda seeks to temporarily legitimize female martyrdom by unraveling historical 
identities that point to an ongoing culture of martyrdom.221   
A sophisticated multimedia structure builds a global community that transcends 
borders and fosters the idea of individual responsibility to conduct violent jihad. Suicide 
terrorism works and the strategies used to influence nationalist identity movements are 
re-invented to motivate and inspire others to embrace and participate in martyrdom. Al 
Qaeda has formed multiple levels of social networks that rely upon informal 
communication channels through the Internet, mass media statements, and deeply 
embedded community networks. They build imagined communities that can spread by 
the proliferation of mass media showcasing aggression, occupation, and perceived 
tyranny over Arabs.222 These imagined communities become production centers for new 
recruits and potential suicide bombers and gives Al Qaeda religious legitimacy to endorse 
operations Sunni nationalists may have difficulty approving, such as female suicide 
bombers.  However, the movement realizes the debate within the Islamic community 
around suicide bombings and attempts to legitimize its actions via the power of its 
organizations and the simplicity of their moral narrative. 
Religious scholars have provided decrees and justifications for their use of suicide 
bombers and women’s participation.  Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah, legitimized suicide bombings as an acceptable military tactic against well-
armed enemies.223 One Saudi preacher, Fatima Umar Naseef, contests conservative 
traditions women are held to represent and argues women should be as active as men in 
                                                 
219. Von Knop, “The Female Jihad,” 407. 
220. “The ‘Women’s information office in the Arab Peninsula’ releases the first issue of a new 
publication for women,” SITE Institute, March 3, 2009. 
221. How prolific this magazine is in areas like Diyalah where many female bombers in Iraq have 
originated may provide context to how valuable online Jihadist propaganda is within conflict zones. 
222. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” 169.  
223. Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom, 22. 
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defending the Muslim nation, asserting that: “it is unlawful for anyone to refrain from 
fighting.”224  In 2001, the Saudi High Islamic Council gave the legal justification for 
female suicide attacks against Israel.  Prior to 2007, six fatwa had been identified 
allowing women to conduct martyrdom operations.225  From these official 
pronouncements came the need for a structured language and history devoted to 
explaining female martyrdom to the Islamic world. 
In videos, women are generally portrayed as equal to men, fulfilling similar duties 
of defending Islam and Iraq against invaders and taking revenge on the part of all 
Muslims.  One of the first female suicide bombers in 2003, Nour Qaddour al-Shammari 
brandished an assault rifle in front of an Iraqi flag stating: “We say to our leader and holy 
war comrade, the hero commander Saddam Hussein, that you have sisters that you and 
history will boast about.”226 Von Knop notes that in the past, Muslim women would have 
to abide by society’s strict honor-based codes and required permission from their families 
in order to participate in a militant organization.  She argues that al-Khansaa appears to 
be recruiting women outside of these traditional codes with its call for a broader role of 
women in jihad. However, it is apparent that women still require family approval and 
society demands legitimate authorities approve such behavior.  
E. SUMMARY 
Iraq is a particularly important case to analyze as it shows how traditionally 
conservative insurgent groups evolve their military tactics to accept previously forbidden 
paradigms. There were many tactical reasons for using female suicide bombers in Iraq, 
namely Al Qaeda needed even more creative methods to infiltrate tightly controlled areas 
and female bombers were able to use tribal and cultural traditions to evade detection. 
However, tactical reasons alone do not fully explain how female suicide bombers became 
a mechanism that organizations and social groups in Iraq endorsed. 
                                                 
224. Fatima Umar Naseef, Women in Islam: A Discourse in Rights and Obligations (New Delhi: 
Sterling Publishers, 1999), 153. 
225. David Cook, “Women Fighting in Jihad?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 380; Von 
Knop, “The Female Jihad,” 405. 
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In the case of Iraq, a combination of three factors provides a sufficient 
explanation for understanding the emergence of female suicide bombers.  First, a 
structural shift opened up an identity struggle between the minority Sunni Arabs and the 
new Shia political majority; second extremist organizations were able to merge religious 
and sectarian grievances as part of the identity struggle and mobilize women to defend 
the nation; and third, the above two factors were skillfully wrapped in a narrative of jihad 
that emphasized the necessity of female martyrdom for the survival of Sunni Islamic 
identity. Societal and individual motivations, norms and values play a strong part in 
crafting insurgent behavior. Insurgent organizations use suicide bombers to create space 
in a threatening security environment in order to perpetuate their identity and survival, 
but women also embrace martyrdom as a means to create space in a highly patriarchal 
society where identity and appropriate behavior is typically in question.  
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V. CASE 3:  AFGHANISTAN 
This chapter looks at Afghanistan during two separate conflicts—the anti-Soviet 
resistance (1979–1989) when the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led 
Afghanistan and the current Taliban-led insurgency (2002–2009) against the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).  It outlines the history of these conflicts 
and the structural factors which inhibited women’s participation in martyrdom 
operations.  It first looks at structural characteristics unique to Afghanistan, namely the 
convergence of tribal and religious institutions and how these interact under the threat of 
external invasion.  It then looks at the organization of the insurgency and the various 
actors involved.  Finally, it assesses the martyrdom identity in Afghanistan during the 
two conflicts and how women played a supportive role in developing historical and 
cultural narratives of jihad. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Afghanistan has suffered from violent conflict for more than thirty years.  In 
1979, the Soviet Union invaded the country in order to aid the PDPA government.  From 
1979–1989 a fierce rural resistance mobilized and fought against central governance from 
an infidel regime displaying what many saw as disrespect for Afghan culture and Islam, 
and which enacted mass killings, institutional torture, summary imprisonment, 
environmental devastation and a breakdown of society. A general level of insecurity 
throughout the country led to the failure of an illegitimate government and its inability to 
provide resources or presence at the village level. Out of this violent period arose a 
number of previously formed mujahedeen parties ready to represent various factions 
within Afghanistan.  When the Soviets were finally defeated and Afghanistan gained its 
independence, the communist regime collapsed in 1992, and the country became 
embroiled in civil war.  The various factions that held some level of alignment during the 
anti-Soviet jihad were now fierce enemies in a fight over control of Afghanistan.  In 
1994, the Taliban, flush with support and resources from Pakistan, arose as the only 
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group able to unify the country and bring a level of peace to the region.227  The Taliban 
regime brought a puritanical version of Islam and Pashtunwali that kept the nation from 
recovering its pre-war position and kept women in a protected status leaving them little 
opportunity outside the home.  In the new Taliban state, the central government was weak 
in terms of providing essential social services but it succeeded in providing security and 
justice—hallmarks of Taliban governance.228   Under this structure, Osama bin Laden 
found refuge and access allowing his organization, Al Qaeda, to plan global attacks on 
Western targets.229  The suicide terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were planned 
and coordinated from Afghanistan thus compelling the U.S. to overthrow the Taliban 
regime and prevent terrorists from using the country as an area to plan further attacks.230  
Though these suicide attacks did not involve Afghan nationals, they represent the level of 
influence foreign jihadi organizations have had in Afghanistan since the anti-Soviet jihad.  
While suicide missions have become an increasing trend in Afghanistan since 2001, the 
propensity of female suicide operatives is much less than in other conflict regions.231  
This chapter will discuss the agency and structure influencing Taliban organizational 
objectives. 
As discussed in the introduction, suicide missions have increased dramatically 
throughout the world since the 1980s and insurgents in Afghanistan are increasingly 
                                                 
227. One of the first acts that brought prominence to the Taliban and their leader, Mullah Mohammad 
Omar, was bringing to justice a mujahedeen commander who abducted, raped and killed three women in 
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rank on the level of folklore and myth. See: Kristian Berg Harpviken, “Transcending Traditionalism,” 
Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (August 1997): 271–287; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 25; Thomas H. 
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Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (September 2007): 317–344. 
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reliant on this phenomenon as a tactic.  However, during the Afghan Jihad against the 
Soviets in the 1980s, suicide attacks were rare, if not nonexistent.232  In fact, this extreme 
tactic was largely considered anathema to the Pashtun warrior spirit that embraced hand-
to-hand combat or a direct assault rather than the less personal, foreign-influenced suicide 
operation.  Nevertheless, suicide bombing has gradually become a guerrilla tactic 
embraced by insurgent groups throughout Afghanistan, especially among Pashtun-
dominated elements like the Taliban.233  However, while most groups have also 
embraced women as participants in suicide missions, it remains a tactic without 
precedence in Afghanistan.  What explains the lack of propensity for Afghan women to 
engage in suicide missions in Afghanistan?  This thesis argues there are structural 
barriers in Afghanistan limiting insurgent military strategies.  Organizations are not 
governed purely by material gains and losses; rather their motivations are influenced by 
strict cultural barriers and ideological foundations that are currently distinct from other 
insurgent groups. 
Like other insurgent groups around the world, Taliban use suicide attacks for 
many of the same tactical reasons discussed in Chapter II.  Suicide bombers are able to 
strike deep within secure facilities, are able to target specific persons, bombers can hide 
their payloads under culturally appropriate attire, they can signal to the enemy the extent 
to which insurgents are willing to attack, and they keep counterinsurgent forces wary of 
the civilian population since anyone can be a bomber. Suicide attacks increased 23 
percent from 2006 to 2007, but then declined slightly in 2008 (see Figure 4).  As well as 
suicide bombings, insurgents in Afghanistan use a number of improvised explosive 
devices (IED), which continue to be the greatest cause of death for U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan.  From 2006 to 2007, IED attacks increased 83 percent from 1232 IED 
                                                 
232. The first recent suicide attack in Afghanistan was an attack on the famous mujahideen 
commander Ahmed Shah Massoud at Khwaja Bahauddin on September 9, 2001 by Arab al-Qaeda 
members.  See: Coll, Ghost Wars, 582–584. 
233. This chapter discusses the various insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan.  While not all 
groups fall under the Taliban organization (often referred to as the Quetta Shura Taliban), most have some 
allegiance to their cause and are influenced by their directives and regulations. 
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attacks to 2258.234 Since May 2009, the number of U.S. troops killed by IEDs was 206 
while those killed by suicide attacks were eight.235 Suicide attacks are generally 
concentrated in provinces the Taliban consider the most important, such as the volatile 
southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar which is the perennial Pashtun heartland, 
the eastern border province of Khost—a long contested region with strategic 
transportation routes, and the capital province of Kabul (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan236 
                                                 
234. IED attacks increased 45 percent from 2007 to 2008 (3276 in 2008), Jason H. Campbell and 
Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 
Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, May 19, 2009. 
235. By August 2009, U.S. casualties had already surpassed last year’s with 295, most killed by IEDs.  
Insurgent suicide attacks have targeted and killed more Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan 
National Police (ANP) forces then coalition troops. More civilians (34 percent) are killed as a result of 
insurgent suicide bombings and IEDs than any other violent act (such as 26 percent killed by coalition 
airstrikes). See: Campbell and Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index.” 
236. SVBIED: Suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (IED); PBIED: person borne IED.  
Numbers for 2009 are only through the month of March.  Table constructed by author, data compiled from 
World Incidents Tracking System, National Counterterrorism Center. 
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Figure 5.   Prominent Attack Locations by Province237 
While critically important to the survival of an organization, tactics alone do not 
define military strategies.  Societal and individual motivations play a strong part in 
crafting insurgent behavior.  Structural variables that affect norms, ideational values and 
identity play a strong part in the emergence of female martyrdom. Insurgent 
organizations use suicide bombers to create space in a threatening security environment 
in order to perpetuate their survival, but this tactic also gives agency to women and a 
means to create space in a highly patriarchal society where identity and appropriate 
behavior is always in question.  In Iraq and Sri Lanka strict norms defining female 
behavior were present but opportunities provided through organizational change allowed 
women to become active participants in the insurgency.  While structural components 
create and sustain individual, organizational and societal acceptance of female suicide 
bombers in some countries, they can also infringe upon the use of this tactic in others, 
like Afghanistan.  
 
                                                 
237. Table constructed by author, data compiled from World Incidents Tracking System, National 
Counterterrorism Center. 
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In the case of Afghanistan, I argue three primary factors suggest a constructivist 
interpretation provides a better explanation for understanding the lack of female suicide 
bombers. First, a permissive social and geographic environment in Afghanistan gives 
insurgents freedom of mobility and resistance that lowers the need for female bombers; 
second, the enduring presence of a strict culture restricts female participation in Afghan 
society and insurgent organizations; and third, a female culture of martyrdom that would 
typically open space for female participation in insurgent actions and narratives is 
identifiably absent.  As mentioned in Chapter I, realist notions of the utility of female 
suicide bombers as a military tactic provide a valuable explanation; however, the tactic’s 
emergence is better explained by understanding a broader spectrum of components 
developed in this case study.  The questions asked here are similar in scope to those 
asked in Chapter I:  how do sub-state organizations choose their military strategies?  Why 
do some insurgent groups implement female suicide bombers while others do not?  
Closer analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan shows that insurgent behavior cannot be 
understood purely by a realist framework but must address institutional and social 
structures in Afghanistan. 
B. STRUCTURAL FACTORS  
This section looks at the converging roles of two structures—Pashtunwali and 
Islam—and how these influenced resistance factions fighting against external aggression.  
It also looks at the role women held during these conflicts and how agency has been 
influenced by conflict and competing social structures.  Pashtunwali and Islam are two 
competing normative structures in Afghan society that have supported and limited the 
role of resistance against foreign invaders. Islam and the tribe operate in distinct realms 
that at times support and other times conflict with each other.238  Even under times of 
jihad, Pashtunwali has constricted the normative perceptions of women among tribes and 
 
                                                 
238. David Edwards’ thesis in Heroes of the Age presents the notion that honor, Islam and rule 
(represented by state governance) “represent distinct moral orders that are in many respects incompatible 
with one another.”  While these realms find ways to reconcile their differences in the interest of society, 
they remained the foundation of internal conflict with the rise of the nation-state. 
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mujahedeen parties thus limiting their participation in insurgencies.  This section will 
describe the relationship between competing social systems and how it alters identities 
during times of conflict. 
The Pashtuns are an ancient ethnic group, comprising about 60 tribes that span 
from southern Afghanistan into eastern Afghanistan and across the border into northwest 
Pakistan, with pockets of Pashtun communities in the north and west of Afghanistan.239 It 
is believed that they already resided in the eastern highlands and mountains of what is 
now Afghanistan when Alexander’s armies passed through the area to invade India in the 
fourth century B.C.240 British occupying the Indian subcontinent in nineteenth century 
often wrote of Pashtuns in an iconic fashion, both with admiration of their valor and 
independence, as well as disgust at the inability to govern them.241 The Pashtuns have 
since been esteemed for what British described as character and commitment to their 
tribal code, Pashtunwali.242  
                                                 
239. The Pashtuns reside in all areas of Afghanistan, but they predominate in the southern and eastern 
provinces.  Pashtun representation straddles the Durand Line border as they also reside in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. The term 
Afghan, while today encompassing all ethnicities in Afghanistan, has traditionally referred to Pashtuns.  
When Afghanistan was able to consolidate into a state, the term became descriptive of all ethnic groups.  
Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Oxford: Westview Press, 
2000), 11. 
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empires to pass through include the Persians led by Cyrus and Darius the Great (350 B.C.), the Graeco-
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the Mongols under Genhis Khan (1220 A.D.). Pashtuns trace their genealogy to Qais, a companion of the 
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Taliban, 10.  Others argue they came with Ephthalite Hun invaders in the fifth century A.D.  See: Martin 
Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 5.  
Herodotus writes of “Paktues” in the fifth century B.C. in northern India, while some see this same tribe 
referenced in the text of the Vedas originating with Aryan invaders of the Indian subcontinent 6000 years 
ago.  See: Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (New York: Macmillan, 1965), chapter 11; D.H. Gordon, The Pre-
historic Background of Indian Culture (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1975), 94. 
241. P.D. Bonarjee, A Handbook of the Fighting Races of India (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co. 
1899), 9.  He writes: “they are a wild, lawless turbulent race, to whom law and order are things to be 
scoffed at.” 
242. As Dupree explains, “this is a stringent code, a tough code for tough men, who of necessity live 
tough lives.” It is an adaptive, non-written code given prominence by western observers of Pashtuns 
attempting to explain the behavior of people they did not understand that provides significant utility for the 
harsh geographical environment Pashtuns live in. See: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: University 
Press, 1973), 127. 
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The tribe in Afghanistan holds a powerful role as an institution shaping and 
defining behavior among men and women.  Kinship and patrilineal descent are important 
structures that define roles and provide security, praxis and order within the tribal 
community.   Concepts such as nang (honor), melmastia (hospitality), nanawati (asylum), 
and badal (vengeance) are represented within Pashtunwali.  Honor is an important 
concept that defines the worth of a Pashtun to himself and in the eyes of the tribe.243  
Olivier Roy describes Pashtunwali as an “ideology” and a “body of law,” which has 
changed over time as needed.244 Due to the strict cultural code Pashtuns live by, blood 
feuds are a common occurrence, typically arising out of issues involving women, land 
and personal injury.245  In many ways, women derive power from their ability to retain or 
take away a man’s honor. It is the duty of men to uphold the respectability of their 
women, lest they be dishonored.246  But a woman can easily manipulate this fragile status 
symbol through her own actions.  Thus, a man is obligated to always keep an eye on his 
wife, sisters and female relatives. It should be noted that the nature of power relations in 
Afghanistan is not absolute.  Some women have more power and dominate over men 
within their home, family or tribe in subtle ways that may or may not be viewable to the 
community. 
This tribal (secular) code comes into conflict with Islam, which is a separate 
(religious) legal code.  Traditional tribal interaction is through the legal code of 
Pashtunwali and the political body of the tribal assembly (jirga), whereas Islam presents 
                                                 
243. One famous Pashtun poet, Kushhal Khan Khatak writes: “The very name of Pushtun spells 
honour and glory, Lacking that honour, what is the Afghan story?” see: Magnus and Naby, Afghanistan: 
Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 13. 
244. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
35. 
245. Pashtuns that have been dishonored are obligated to seek revenge in order to regain their status 
within the community.  Revenge may take years, even generations to secure, as one proverb makes clear: 
“People say of the Pakhtun who took revenge after a hundred years, ‘He took it quickly.’” See: David B. 
Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 241, n. 9. 
246. A man without honor is called daus, or one who is “unable to preserve the sexual honor of his 
wife … that the normally sacrosanct domestic quarter of his home is violable and that he himself has not 
the power to defend his home, his lands, or his women” are areas which would characterize him as daus.  
This is undoubtedly the worst identity one could be given.  See: David Edwards, 58. 
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itself through sharia and those who interpret it, mullahs.247  There are many examples of 
the opposition between Pashtunwali and Islam to include disagreements over property 
rights for women, adjudication of adultery, dowry allotments, land distribution, the right 
of vengeance and much more.248 That these institutions are different is an important 
factor to recognize, particularly when looking at how insurgent organizations are 
influenced by structure.249  As seen in Chapter II, legitimating authorities with religious 
significance are typically the agents that sanction suicide missions.  During times of 
conflict in Afghanistan, jihad has been a mobilizing and unifying factor, weakening the 
power of the tribe and empowering the role of religious figures.250 Even under 
disagreement, mullahs have been able to influence strict Deobandi and even Salafi 
Jihadist regulations that are in conflict with tribal laws and livelihood.251  Particularly, 
the imposition of sharia on Pashtunwali has always been a clash between Pashtun tribes 
and Islamic leaders.  Recent events have shown Taliban to be at odds with tribes, often 
assassinating tribal elders that promote peace jirgas and imposing threats against others to 
                                                 
247. Olivier Roy states that, “Afghan peasant life is permeated by religion.” Islam is a structure that 
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cooperate.252  At the same time, other “moderate” Taliban realize the tenuous ground 
they tread on in some villages and are careful at how they reintroduce sharia.253  
Magnus and Naby explain how the 1980s resistance movement provoked deep-
seeded grievances that had gone unresolved for many years, “The Afghan jihad provided 
a stage on which a spectrum of political ideas and religious convictions could be 
activated.”254 Jihad against external forces was a unifying factor for Pashtuns creating a 
shift in power relations from tribal to religious leaders.  The mujahedeen were defending 
their Islamic land against aggressors, not pushing forward to conquer infidel societies.  
This distinction is an important structural concept that influenced foreign and local 
fighters to participate.  The moral imperative to participate in defensive jihad was quite 
obvious not only to Afghans and foreign fighters, but to the international community 
which supported the mujahedeen, as Afghanistan was a stage in which the Cold War was 
being fought. 
One of the greatest reasons Muslim peasants supported the defensive jihad was 
the push of atheism by Soviet-led communist parties in Afghanistan, Khalq and Parcham. 
While Islam often clashes with the tribal code Pashtuns live by, it has been a constant 
force in Afghanistan for over a thousand years. One of the central structures in Islam and 
the Afghan village is the mosque, which acts as a convenient location for social relations 
and communication to take place.  Here people can share their grievances, discuss news 
and happenings outside the village and engage in a manner that foreigners and irreligious 
people may not fully appreciate, thus the secular tribe and the religious group is united 
within the mosque.  When Soviet atheists tried to take this crucial system of human 
interaction away from Afghans, it initiated resistance.  PDPA social reforms initiated at 
the behest of Moscow sent those resistance groups previously on the fence to become 
                                                 
252. Xinhua, “Gunmen kill pro-gov’t tribal leader in S. Afghanistan,” China View, June 6, 2008; 
Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 2 (January 2008): 1–4. 
253. Maliks (tribal leaders) have been known to refuse refuge for mullahs that preach against GIRoA 
or try to undermine the malik’s authority by imposing Taliban-like rules and regulations.  
254. Magnus and Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 136. 
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fully engaged jihadists.255 When the Marxist-influenced policies were instituted they 
undermined local traditions, land ownership and gender relations to the extent that tribal 
leaders and religious elements united as one against a common enemy.256 
The threat of foreign invasion and the imposition of a secular, modern central 
government on the sovereignty of the rural areas caused groups to mobilize under the 
banner of jihad.  The following will describe two major variables at work in this 
resistance—the ideology of jihad and its ability to mobilize and provide legitimacy 
behind resistance, and the influence of religious figures in the transmission of resistance 
ideology.  
Religious movements against oppressive and illegitimate regimes hold historical 
significance in Afghanistan and Pakistan.257 Striving to live as the Prophet and emulating 
his example of resistance, particularly in the period of conflict in Medina (622—632), 
many alienated Afghans would follow the mullahs (religious leaders) in response to their 
corrupt and failed governments.258  They would create imagined communities based on 
piousness and spiritual perfection that could conform to the shared conflict tribes resided 
in.  While some movements were quietist and pacifist, others took on violent, offensive 
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Mohammad Daoud and his cabinet appeared in front of the world during Independence Day celebrations 
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258. Barbara D. Metcalf, “Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoban, Tablighis, and Talibs,” SSRC 
Website, 10. 
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jihad as their slogan.259  Influential to the Taliban’s insurgency today is the power of the 
village mullah.  Prior to Deobandi-trained mullahs, Afghanistan had a very strong Sufi 
influence and representation that preached moderate and personal forms of Islam.260  
Partly due to their politicization in Afghan politics, and partly due to the increase of 
young Deobandi–trained mullahs arriving from Pakistan, the peaceful Sufi influence 
among Afghans declined in the 1990s.261  This is particularly important because the 
religious establishment plays a vital role in spreading information and recruiting local 
support to the Taliban.262  
The Taliban movement is representative of past charismatic “mad mullah” 
movements in which violent jihad was used as a rallying cry.263 The religious duty and 
the charismatic leaders calling for it resonated with diverse tribal and ethnic groups 
similar in their cause and fervor to rid the nation of infidel occupiers.264 Winston 
Churchill blamed the mullahs for their “vitriolic preaching,” their “slanders,” and 
“incitement” that prevented the British from quelling tribal uprisings sparked by mullahs 
keen enough to realize their power remained intact only if the reach of civilization 
remained outside the village.265  Mullah Omar also knew the instrumental nature these 
                                                 
259. Deobandi roots reside in Darul Uloom, India.  These consist of moderate and quietist 
interpretations of jihad.  They follow a pacifist model and have even issued a fatwa (religious edict) against 
terrorism. The Taliban movement, which finds its roots in Deobandism, is a radical interpretation of this 
order that embraces defensive and offensive forms of jihad.  For more on the Deobandi Fatwa see: Jeffrey 
Donovan and Abubakar Siddique, “Taliban’s Spiritual Fathers Denounce Terror. Could Taliban be Next?” 
Radio Free Afghanistan sourced in Moby Media Updates, November 18, 2008. 
260. Prior to the 1970s, mullahs played a minor role within the tribal areas of Afghanistan.  They acted 
as notaries for marriages, presided over ceremonies and provided charms for those seeking a mullah’s 
blessing. The khan (landowner) and malik (tribal elders) played the most influential role in Afghan society 
and the mullah acted in the interest of the tribe, not opposed to it. See: Roy, Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan, 26–29; Edwards, Heroes of the Age, 131–132; Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 
117. 
261. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 43–44. 
262. Conrad Jennings, “Update from Kandahar: A City in Crisis and Implications for NATO,” The 
Culture & Conflict Review, 2, no. 4 (November 2008), 
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=21&IssueID=19. 
263. Some examples of “mad mullah movements” in Afghanistan and Pakistan include:  the Fakir of 
Ipi, Shami pir or Hadda-yi Sahib, the Akhund of Swat, Bacha-yi Saqaol. Also see note 257. 
264. Edwards, Heroes of the Age, 191. 
265. Ibid., 178 
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religious underpinnings could have on the population and used it to boldly present the 
hallowed cloak of the Prophet Mohammed and proclaim himself “Leader of the 
Faithful.”266 
In the 1980s, mullah networks were used to mobilize and spread the ideology of 
the anti-Soviet jihad. As a process of the Cold War, the tribal system on both sides of the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border was systematically broken apart as elders lost authority over 
their people and politicized Deobandi mullahs and factional religious figures were 
supported and resourced by international actors.267 War in Afghanistan brought millions 
of Afghan refugees into Pakistan where their children were divorced from the traditional 
tribal structure and raised in Islamic fundamentalist environments.  Here, mullahs gained 
a prominence unseen in the past, receiving significant support and respect from the 
community, allowing them to travel freely throughout Afghanistan and often preaching 
anti-government messages to thousands of mosque attendees every Friday.268  Like 
                                                 
266. Rashid, Taliban, 42.  
267. Part of this was a systematic effort by Pakistan to eliminate Pashtun nationalism in Afghanistan 
and on its western border, the Durand Line. Named after the British foreign secretary of the British Indian 
government, Sir Mortimer Durand convinced Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan to sign an agreement in 
1893 demarcating the border between Afghanistan and then British India.   A loya jirga (tribal council) in 
Afghanistan in 1949 declared the agreement invalid once the partition of India took place in 1947, however 
Pakistan and the international community failed to recognize the loya jirga’s ruling.  The uncontrolled 
official border runs 1,610 miles and splits the Pashtun nation in two.  It continues to be a contentious issue 
that fuels nationalist aspirations on both Afghan and Pakistan sides of the border.  For the Taliban, it holds 
strategic and ideological value.  As a strategic asset, the Pakistani side of the border has provided a safe 
haven for insurgents, particularly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which Pakistan has found increasingly difficult to govern. Pakistan 
worries that if the focus on driving out foreign troops morphs into a secular nationalist struggle for the 
Pashtun homeland, the insurgency could become a much less manageable affair.  See: Ann Scott Tyson, 
“Border Complicates War in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, April 4, 2008, Johnson and Mason, “No Sign 
Until the Burst of Fire,” 67–72; Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” RAND 
Counterinsurgency Study Vol. 4 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008). 
268. Conrad Jennings, “Update from Kandahar: A City in Crisis and Implications for NATO,” The 
Culture & Conflict Review, 2, no. 4 (November 2008), 
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=21&IssueID=19. 
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western politicians on Sunday morning talk shows, mullahs drive home detailed but 
simple messages that resonate with millions of Afghans.269    
1. Position of Women in Afghanistan 
It is important to assess the status of women in Afghanistan as they live under 
competing structures of Pashtunwali and Islam in the midst of over thirty years of 
conflict. Much more than the other cases in this thesis, Afghanistan has a highly 
conservative culture that generally requires a strict segregation of the genders, restricts 
female mobility and deters women from leaving the home.270  While the overall status of 
women in Afghanistan today is better than life under the Taliban, there are still many 
cultural, socio-economic and gender problems that leave women with little choices.  
Many young girls are sold at a young age to older men in order to pay off family debts, 
despite the Constitutional law that establishes sixteen as the legal marriage age for 
women.271  Others are forced into child labor or sex work in order to pay off opium 
debts.272 The inadequacy of the official legal system means 85 percent of all 
administered justice takes place in sharia or tribal court systems.273  The majority of 
                                                 
269. In one recent study, 42 Taliban foot soldiers were interviewed in southern Afghanistan —all from 
a variety of Pashtun tribes. None were aware of Afghanistan’s relation to the rest of the world or Mullah 
Omar’s ideological motivations, but most had similar grievances, citing coalition bombings, government 
corruption and unemployment as their main motivations for fighting. Answers among interviewees were 
resoundingly similar between each Talib reflecting the deep and widespread influence mullahs have in 
Afghanistan.  See: Graeme Smith, “Talking to the Taliban,” Toronto Globe and Mail, May 2008. 
270. The level of conservatism varies throughout the country and is dependent upon the tribe and 
family from which women reside.  Whereas most women in Kabul travel without the full burqa or chaddari 
(a loose garment completely covering a woman’s body and face), hardly any will be seen in Kandahar 
without it.  Kuchi (nomad) women will freely walk about their encampments without the covering.  
Kalasha are a non-Islamic tribe in the north-eastern Nuristan Province that do not follow the rules of 
purdah. Other tribal women will farm and collect water with or without the burqa dependent upon the 
presence of men in the area.  Most women are required to travel in pairs, during the daytime or be 
accompanied by their husbands or male relatives (otherwise known as mahram). 
271. Selling one’s daughter for a fixed amount in order to settle a debt is commonly associated with 
the Pashtun practice of badal. Girls can also be traded to settle a dispute between clans, otherwise known as 
the practice of bad dadan. 
272. An estimated 60–80 percent of Afghan marriages are forced, and more than 57 percent of women 
are married before they turn age 16, many to men several decades older.  See: “Afghan Women turn to 
Suicide by Fire,” Associated Press, November 18, 2006. 
273. Many of the courts are run by Taliban shadow justice systems.  See: John W. Warnock, “The 
Status of Women in Karzai’s Afghanistan,” Global Research April 14, 2009.  
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women in prison are there for “moral crimes” such as adultery, running away from home 
or eloping to escape an arranged marriage.274  
Another way of denying women access to economic, social and political power 
has been the practice of purdah.275  In daily life, purdah creates boundaries in areas 
women are denied access to, such as education and jobs.276  Purdah was originally an 
urban phenomenon in Afghanistan, used as a measure of social status and protection.277 
There is no definite requirement in Islam for a woman to practice purdah or wear the 
veil, thus the tradition finds its roots in the structure of male-dominated social spaces, 
particularly as a means to control women.278  In rural areas it is often dependent upon the 
rigidity of the family, tribe or local warlords, but generally in the Muslim world, village 
and nomadic women have rarely worn a veil due to its impracticality in everyday life. In 
village areas, women are needed as much if not more than men to perform farming and 
other daily livelihood tasks, making purdah an inconvenient custom to apply.279 The 
practice became more prominent under Taliban rule, however women often bent the 
rules, covering their faces with the chadar when a Talib is around, and then pulling the 
chadar away when the Talib passes.280  Ultimately, purdah is a lever for men to control 
                                                 
274. One report cited 56 percent of women in Kabul prisons in 2005 were held there for these reasons. 
See: “Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan 
and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights,” Report No. E/CN.4/2006/108, 
Sixty-Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights, March 3, 2006, 6. 
275. Purdah is the practice of women’s seclusion and the segregation of the sexes. It is applicable 
primarily to women past the age of puberty, but young girls and boys will often be separated.  Anna M. 
Pont, Blind Chickens and Social Animals: Creating Spaces for Afghan Women’s Narratives Under the 
Taliban (Portland: Mercy Corps, 2001), 18.   
276. The adult literacy rate for women in Afghanistan in 2005 was a meager 12 percent, compared to 
43 percent for men. See: “Human Development Report 2007/2008” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/. 
277. President Hamid Karzai’s wife, Zenat Karzai, practices purdah.  Women’s rights groups often 
question her seclusion, especially since she is an educated and trained gynecologist.  Though not wanting to 
stir the ire of conservative Pashtuns as King Zahir Shah did when presenting his wife in public in Western 
clothing during the 1950s, the Karzais have chosen a less public image for Afghanistan’s first lady.  See the 
first interview with Zenat Karzai: “Afghan First Lady’s quiet pubic debut,” The Telegraph, April 12, 2004. 
278. Louis Dupree writes, “A careful examination of the Qor’an, the Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet), 
and the Hanafi Shari’a of Sunni Islam (the religious law practiced in Afghanistan), reveals no definite, 
unqualified requirement for purdah and the veil,” 531. 
279. Ibid., 531. 
280. Pont, Blind Chickens and Social Animals, 37. 
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the behavior of women, particularly in urban areas where tribal and religious values 
intermix and women are often considered property. However, its application is often 
dependent upon social, economic and political conditions and women find ways to 
maneuver around the rules.  
A modern example of the system women live under can be seen in Musa Qala 
district in Helmand when in February 2007, British forces struck a deal with local leaders 
to withdraw from the area.  Soon after, Taliban forces recaptured the key district center.  
Almost immediately, the strict Taliban code of conduct was imposed: schools were shut 
down, beards became compulsory and sharia enforced.  Women were “treated like slaves 
in Musa Qala,” according to Fawzia Olomi, director of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
in Helmand.  She said, “Either due to insecurity or a lack of opportunities women in 
Musa Qala have always—even when the Taliban were not ruling there—suffered 
deprivation and violence.”281  She explained that after 2001, women were able to choose 
whether they wanted to wear the burqa or not, but once the Taliban regained control of 
the city, they not only had to wear the burqa, but were also required to have a male 
relative escort them outside the home. 
Due to the tight restrictions on women, they still face difficulty accessing 
essential social services.282  A poll conducted by the Asia Foundation surveyed men and 
women across Afghanistan on a variety of social issues.  One section obtained responses 
on challenges faced by women in accessing education, employment and women’s rights 
in the political affairs of the community and nation.  Figure 6 shows rankings of the most 
critical problems facing women in Afghanistan.  Access to education is viewed as the 
largest problem in the country, with less than one-third of all Afghan girls in school.  In 
most areas of Afghanistan it is still either too dangerous for women to obtain education or 
restricted due to the lack of resources reaching rural areas.   
                                                 
281. “Afghanistan: Taliban impose rule, hefty taxes in Musa Qala district,” IRIN News, June 28, 2007. 
282. One example of this was that few women were able to vote in the 2009 presidential election.  
Women’s voting was one of the main targets of fraud, with female voting stations registering more 
irregularities than male polling stations.  Men would show up to female polling stations with “fistfuls of 
female voter cards,” submitting votes for all the women in the village.  In one village of 250 people, 200 
women supposedly voted in only three hours. See: “Heidi Vogt, “Fraud Surrounds Women Voters in 
Afghan Election,” Associated Press, October 30, 2009. 
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Figure 6.   What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? Comparison 
between 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.283 
Another question asked whether women should be allowed to work outside the 
home.  Figure 7 shows a majority believes they should be able to do so, with a small, 
gradual decline year over year from 2006.  This could represent perceptions of declining 
security and a reluctance to allow women outside the home.  Nearly four-fifths of women 
(80%) compared to 55% of men believe women should be allowed to work outside the 
home.  Support for this is also higher among youth (71%) between 18 and 24 compared 
to those over 55 (62%).  A similar trend is seen between urban (79%) and rural (64%) 
residents.  These figures show there is less rigidity among the younger, urban generation 
toward typical traditional ideas of male dominance in the work force. 
                                                 
283. From Ruth Rennie, Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Sen, “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the 
Afghan People,” The Asia Foundation, Fig. 8.2, 124. 
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Figure 7.   Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home.  
What is your opinion about this? Comparison between 2006, 2007, 2008, and 
2009.284 
Another question asked whether women should be allowed to vote in elections.  
83 percent of the respondents believed that they should.  Support for female suffrage was 
higher among women (88%) than men (79%) and within urban (91%) areas than rural 
(81%) areas. A follow-up to this question was whether women should decide for 
themselves or should they receive advice from men (see Figure 8).   Nearly a quarter of 
respondents believed women should seek advice from men prior to voting, while another 
19% believed they should decide for themselves but at least seek consultation with men 
prior to voting. 
 
Figure 8.   If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or 
should they receive advice from men? Comparison between 2006, 2007, 2008, 
and 2009285 
                                                 
284. From Rennie, Sharma and Sen, “Afghanistan in 2009,” Table 8.2, 126. 
285. From Rennie, Sharma and Sen, “Afghanistan in 2009,” Table 8.3, 128. 
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A final question this section looks at is whether respondents to the survey are 
opposed to women representing them in a number of political organizations (see Figure 
9).  By law, women are to constitute 25 percent of the parliamentary seats in Afghanistan.  
This has likely had some effect on the perceptions of female participation.  Between men 
and women on this issue, there is little difference—50 percent of men and 53 percent of 
women have no objection to being represented by women in these institutions.286  
 
Figure 9.   Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following 
organizations?287 
GIRoA has still not fully embraced the western demands of integrating women 
into society, exemplified by the lack of policewomen in Afghanistan’s National Police 
(ANP).  Of the 63,000 police in spring 2006, only 180 were women.  Many of these 
women are given tasks that westerners may consider menial such as cooking, cleaning 
and making tea for male officers.288  
 
                                                 
286. While there have been openings for women in urban areas of Afghanistan, the more rural areas 
remain highly conservative and traditional, often relying upon Taliban regulations by default.  In 2002, in 
Gereshk district, Helmand province women were noted as being confined to their homes and playing no 
part in community policy making.  However, some educated women were able to work as teachers for 
female students where girls’ schools existed.  See: UNHCR Sub-Office Kandahar, “District Profile on 
Nahri Saraj District (Girshk),” November 29, 2002. 
287. From Rennie, Sharma and Sen, “Afghanistan in 2009,” Table 8.6, 132. 
288. Due to their low representation in this institution, many women are hesitant to approach ANP to 
report crimes or Taliban activity.  Unfortunately, a valuable intelligence asset is lost due to this cultural 
conundrum. Andrew Wilder, “Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police,” 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Issue Paper Series (July 2007), 9. 
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Like today, women were given more rights under the Soviet-led PDPA regime 
controlling Kabul then in the sub-district areas of Afghanistan.289 However, much to the 
dismay of western critics, women’s rights, even in the urban areas, is approached with 
hesitation so as not to upset the conservative Pashtun base residing in the countryside and 
providing much needed support to the Taliban insurgency.  Providing access and equal 
rights to women is a controversial and dangerous program undertaken by the international 
community as it upsets the cultural identity maintained with purdah and often enforced 
by both men and women.  Some women look to life under the Taliban as more rewarding 
and secure than life under the mujahedeen or international occupation.  Some women feel 
the international community is trying to force women to take the burkha and chaddari 
off:  
Some of us may take it off once we are ready and our society is ready.  To 
be pressured by the West to take off our chaddari is as bad as Taliban 
imposing [it] on us [in the first place].  We have the right to choose what 
to wear.290  
Other women have reacted with self-mutilation to harsh and unequal treatment 
imposed on them from their families.  Many women are choosing to commit suicide as a 
result of physical, sexual and psychological abuse at the hands of spouses or family 
members.291 Burning is one of the most common means of suicide, a reflection likely of 
the proliferation of Bollywood films that represent women partaking in sati.292  This is 
reflective of how little has changed for many women in Afghanistan with the ouster of 
Taliban.  As Ann Jones has stated, “Afghan women of the Kabul elite haven’t yet caught 
                                                 
289. The Democratic Organization of Afghan Women publicized fears of Kabuli women were a 
mujahideen victory to occur. Magnus and Naby, Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 148. 
290. Elaheh Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion (New York: Zed Books, 2007), 37 
291. In 2007, almost 500 cases were recorded of women burning themselves to death or disfigurement 
in order to escape abusive situations.  See: Mandy Clark, “Rights Groups say Afghan Women Committing 
Suicide at Alarming Rate,” Voice of America, May 27, 2008.  In Herat province, there were 93 cases in 
2005 and at least 54 in 2006.  See: “Afghan Women turn to Suicide by Fire,” Associated Press, November 
18, 2006. 
292. An ancient Hindu practice in India (now outlawed) where recently widowed women would throw 
themselves onto the funeral pyre of their deceased husbands. 
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up to where they were thirty-five years ago.”293 What rights women have gained over the 
last eight years are quickly eroding as former warlords and strongmen write gender 
discrimination into law. 294 
The role of women in Afghanistan has ebbed and flowed as central governments 
influenced by outside powers attempt to undermine traditional tribal and religious 
structures.  As a result these structures have united during times of conflict to resist 
central government influence on the cultural identity of Pashtun tribes.  In order to 
protect the character of the women and family (ultimately the man’s honor) from the 
corruption emanating from Kabul, the rural areas have turned toward religious figures 
and fundamentalism as a means of survival irrespective of linguistic, cultural and tribal 
differences that have prevented Afghanistan from unifying for thousands of years.  Jihad 
is a rejection of the ills modernity and outside influence brings to Afghanistan. The urban 
areas influenced by the central government and the forces of modernity are looked upon 
as bastions of corruption and evil supported by foreign infidels.  This narrative has been a 
central component driving sub-state organizations in Afghanistan. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND AGENCY 
This section looks at the role and relationship of insurgent organizations in 
Afghanistan using suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism is a new phenomenon in 
Afghanistan introduced by Salafi Jihadist groups. The first IEDs in Afghanistan 
beginning in 2002 were not particularly efficient—usually leftover ordinance with 
primitive detonation systems—especially against up-armored vehicles.295  Even the first 
suicide attacks were rather crude, with artillery and mortar rounds strapped to the 
                                                 
293. John W. Warnock, “The Status of Women in Karzai’s Afghanistan,” Global Research, April 14, 
2009. 
294. A law was introduced in 2009 that wives are obliged to have sexual relations with their husbands 
at least once every four days. The new law allows man to withhold food from his wife if she refuses sexual 
intercourse; must receive permission from her husband to work; and the father and grandfather are given 
exclusive custody of her children. See: Sarah Rainsford, “Row over Afghan wife-starving law,” BBC News, 
August 16, 2009. 
295. Sean M. Maloney, “A violent impediment: the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar 
province 2003—07,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (2008): 204; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, 
Kalishnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008), 148. 
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chest.296  Bombers often detonated too early or too late due to little training or 
understanding of what they were doing.  Much of Afghanistan’s IED evolution is due to 
tried and tested methods in Iraq.  IEDs in Iraq became more sophisticated in September 
2003, when complex remote-controlled, vehicle-borne IEDS and daisy-chained IEDs 
using tripwires began to augment straightforward suicide attacks.297 By 2006, highly 
sophisticated bombs were being found in insurgent safe houses throughout 
Afghanistan.298 The surge of U.S. military troops in Iraq in June 2007, decreased daily 
attacks there by 42 percent, but at the same time, the number and lethality of IED attacks 
by Taliban fighters in Afghanistan increased.299  As Iraqi insurgents found the 
environment less permissive, many moved to the Afghan front where these tactics were 
gradually introduced to the battlefield.300  
Two years prior to the U.S. surge in Iraq, the Taliban were learning new tactics 
and communication strategies from Iraqi insurgents sponsoring “terror workshops” in 
Pakistan.301  Insurgents were instructed to stack anti-tank mines and remotely detonated 
shape charges under roadways and bridges.  The thousands of culverts in Afghanistan 
became a prime location for insurgents to take out up-armored Humvees and Mine 
Resistant Armored Personnel (MRAP) carriers, often referred to as “Green Monsters That 
Spit Fire and Shit White People Out the Back.”302  Insurgents covertly placed simple, but 
efficient home–made IEDs encased in pressure cookers, water jugs and fuel containers 
underneath culverts scattered throughout Highway 1 and the other paved or dirt roadways 
                                                 
296. On 27 January 2004, an insurgent detonated this crude explosive mix next to a NATO convoy. 
See: H. John Poole, Militant Tricks, Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent (North Carolina: Posterity 
Press, 2005), 99. 
297. Montgomery McFate, “Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs,” Military Review (May-June 2005): 37. 
298. One bust found 15 bombs in a mosque in Kabul, see: Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov, and Laptop, 
149. 
299. Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures,” CRS Report for Congress, The Library of Congress, Updated February 8, 2008. 
300. Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Insurgence in Afghanistan,” 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, No. 2 (2007): 98. 
301. Jason Yung, “Afghanistan: The Taliban,” Parliamentary Information and Research Service, PRB 
07-27E, Canada, December 5, 2007. 
302. Maloney, “A violent impediment,” 213. 
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in Afghanistan. Tunnels were dug from a distance that would reach the intended area and 
allow insurgents to position the IED without being detected from overhead surveillance.  
For suicide attacks in urban areas, militants used pilfered military and police uniforms to 
blend in during recruitment events or to easily make their way into government 
buildings.303 While well-seasoned insurgents and terrorists provided instruction to new 
recruits, misaligned Pakistani intelligence services also assisted.304  
The Afghan Taliban developed an urban suicide campaign in the fall of 2005, 
with support from Al Qaeda-trained, madrassa-recruited refugees from Pakistan.305 Many 
of the initial bombers were sloppy as a result of improper training.  In 2004, suicide 
attacks were estimated to have a failure rate of around 60—70 percent.306 Even up to 
2007, suicide attacks were not very successful in killing foreign troops.  A study by the 
Jamestown Foundation found that of the first 22 attacks in 2007, 16 cases claimed only 
the suicide bomber himself.307 In 2007, the chief medical examiner in Kabul had shown 
that three out of five suicide bombers were physically or mentally disabled.308  While the 
targets were mostly international forces’ convoys or dismounted patrols, the suicide 
bombers either detonated their explosives prematurely or their bombs failed to penetrate 
                                                 
303. Amir Shah, “Bombing kills 9 Afghan Soldiers,” New York Times, September 29, 2005. 
304. Analysts within the U.S. government and journalists with significant access to the region agree 
that elements within the Pakistani ISI were providing direct logistical and intelligence support to the 
Taliban. While it is not overt Pakistani policy to support insurgents in Afghanistan, there are certainly 
elements within Pakistan’s security establishment that see the Taliban as a hedge against an unfriendly 
administration in Kabul.  However, this miscalculation has brought significant internal calamity to 
Pakistan, essentially unleashing an uncontrollable Frankenstein. In Pakistan there were 56 suicide attacks in 
2008, and 38 in the first half of 2009. A number of attacks have targeted Pakistan’s internal security 
apparatus, religious institutions, and important infrastructure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. See: 
Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 2008; Congressman Mark Kirk, “Afghanistan: The Rise of the 
Narco-Taliban,” Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Afghanistan, 
February 15, 2007; Johnson & Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire,” 72; Matthew Cole, “Killing 
ourselves in Afghanistan,” Salon.com, March 10, 2008. 
305. Johnson and Mason, “Understanding the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,” 82. 
306. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov, and Laptop, 149. 
307. Bryan Glyn Williams and Cathy Young, “Cheney Attack Reveals Taliban Suicide Bombing 
Patterns,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 27, 2007, 
http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=222. 
308. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Disabled Often Carry Out Afghan Suicide Missions,” NPR News, 
October 15, 2007. 
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the heavily armored vehicles ISAF309 troops traveled in.  However, in terms of 
psychological impact, the suicide operations were quite successful.310  
Much of the organization and tactics of the anti-Soviet mujahedeen resemble what 
we see today for anti-government insurgent groups.  The number of actual mujahedeen 
fighters from 1979 to 1989 fluctuated between 40,000 and 60,000, split among the 
Peshawar Seven and then into sub-detachments and sub-units throughout Afghanistan.311  
Motivations among the factions and fighters differed, but they all united under the 
expulsion of foreign forces and the overthrow of the PDPA government.312  The primary 
tactical elements of the mujahedeen were combat groups consisting of 15 to 50 men. 
Mujahedeen were powerless without the material and financial support of foreign powers.  
One former ISI officer stated: “No matter how brilliant my strategy might be, the 
implementation depended on the availability of a vast reservoir of cash with which to 
arm, train and move my forces.”313 In 1980, the resistance force had little more than 
British Lee-Enfield rifles left over from the Second World War and Kalashnikov 
automatic rifles made in Egypt.   Within a few years, with support from the West, combat 
groups had machine guns, explosives and anti-aircraft weapons. 
Mujahedeen combat groups received guerilla training in Pakistan.  These groups 
relied upon Pakistan and U.S. intelligence services for the latest information on Soviet 
                                                 
309. International Security Assistance Force or ISAF is the international command headquartered in 
Kabul providing security assistance to Afghanistan. 
310. For example, Dutch ISAF refused to deploy in areas where suicide bombings were widespread. 
International forces began tightening their force protection procedures and treating normal Afghan civilians 
as the enemy. In January 2006, after a suicide car bomb assassinated a high-level Canadian diplomat in 
Kandahar, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) suspended a large number of desperately needed 
development projects in some of the most critical areas of the province.  See: Maloney, “A violent 
impediment,” 210. 
311. The Peshawar Seven were united in 1985 and consisted of: Islamic Party (HIH or Hezb-e-Islami 
Gulbuddin); Islamic Society (JIA or Jamiat-i-Islami); Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA or Harakat-
e-Inqilab-i-Islami); Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IUA or Ettihad-i-Islami); Islamic 
Party (HIK or Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis); National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA or Mahaz-e-Melli 
Islami); and Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF or Jebh-e-Nejat-i-Melli Afghanistan).  
312. For a discussion of each party’s motivations see: Lester W. Grau & Michael A. Gress (translated 
and edited) The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 2002), 53–55; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 137–172. 
313. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower 
(Havertown: Casemate, 2001), 77. 
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troop movements.  Groups also consisted of terrorist cells of three to five men that would 
assassinate prominent leaders or sabotage government services.  From 1985 to 1987, over 
1,800 terrorist or insurgent acts were conducted against the PDPA regime.314 These 
attacks were not considered suicide missions since the death of the assailant was not 
necessarily required for the success of these missions. 
The following sections look at the variety of insurgent organizations using suicide 
tactics in Afghanistan. The current conflict has four main elements: Quetta Shura 
Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami (HIG), the Haqqani Network, and Al Qaeda, in addition to tribal 
and criminal elements.315  These groups also have divergent motivations but are united 
on the common cause to expel foreign forces from the country and install a legitimate 
Islamic regime based upon sharia.  The first four groups are the most organized.  They 
tend to share fighters, conduct missions together and hold refuge in Pakistan where they 
recharge, train and coordinate future operations.  Suicide missions are done by the top 
four groups, but typically under the auspices of the Taliban.   
1. Haqqani Network 
The reach of the Haqqani Network is extensive and their ability to wage 
sophisticated urban assaults threatens to drive the insurgency into a more complex level 
of warfare. In recent years, the Taliban has experienced internal order and discipline 
problems that threaten to undermine the insurgency.316  The Haqqani Network represents 
a group of highly disciplined fighters and commanders that subscribe to the Quetta Shura 
hierarchy and their established rules and regulations.317 The group has deep links in 
eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan and consistent support from Arab and jihadist networks 
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316. For example, many attacks in the northeast of Afghanistan are conducted by local warlords, 
criminal elements, and groups unaffiliated with the Taliban, however the Taliban are often blamed for these 
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Movement and Influence in Afghanistan,” Vigilant Security Services Afghanistan, April 24, 2007. 
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Gopal, “Inside Afghanistan’s most dangerous insurgent group,” Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 2009. 
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from around the world.318  Led by Siraj Haqqani, son of the legendary mujahedeen 
commander, Jaluluddin Haqqani,319 this group coordinates some of the most spectacular 
suicide missions seen in Afghanistan.320 Haqqani operatives are heavily armed with 
rocket-propelled grenades, assault rifles and explosives-laden vests, and are typically 
trained in guerilla tactics and urban warfare so as to maximize the kill ratio prior to 
detonating their explosives.  Their attacks are highly coordinated, often involving 
upwards of 15 individuals attacking a target from different angles and at varying periods 
of time.321 Al Qaeda trainers likely teach these types of tactics, but many analysts believe 
Pakistan’s ISI has had a primary role in planning, resourcing and coordinating the 
operations.322 
The Haqqani cells are spread throughout eastern Afghanistan and are suspected to 
have operational capability in Kandahar and southern Afghanistan.323 The Haqqanis draw 
support from the Zadran tribe of eastern Afghanistan, located in the P2K region (Paktya, 
                                                 
318. Anand Gopal, “The most deadly US foe in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 
2009. 
319. Jalaluddin Haqqani, now in his late 70s, is still hailed as a hero of the resistance against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.  He stands out among other mujahideen commanders as never being labelled a 
warlord and being committed to national sovereignty.  He has been characterized as the “main engine in the 
Taliban movement.” See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Part 3: Through the eyes of the Taliban,” Asia Times 
Online, May 5, 2004 and Imtiaz Ali, “The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Afghanistan,” 
Terrorism Monitor, 6, issue 6 (March 24, 2008). 
320. The Haqqani Network attempted to assassinate President Hamid Karzai in April 2008 during a 
military parade in Kabul; other attempts on the President have also been linked to Haqqani. Prior to the 
April attack, dressed in police uniforms, Haqqani Network operatives led the January 14, 2008 raid on the 
five-star Serena Hotel in Kabul and the March 3, 2008 suicide truck bombing on the Sabari district 
headquarters in Khost. Their attacks include diverse delivery systems that include massive truck bombs, 
donkey-borne IEDs, suicide operatives on foot, motorbike, or bicycle and a variety of disguises to penetrate 
government installations. 
321. On 21 July 2009, fifteen men disguised in burkhas stormed government and security buildings in 
Gardez and Jalalabad.  Using commando-style tactics, the Haqqani operatives fought fiercely to get past 
security check posts.  Once inside the building, the insurgents detonated explosive vests killing at least a 
dozen people and injuring over twenty. 
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Paktika and Khost provinces) and North Waziristan.324 Senior U.S. intelligence officials 
suggest there were recently “157 training camps and ‘more than 400 support locations’ 
spread throughout the tribal areas and the settled districts of the Northwest Frontier 
Province” that have been used to indoctrinate, arm, coordinate and carryout suicide 
attacks on international and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan.325  
2. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) 
Originally a political faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977, it was one of the 
major mujahedeen organizations fighting the Soviets.  Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was a 
favored recipient of resources coming from Pakistan’s ISI during the anti-Soviet jihad.  
Hekmatyar has since arisen as a formidable opponent, allying himself temporarily with 
Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.326 His group has significant support in the northeastern 
provinces of Afghanistan among a wide group of Pashtun tribes.327  His consistent stance 
against the corrupt Afghan government and the occupation of international troops brings 
the support of many Pashtun, Pashai and Nuristani tribesmen with legitimate local and 
regional grievances.  HIG has conducted operations throughout northeastern Afghanistan 
to include complex attacks on combat outposts, ambushes, and sophisticated suicide 
operations. 
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3. The Quetta Shura Taliban 
The Taliban represent a puritanical form of Islam combining tribal customs with a 
strict interpretation of religious law.328 While the Taliban brought security and justice, 
they were overly strict in their implementation of it.329 The Taliban distinguish their 
movement from GIRoA by labeling this structure and those supporting it takfir (an 
apostate).  They characterize government employees as “spies” or “enemies of Islam” 
and obtain religious authority from self-proscribed mullahs working within the 
organization.  This gives Taliban the ability to wage jihad on virtually anyone including 
in one case, a mullah who openly prayed against suicide operations.330  This manner of 
extreme interpretation is similar to Al Qaeda as discussed in Chapter IV.331 However, the 
Taliban have not endorsed female suicide terrorism as an option.  Other insurgent groups 
in Afghanistan have also disregarded the role of women in the insurgency. 
The organization is led by a reclusive, but charismatic leader, Mullah Mohammed 
Omar. In 1996, he arranged a public gathering to view the hallowed cloak of Prophet 
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Mohammed for only the third time since it was brought to Afghanistan in 1747.  This 
event gave Mullah Omar the title Amir al-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful).  Omar 
was said to have taken his role seriously, often walking the streets to “gauge the 
problems” of common people, and wearing a perfume blend thought to have been worn 
by the Prophet Muhammad.332 
A major influence of the Taliban movement is nationalism. In Afghanistan’s 
history tribal identity has often complemented religious ideology and objectives with 
revolts under jihad being temporary attempts of tribes or factions to gain power, 
particularly from illegitimate ruling authorities.  Some argue the Taliban are focused on 
regaining their traditional tribal homeland and that Taliban motivations have been more 
secular than religious, involving a fight within the Pashtun confederation.333 However, 
the Taliban are willing to accept virtually anyone that believes in uniting the Afghan 
nation against foreign aggression.  In this effort, they often draw reference to Afghans’ 
defeat of British invaders in the nineteenth century and the Soviet occupation in the 
1980s.  To the international community, Taliban brand their image as non-
confrontational, drawing distinction between Afghan nationalism and Al Qaeda terrorism 
stating that they had no connection to the terrorist operations on September 11, 2001.334 
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Another major influence of the Taliban movement is foreign strategic 
imperatives. This involves two major components with intricate and sometimes 
unintended interaction often composed of competing elements: states seeking strategic 
depth and non-state actors seeking chaos. Particularly Pakistan, but also non-state actors 
such as Al Qaeda and splinter groups that make up the Salafi Jihadi movement have used 
and enhanced the conflict in Afghanistan in order to perpetuate their own existence.  
Taliban (and mujahedeen before them) have been used for many years as a proxy force 
against enemies of the state of Pakistan.335   
Taliban are provided logistical, tactical and strategic support from foreign nations 
and the Salafi Jihadi movement.  One reason the Taliban do not need female suicide 
bombers is the steady stream of male recruits coming from religious schools in Pakistan.  
Pakistani leadership under Zia ul Haq (1977—1988) utilized the Cold War paradigm to 
spread Islamic fundamentalism throughout Pakistan.  Thousands of madrassas, used to 
impart Deobandi resistance ideas, were built with Saudi and U.S. money.  After 9/11, 
there were over 15,000 madrassas in Pakistan.336 The influx of three million Afghan 
refugees kept the madrassas busy educating and providing a legitimate social function to 
Pakistan.337 Some schools, however, radicalized students and built armies of militants to 
be used against Pakistan’s perceived threats.338  
Elements of the Pakistani military establishment and their intelligence service 
(ISI) are well known to have provided the Taliban with the intelligence to launch the 
deadly Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul in 2008.339  Many argue that Afghanistan has 
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been a strategic “prize” of which India and Pakistan has been fighting over for years.340  
In the classical sense of a security dilemma, each move made by one side in Afghanistan, 
provokes a counter move by the other. As a measure against India, Pakistan conducted an 
experiment in “social engineering” that fundamentally marginalized and dismantled the 
traditional tribal elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan, supplanting them with radical 
Muslim extremists.341  
Some authors contend that Pakistan resides in a parallel state and operates with 
similar strategic dilemmas as Israel—fearing enemies on both sides of its borders.342 
Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, head of the ISI during the anti-Soviet jihad explained 
the reason for using foreign Muslim radicals: “We are fighting a jihad and this is the first 
Islamic international brigades, the West has NATO, why can’t the Muslims unite and 
form a common front?”343  Among these fighters were Arabs, Chechens, Uighurs, 
Uzbeks, Turks and Filipino Moros.  However, suicide was not an encouraged tactic in 
mujahedeen cells.  Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf commanded the ISI’s Afghan Bureau, 
supplying, training and planning mujahedeen cells and their operations in Afghanistan.  
He states that none of his Pakistani staff were encouraged to commit suicide if caught by 
the enemy, rather to die fighting if this was the only option available.344 Understanding 
the Taliban in Afghanistan, one must look at their roots in Pakistan and the perpetual 
state of conflict the nation has been in since its inception.345  
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Evidence suggests significant material support has gone to the Taliban from 
elements within the Pakistan ISI;346 other evidence suggests Arab trans-national terror 
networks,347 Al-Qaeda, and even Iran.348  Some argue that recent empowerment of the 
Taliban (as early as 2003) were likely inspired by the U.S. preoccupation with operations 
in Iraq.  This forced India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to reassess their regional strategic 
positions of safety and to align accordingly.349  Karzai turned to India for support, giving 
space for at least five Indian consulates in Afghanistan, accepting US$600 million in aid, 
and allowing a unit of the Indian military, the Border Roads Organization, to rebuild 
portions of the Afghan highway system.350  Pakistan reacted by providing supplies, 
intelligence, and refuge to the Taliban, however their efforts at controlling the Taliban 
has since become more of a problem than a solution with the increased attacks against 
Pakistani military, intelligence, and civilian institutions.  
The other component of foreign influence involves the relationship with non-state 
actors. While many Taliban are experienced fighters and practitioners of irregular 
warfare, and some Taliban members had fought the Soviets as mujahedeen in the 1980s, 
the Taliban as an organization were not trained or experienced in waging an insurgency.  
Part of the answer lies with support provided by Al Qaeda and foreign fighters transferred 
from Iraq.351 The anti-Soviet jihad allowed a number of foreign jihadists to train, 
socialize and experience war with Pashtuns.  Afghanistan provided battlefield preparation 
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for the global jihad and as Hafez argues, “a template for mobilizing Muslims in defense 
of Islamic causes.”352 Initially the stated goal of the Taliban was to rid Afghanistan of the 
chaos the various Mujahedeen factions brought to the country, but as their territorial 
control expanded, they changed their explicit goal to transforming the country into “‘a 
pure Islamic Emirate’ as a prelude to achieving wider regional objectives.”353 Al Qaeda 
used kinship and jihadi ties to Pashtuns in the region in order to ensure a place of refuge 
and coordination for future anti-West operations.354  This has strategic significance for 
the Taliban.  First, Afghanistan offers non-state actors refuge from counterinsurgency 
forces in Iraq and an area to share their knowledge of sophisticated IEDs, guerilla tactics 
and suicide missions with young Taliban that have limited training compared to what 
their fathers had received in Pakistan.355  It also brings more recruits from abroad, 
particularly those who can be sacrificed as suicide bombers. However, it can also bring 
consequences, such as behavior considered inappropriate to Taliban objectives of 
winning over the population.356 Ayman Zawahiri once tried to persuade Mullah Omar to 
allow girls education, basic schooling and even combat training in Afghanistan.  He used 
the example of Malalai who fought against the British in the nineteenth century.  Omar 
refused saying the “presence of women at the fight or among soldiers would lead to a 
breakdown in discipline.”357   
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Since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Quetta Shura Taliban has 
attempted to regain a semblance of internal order and discipline among its commanders 
and fighters.358 It has been faced with significant rifts over the years, fissures between 
regional commanders, and faces the emerging threat of criminal entrepreneurs with less 
than political interests at stake.  The Taliban released a new code of conduct in May 
2009, “Rules and Regulations for Mujahedeen” that provided a catalog of weak points, 
vulnerabilities and fears emanating from the Taliban’s top echelon of leadership.  Suicide 
attacks were addressed in rule 41, stating the following guidelines for conducting an 
attack: 
• The attacker must be fully educated of their mission; 
• Attacks must only target high ranking people; 
• Civilian deaths must be avoided, and; 
• Suicide attacks must be approved by Taliban provincial authorities. 
The issuance of strict guidelines in conducting suicide attacks suggests the Taliban fear 
losing control over these types of operations.  Attacks coordinated by rogue insurgent 
cells risk being sloppy, maiming more civilians than government personnel, and turning 
the tactic into a competition between rival organizations for popular support or financial 
assistance from outside donors.359  They also risk being used by criminal syndicates as a 
way to protect illicit drug production and smuggling from government and international 
interdiction efforts.360  This order from the Quetta Shura is an effort to regain control 
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over the monopoly of terrorism in Afghanistan as well as to rein in on those brutal acts, 
which they see as over the top and harmful to their image.  
The brutal nature of suicide bombings leaves a sting in the side of many Afghans.  
When suicide missions go awry, Taliban typically deny responsibility in the attack and 
try to blame coalition forces for the violence.  Recent surveys show suicide bombings 
have little support among Afghans.  89 percent believed suicide attacks were unjustified 
in 2007.361 A recent Gallup poll found that 85 percent of Afghans disapproved of suicide 
bombing and another 90 percent found it un-Islamic.362  Concern with public disapproval 
is apparent in the organization, and one of the reasons women are not part of these 
operations.  
4. Women’s Role in the Organization 
Women did not play an active role in the anti-Soviet Jihad, however there were 
instances of their involvement.  Some women fought and served as commanders in the 
Revolutionary Defense Group militias.  One female warlord, Bibi Ayesha,363 otherwise 
known, as “the Pigeon” was commander of a band of 150 men in the Nahrin district of 
Baghlan, northern Afghanistan.  She fought against Soviets, Taliban and the Karzai 
government, dismissing the idea that women could not fight in battle: “It makes no 
difference if you are a man or a woman when you have the heart of a fighter.”364  But 
even Ayesha, a Tajik, conformed to Pashtun culture, insisting a male relative accompany 
her into battle, with at least four of her sons having fought alongside her. 
Another example, that of Nahid, a woman who helped coordinate a protest march 
in April 1980 stood out as an example for years to come.  The march in Kabul was in 
response to the 27 December 1979, Red Army invasion of Afghanistan.  Nahid 
approached an officer in the Afghan Communist Party, calling him a coward:  
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Since you are incapable of defending your honor you are not a man any 
more.  Here, take my veil, put it on your head and give me your weapon.  
We women will be better at defending this country than you are.365   
Nahid’s bravery became a symbol of female resistance to occupation, such as women 
who fought alongside men in Nuristan. The Nuristan Front newspaper said that women 
“offered their blood for the Islamic revolution like red tulips at springtime.”366  Women 
believed that they would be offered equal status to men once the Afghan resistance had 
ended, instead persistent conflict swept away any opportunity at equality and the mass 
movement of Afghan liberation turned into a prison of religious authority.367 
As participants of the anti-Soviet jihad, most women played supportive roles to 
mujahedeen. There was an important role for non-combatants to fill, to include political 
activity, writing and supporting front line fighters. Women sheltered and hid mujahedeen 
traveling through villages, stood watch in the evening as mujahedeen slept.  Women 
would tend to soldiers by cooking, cleaning clothes or dressing wounds.  They would 
clean, oil and repair weapons.  They would also serve as couriers, carrying weapons, 
radios and supplies from safe havens to the front.  They would even wash and care for the 
dead, preparing them for burial and often mother orphaned mujahedeen children.368 It 
was also incumbent upon women to carry out vengeance in accordance with tribal code, 
when no man of the family was able or alive to reclaim the honor of the family.  In 
Pashtunwali it is incumbent upon the wife of the slain male to take vengeance.369  One 
woman, after seeing many in her village killed by Russians, pleaded with her brothers to 
                                                 
365. Sayd Bahodine Majrouh (ed.), Songs of Love and War: Afghan Women’s Poetry (trans.) Marjolijn 
de Jager, (New York: Other Press, 2003), 39. 
366. Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination (New York: Macmillan Press, 1982), 
125. 
367. Eric Hoffer writes, “the adherents of a rising movement have a strong sense of liberation even 
though they live and breathe in an atmosphere of strict adherence to tenets and commands.”  This is an 
important concept when looking at the temporarily relaxed spaces offered women in insurgencies.  These 
spaces are rarely opened longer than the conflict lasts.  Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the 
Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), 32. 
368. Pashto proverbs hail the role motherhood: “Paradise is under the feet of a mother” and “The angel 
of blessing does not put his foot in a home with no women.” Anna M. Pont, Blind Chickens and Social 
Animals, 82. 
369. Edwards, Hereos of the Age, 59. 
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get her a bomb so that she could destroy a tank and become a “shaheed,” however they 
refused since the obligation for vengeance became the brothers’.370  
In the Taliban era, women’s role in jihad is much less active and supportive.  
Since the Taliban, were in many respects, a reaction to the chaos under mujahedeen 
resistance and rule, the Taliban advocated very strict policies for interaction between men 
and women.  In tribal society, women act as peace brokers or part of the mobilization 
effort during conflict.  However, as previously addressed, the Taliban undermined tribal 
mores with a strict puritanical interpretation of women’s role in society.  Years of Taliban 
rule and a generation of youth indoctrinated in madrassas created an environment where 
women had little role outside the home.  One of their largest spaces for involvement, 
which Taliban had little control over, were women’s networks or solidarity groups.  
These groups provided women the ability to work together toward survival strategies, 
coping mechanisms and income-generating activities.371  Unlike other insurgent actors 
this thesis has examined, women’s agency in Afghanistan was not found within the 
Taliban organization and a martyrdom identity for Pashtun women has thus far been 
deemed inappropriate by the organization and society. 
D. THE MARTYR IDENTITY 
One should not be surprised that religion played such a strong role in unifying the 
Afghan resistance.  Christianity has and continues to be a motivating factor in western 
militaries. The hero who confronts evil in order to save the honor of his people has been a 
common mythology advanced by many societies. A look at some of the war posters 
created during the two World Wars show that religion is often exploited to encourage 
soldiers to fight. During the great wars of the twentieth century, states utilized pre-
existing traditions, narratives and memories embodied in a variety of cultural tools and 
representations in order to instill an obligation of sacrifice for the secular nation. An 
overwhelming theme found in war propaganda during World War I and II was the 
                                                 
370. Deborah Ellis, Women of the Afghan War (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 50. 
371. Women’s networks developed informal schools, health clinics, legal advice, and donations to the 
poor and a number of other social services otherwise absent from the Taliban government.  See: Elaheh 
Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women: Identity & Invasion (New York: Zed Books, Ltd., 2007), 28–30. 
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preoccupation with religious symbols glorifying sacrifice, death and resurrection 
packaged in the immortal veneration of the nation’s martyrs.  Heroes were connected 
with the glorious age of Christianity and given eternal life through the nation’s 
institutionalization of the aesthetics of sacrifice and death.372  These same notions have 
been present in crafting a cult of martyrdom in Afghanistan.  One who is sacrificed for 
the cause is venerated as a hero and given the title martyr or shaheed.   In the Afghan 
jihad, commanders would never claim mujahedeen had been killed in battle; instead they 
would report that fighters had become Shaheed.373 Even those who fought and lived were 
honored as Ghazi in poems and martyrologies.374 
The martyr identity in Afghanistan has been linked with both religious and secular 
ideals and traditions.  Afghans are proud of their ability to defeat foreign invaders from 
Alexander the Great to three victorious wars over British troops in the nineteenth century. 
These events are typically linked to present actions as a continuation of the heroic 
mujahedeen.  Today’s martyr, like the past, is composed of economic, political and social 
grievances wrapped in the moral language of jihad.  Most true believing Taliban believe 
there will be “an ultimate divine victory for their jihad” similar to what they experienced 
against the Soviets.375  One method by which Taliban spread the martyr identity is 
through traditional Afghan story telling and narratives.  Thomas Johnson’s study of 
Taliban night letters has shown that this has remained a consistent medium since the anti-
                                                 
372. For examples of this western aesthetic, see: Anne-Louis Girodet de Roucy-Triosson, Ossian 
Receiving the Ghosts of the French Heroes (1802); Constantino Brumidi, Apotheosis of Washington 
(1865); Alonso Earl Folinger, “The Greatest Mother,” Red Cross Poster, Library of Congress (1918); 
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373. Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan The Bear Trap, 33. 
374. A Ghazi is one who wages a ghazawat, or a victorious raid. It is a term of recognition. See: 
Magnus and Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 35. 
375. “Afghanistan: Taliban propaganda effective among Pashtoons,” IRIN News, 1 August 2007. 
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Soviet jihad.376  This “resistance literature” has enabled mujahedeen and Taliban to voice 
absolute opposition through jihad to foreign occupation and corrupt Afghan leaders.377  
The linking of Afghan narratives has had an influence in mobilizing divisive tribes for 
peaceful or violent means.378 Poetry and songs have also been very important methods of 
transferring information in a highly illiterate, rural society.  Part of oral traditions, these 
have equally important roles in describing family, tribal and national history, delivering 
religious and moral messages and sharing news of the urban and far away places most 
rural Afghans never come in contact with.   
Women have played an important inspirational role as purveyors of information 
in Afghanistan through artistic expression, particularly during times of crisis and in 
support of mujahedeen.  Malalai is one oft-cited example of Pashtun heroism among 
women.379  Another is Rabia Balkhi, a famous female poet of the tenth century which the 
Taliban have given respect to.380  The Taliban, like the anti-Soviet mujahedeen, use 
poetry as a means to transmit their sacred cause as one that is a legitimate defense of the 
Afghan nation against foreign invaders on a crusade against Islam.  The poetry often 
refers to Western desires to embarrass and humiliate pious and humble Afghan Muslims, 
                                                 
376. Night Letters or Shabnamah are letters or leaflets posted on public spaces to warn Afghans 
against cooperating against the government or foreign occupiers.  They also present warnings to stay away 
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protected her tomb from desecration.  See: Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women, 16. 
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but the main intent of the poem is to awaken Afghans to their plight and motivate them to 
participate in jihad.  
These oral transmissions were predominant, particularly in refugee camps in 
Pakistan, where many displaced clans and individuals traveled to safety.  One form of 
poetry, called landay, is often used in conversation as a means to drive a point home, but 
typically used by women as a form of expressing positive and negative emotions in 
response to themes of love, honor and death.381 Landay, like other oral traditions, are 
reactive to the structural constraints of conflict and occupation, having an influential role 
in the behavior of mujahedeen. While Majrouh’s study concludes women’s landay were 
less religious than male poetry, the common themes pressured men to join the fight.  The 
landay presented in Majrouh’s study illustrate women focused not purely on religious 
jihad, but also resistance against occupation and foreign aggression. Landay were often 
sung to motivate sons to join the fight for it depended upon the survival of the next 
generation as illustrated below:  
Son, if you desert our war; I shall curse everything and also the milk of my 
breasts.382  
May you perish on the field of honor, my beloved! So that girls will sing 
your glory each time they haul water from the spring.383 
In terms of supporting jihad, this may be the most influential role women played.  
Sacrificing her men becomes her jihad and may even necessitate her participation on the 
battlefield.384 Other landay, sung by young girls or wives addressed men’s need for 
sexual relations.  While women had little influence in the public sphere, they had 
significant roles in the home.  Their ability to withhold sexual relations from men was a 
                                                 
381. Literally meaning “the short one,” landay is a poem consisting of two verse lines of nine and 
thirteen syllables, absent of rhyme. Sayd Bahodine Majrouh, Songs of Love and War, ix–xvi. 
382. Sayd Bahodine Majrouh, Songs of Love and War, 67. 
383. Ibid., 16. 
384. Audrey C. Shalinsky, “Women’s Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad,” International Journal of Middle 
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form of power.  In these landay, a coward would never be seen by his lover the same way 
again: 
Go first, my lover, to avenge the martyr’s blood; Before deserving the 
refuge of my breasts.385 
A martyr is like lightning that glitters and is then snuffed out. He who dies 
at home does nothing other than defile the bed. 
Landay were also a way to remind men of their honor and duty to defend the 
family and village from outside aggressors. 
Oh my love! If in my arms you tremble so; What will you do when a 
thousand lightning bolts flash from the clash of swords?386 
May you be found cut to pieces by a trenchant sword, But may the news of 
your dishonor never reach my ears!387 
They made clear that men were not alone in the fight.  Women followed their men 
and supported their bravery throughout: 
With my own hands I have sent you off to die, And then I climbed onto 
the roof to see you brave the first volley of guns.388 
Poetry, storytelling and night letters are all traditional means of passing 
information on in Afghanistan.  These methods are supported by twenty-first century 
technology that links rural narratives to the urban. Taliban utilize low-tech FM radio 
transmitters and broadcast their own radio program, “Voice of Shariat” on the back of 
pickup trucks throughout Afghanistan.389  The broadcasts are said to focus on 
government corruption, the Koran, jihad and other religious programs, but omit 
references to suicide attacks.  Bluetooth technology however has spread music and videos 
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on martyrdom operations in a viral fashion throughout southern Afghanistan.390 An 
additional tool used by the Taliban is the Internet.  In June 2009, an online version of 
Voice of Shari'ah was launched via the Taliban Pashto-language website Shahamat.391 
The service streams news, commentaries, poetry and martyrologies, and is updated twice 
daily.392 This acquisition of twenty-first-century technology shows an organizational 
acceptance of modern technology by the Taliban and the influence of Salafi Jihadist 
strategy, which has been using a variety of multi-media formats for their efforts to spread 
a culture of martyrdom. 
Suicide training camps in Pakistan are often filmed and the DVDs distributed to 
cities in Afghanistan.  The influence of Al Qaeda is apparent with Arabic songs, 
beheading-style executions, and frequent subtle connections between the Afghanistan and 
Iraq conflicts, including appearances of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the videos.393  The 
path of jihad is the main theme of these films. One film shows a young suicide bomber 
identified as Noor Aslam, presenting his personal statement:  
Friends, our religion is being desecrated, but you and me are asleep at 
home.  Our sisters and mothers are dishonored and raped.  They are forced 
to have sex with dogs and pigs, but you and me are asleep comfortably in 
our homes.394  
He then explains the sacrifices the prophets of Islam made and how all Muslims must 
also make sacrifices.  “Therefore friends, rise! I am also ready to sacrifice my life for 
Allah.  One has to die one day anyway.  What would you tell Allah if you die on your 
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deathbed at home?”  These martyrologies have similar structure and themes to those Al 
Qaeda released in Iraq.  
Key to this emerging technology within the Taliban organization is the absence of 
female voices and perceptions.  While Taliban claim to be defending the honor of women 
in their resistance, they have not opened an opportunity for women to participate in the 
jihad.  Even under the anti-Soviet resistance, mujahedeen allowed women to support the 
jihad with resistance literature and oral narratives venerating the heroic martyr.  Under 
the Taliban jihad, female representation in even supporting martyrdom ideology has not 
been found.  Instead, as Shukira Barakzai, an MP in the Afghan parliament has said, they 
have mixed Sharia, Pashtunwali, politics and self-interest to create an information 
campaign that rivals “the futile metaphor ‘hearts and minds’ chanted by U.S. 
officials.”395 
E. SUMMARY 
After thirty years of conflict in Afghanistan, insurgents and their tactics have 
changed. The Taliban have evolved into an amorphous movement that takes on a variety 
of resistance narratives dependent upon local conditions. With the influx of foreign 
fighters from Iraq and the refuge Pakistan brings, it has become increasingly difficult to 
pinpoint who the Taliban are and subsequently what influences them.  Today’s Taliban 
are involved with illicit narcotics production and smuggling, criminal enterprises and a 
number of non-ideological operations that threaten to undermine the moral narrative of 
their resistance.  Fighters influenced by entrepreneurial gains and foreign Salafi Jihadists 
have become a less disciplined movement   
Culture and religion are powerful structures influencing the behavior and tactics 
of insurgents.  However, the influx of foreign insurgent organizations like Islamic Jihad 
Union, Chechens, Arabs and the Salafi Jihadi movement threaten to undermine cultural 
structures that have traditionally prohibited female involvement in the insurgency. 
 
                                                 
395. “Afghanistan: Taliban propaganda effective among Pashtoons,” IRIN News, August 1, 2007. 
 114
Foreign actors may be more prone to act upon short-term material gains via risky military 
tactics and less concerned with cultural inhibitors that threaten the strength of social 
support.   
For over 30 years, Pakistan, with the help of foreign states, has radicalized and 
exploited religious schools, using the students as proxies against the Indian threat. This 
has backfired on Pakistan as the Taliban, radicalized by the Global Jihadi Movement, 
have turned on the state and civilian institutions.  Salafi Jihadis preaching an individual 
obligation to jihad have compelled many Pakistani and Afghan youth to become suicide 
bombers.  Their influence on the Taliban organization is apparent in the evolution of 
strategy and tactics, however these have yet to include the introduction of women as 
martyrs. 
This section described the factors behind the insurgency in Afghanistan and why 
there has been a relative absence of female suicide bombers in the region. Among the 
factors influencing insurgent behavior are a permissive social and geographic 
environment that gives insurgents freedom of mobility; an enduring presence of strict 
cultural institutions that define acceptable behavior of individuals, organizations and 
society; and an absence of female participation in the culture of martyrdom that defines 
insurgent actions and narratives.  The following section will develop these notions 
further, analyzing and comparing the structural conditions derived from each case study. 
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VI. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapters III through V, each case was presented in isolation, describing the 
historical and structural characteristics behind each insurgency and associated actors.  
Each case revealed that tactics do not fully explain the appearance of female suicide 
bombers; rather an appreciation of structural considerations such as norms, institutional 
barriers, and the dynamics of conflict also influence the agency of actors.  This section 
will develop upon the cases by comparing each against the propositions introduced in 
Chapter I.  This comparative analysis identifies characteristics that affect insurgent 
military strategies in Afghanistan, particularly the propensity to use female suicide 
bombers. There are three primary findings from this analysis that sufficiently explain the 
low propensity for female suicide bombers in Afghanistan.  First, a permissive social and 
geographic environment in Afghanistan gives insurgents freedom of mobility and 
resistance; second, the power of a strict culture restricts female participation in Afghan 
society and insurgent organizations; and third, the pronounced absence of a female 
culture of martyrdom to open space for women to participate in insurgent actions and 
narratives.  These three factors are developed below followed by policy recommendations 
in assessing insurgent military strategy.  
The dependent variable in all three propositions was whether insurgent groups 
used female suicide bombers.  Indicators of this were the presence of female bombers and 
some level of societal support preceding or following usage.  The results showed that 
groups in Sri Lanka and Iraq did use female suicide bombers, while groups in 
Afghanistan have not.   
A. PROPOSITION I 
The first proposition is focused on insurgent freedom of movement and ability to 
receive refuge and support that allows the group to conduct violent actions. The 
independent variable is a non-permissive security environment for insurgents.  Indicators 
include: a geographical and social environment that fail to offer refuge and support for 
insurgent mobility and actions; consistent external support provided to insurgent 
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organizations; and high success of counterinsurgent / terrorist forces. The more effective 
counterinsurgents are, the less permissible an environment will be for insurgent groups to 
operate, thus making female suicide bombings a tactic worth using in order to provide 
time, space, and recognition.  A permissive security environment includes social and 
cultural acceptance of insurgent behaviors such as suicide bombings. External support to 
insurgents also provides essential resources making deferment of female suicide bombing 
more likely. 
Table 2 offers clear patterns that less permissive environments reflect insurgent 
usage of female suicide bombers.  In the cases we find that the LTTE, Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), Mujahedeen and Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) all had safe havens outside the 
range of counterinsurgent reach.  However, LTTE and AQI both lost grip of, or were in 
fear of losing, their safe havens at certain times and subsequently increased the use of 
female suicide bombers. At times when the LTTE position of power was threatened, such 
as during parliamentary elections in 2000, or during periods of counterinsurgent surges, 
female suicide bombings were used as a means to create space for Tamil separatists and 
prevent counterinsurgent incursions onto LTTE territory or their power structures. For 
AQI, increased counterinsurgency operations in 2006 and 2007, bled the organization of 
many male recruits, and drove groups out of established safe havens in important urban 
environments, compelling the organization to support female bombers.  This became 
especially pronounced in 2008, when female suicide bombers reached the highest level in 
Iraq with 32 killing themselves.  
In the case of mujahedeen in Afghanistan, they were never in threat of losing their 
safe haven, which consisted predominately of rural villages and mountainous terrain 
outside the reach of Soviet forces that predominated district and provincial capitals.396  
The QST exist in the same security environment, with the same freedom of movement 
along the Pakistan border that mujahedeen of the 1980s had.  Mujahedeen and QST have 
never had to deal with the structural constraint of counterinsurgent forces like AQI and 
                                                 
396. Marshal Akhromeyev commented in 1986, “We control Kabul and the provincial centers, 
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 117
LTTE have.  Insurgents in Afghanistan have had significant freedom of mobility and the 
capability to move across a porous border to find refuge, resources and training.397  This 
freedom of movement opens the range of military options for Afghan insurgents, making 
female suicide bombers a less urgent tactic.   
Table 2.   Proposition I 
Propositions Variable Indicators Iraq Sri Lanka PDPA GIRoA 
Use of female suicide 
bombers 




use of female 
suicide bombers. 
 
Societal support of female 
suicide bombers 
Y Y N N 
A geographic environment 
which fails to offer refuge 
and support for insurgent 
mobility and actions 
Y Y N N 
A social environment which 
fails to offer refuge and 
support for insurgent 
mobility and actions 
--- N N N 
External support provided to 
insurgent organizations is 
consistent 
N N Y Y 






more likely it will 
rely upon female 








Success of counter-terrorist / 
insurgent organizations is 
high 
Y Y N N 
 
The second indicator of the independent variable is a social environment that fails 
to offer refuge and support for insurgent mobility and actions.  Of all the indicators in 
Proposition 1, this is the weakest. All cases displayed some level of support from internal 
social groups at some point during the conflict.  The LTTE were an ethno-linguistic 
representative of the Tamil population which predominately resided in the northeast 
portion of Sri Lanka—the area where LTTE was headquartered.  They also had an even 
larger diaspora in the southern region of India.  In Tamil Nadu and the northeast of Sri 
Lanka, LTTE were able to seek refuge as needed and had a relatively consistent social 
network to support their operations.  For AQI, they initially had support of ethnic-Sunni 
tribesmen and ex-Baathists disenfranchised by the new structural composition of the 
                                                 
397. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 101–109; Guistozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov, and Laptop, 
110–114; Johnson and Mason, “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template,” Military 
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government—a Shia-dominated and non-Baathist populated regime that threatened the 
livelihood of Sunnis. In the short term, AQI filled the security void by being a constant 
scourge to counterinsurgent forces. However, they lost a great deal of internal support 
once Iraq established the Awakening Councils, essentially arming Sunni men against 
AQI.  The brutal nature of Zarqawi also drew many Islamic fundamentalists away from 
the Iraq conflict, even creating a wedge between Osama bin Laden and the action of AQI. 
This indicator was therefore marked as inconclusive.  For the mujahedeen and QST, rural 
Pashtun villages provided a significant level of support to these insurgents.398 Some 
Pashtun tribes such as the Ishaqzai and Noorzai in Helmand have provided support to 
Taliban due to grievances with the government, other tribes in Nuristan and Kunar 
provinces provide support to Taliban or HIG to protect gem and lumber markets in those 
regions.399   
The third indicator of the independent variable is consistent external support. This 
indicator shows that those groups who lost a significant level of external support also 
turned to women as perpetrators of extreme violence. In the case of LTTE, they had a 
large Tamil diaspora in Tamil Nadu that provided political sway to policy circles in New 
Delhi, which helped originally empower the LTTE as an Indian proxy against the non-
compliant Sinhalese-dominant government of Sri Lanka. LTTE lost New Delhi support in 
1987 when Rajiv Gandhi signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to support its fight against 
Tamil separatists. While LTTE set up organizations around the world to support the 
Tamil independence movement, these provided inconsistent resources.  By 2001, the 
LTTE was labeled a terrorist organization and lost most of its international recognition.  
Externally, AQI filled its recruitment rolls with foreign-born jihadists from a number of 
Middle East and Eurasian countries.  They also received resources, moral and social 
support from foreign-based clients. Outside Afghanistan, support has come from states 
such as Saudi Arabia, U.S. and Pakistan at various times in the conflicts as was 
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previously discussed in Chapter V.  While this support has ebbed and flowed, it remained 
relatively constant in providing mujahedeen and QST the necessary resources to continue 
fighting.  
The fourth indicator of the independent variable looks at the success of 
counterinsurgent forces.  The results of this indicator suggest that those groups facing 
weak or inconsistent counterinsurgent operations are less in need of female suicide 
bombers.  LTTE and AQI both experienced strong and consistent counterinsurgent 
operations against their organizations, providing significant threats to the survival of 
each.  In 2006 and 2007, pressure on AQI was higher than previous years, threatening the 
structure and viability of the organization.  A turn toward female suicide bombers ensued 
as male recruit numbers were reduced.  Similar pressures were placed on LTTE 
throughout their existence causing a retaliation and effort to create space between 
insurgents and counterinsurgents.  Female bombers provided this ability as it forced 
counterinsurgents to reassess their force protection measures, tactics and strategy.  In the 
case of Afghanistan, counterinsurgents have never truly threatened insurgent operations.  
Mujahedeen and Taliban networks have easily been able to replicate lost fighters from an 
endless field of male recruits in the tribal areas of Pakistan.  Afghan insurgents have also 
utilized sophisticated IED and ambush tactics with significant success. 
This proposition developed that in these countries where the dependent variable 
was present (Iraq and Sri Lanka), there was also a geographic environment and possibly a 
social environment that failed to offer refuge and support to insurgent actions and 
mobility, that external support to the group was not consistent, and the success of 
counterinsurgent operations was high.  Where the dependent variable was not present 
(Afghanistan), there was both a geographic and a social environment that offered refuge 
and support to insurgent actions and mobility, a consistent level of external support and 
limited success of counterinsurgent operations. 
All of these indicators together suggest female suicide bombing is a tactic that 
depends upon structural constraints on insurgent actions and mobility.  When the 
organization’s position of safety is threatened to a certain point then alternative military 
strategies become crucial.  When the geographic and social environment fail to provide 
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safe havens and refuge, when external actors remain inconsistent suppliers of resources 
and recruits, and when counterinsurgent forces are strong adversaries, the insurgent 
organizations face a unique dilemma requiring alternative military strategies, such as 
female suicide bombing.   
While this proposition addresses a critical component of what tactics to use to 
ensure organizational survival, it does not fully address structural factors individuals, 
organizations, and society live under as they make decisions.  Proposition II develops this 
idea and brings a more nuanced approach to understanding how organizations choose 
female suicide bombers for more than just tactical motivations. 
B. PROPOSITION II 
The second proposition is concerned with the structure of state institutions and 
how they generally affect organizational and individual agencies in regards to female 
participation with state and sub-state institutions.  The independent variable in this 
proposition is structural processes that inhibit female participation in the state and further 
sub-state insurgent involvement. Indicators of structural influence on female agency are 
derived from a number of social characteristics such as grievances toward the 
government or international forces, a lack of employment and education opportunities for 
women, the failure of political institutions to recognize and address insurgent grievances, 
a subsequent rejection of the institutions provided by the state, and the influence of sub-
state or international structures such as cultural codes of conduct and religious 
fundamentalism on the agency of organizations. Of the five indicators of this variable, 
three were found to have positive attributes in each case studied, while two involving 
participation with insurgent organizations were positive in Iraq and Sri Lanka and 
negative in Afghanistan. Generally, it’s found that if space is provided to women in the 
public sphere, it becomes easier for insurgent groups to establish a similar sphere for 




Table 3.   Proposition II 
Propositions Variable Indicators Iraq Sri Lanka PDPA GIRoA 
Use of female suicide 




use of female 
suicide bombers. 
Societal support of female 
suicide bombers Y Y N N 
High level of societal 
grievances focused on 
structural conditions 
Y Y Y Y 
Structure that fails to 
provide employment and 
economic opportunities for 
women 
N N Y Y 
Structure of government 
fails to further political 
participation of women 
N N Y Y 
Structural processes increase 
female support or 
participation in insurgent 
organizations 










insurgency is more 












Insurgent organizations are 
recruiting women Y Y N N 
The first indicator of the independent variable is the presence of a high level of 
societal grievances focused on structural conditions.  This indicator produced positive 
results in each case study. A condition apparent in all cases is a sudden and detrimental 
change in the governing structure and grievances associated with that change.  
Independence in Sri Lanka placed the majority Sinhalese in authority over the minority 
Tamil population.  This change of power brought a number of institutional modifications 
to benefit the dominant Sinhalese and marginalize the minority Tamil.  Ethnic outbidding 
resulted from the Official Language Act and other constitutional measures that made 
economic and livelihood opportunities difficult for Tamils drew many to seek assistance 
outside the official government structure.  The LTTE arose as a reaction to these 
structural barriers imposed by the state.  The Tamil organization filled the security and 
services void left open by the repressive measures of the “Sinhalese-only” state.   
In Iraq, a similar change occurred, but on sectarian lines. The collapse of the 
Baath regime and change of government to a democratic state brought long-oppressed 
Shiites to the governing stage and left the Sunni minority in a self-help disposition.  
Historical narratives and civil strife emphasized the reality of sectarian division and 
prevented national institutions from truly forming.  Iraq ranks as one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world, adding to civil grievances.  The fear of Shia domination was 
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significant enough to encourage former Baathists and Sunnis to resist.  This stew of 
sectarian anger was a critical component for Al Qaeda to capitalize on.  The organization 
was able to recruit many foreigners and locals under the banner of saving Iraq from the 
occupation of infidels and the imposition of false Islam.  Al Qaeda rallied women to 
support their efforts first as background advocates of jihad, and then, when the situation 
became critical, as frontline fighters martyring themselves for the cause.   
Afghanistan, however presents a different set of structural grievances.  While 
there was a change in power structure in 2001, with the ousting of the Taliban regime, 
there was not a significant shift in ethnic or sectarian power.  A variety of Pashtun tribes 
were represented in the new government as well as other ethnic groups such as Tajiks, 
Uzbeks and Hazara.  This government was legitimized by centuries old praxis—the 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious Grand Council (Loya Jirga).  Moreover, ethnic 
fragmentation, a recent phenomenon in Iraq and Sri Lanka, has been the norm in 
Afghanistan.400  Thus the insurgency in Afghanistan is focused more on ideological 
grievances without strong backing from ethnic or sectarian lines. Afghanistan’s 
corruption ranking is one of the worst in the world (see Table 4).  For this reason, the 
Taliban and Mujahedeen have found temporary unity through political Islam and a moral 
narrative of jihad against corrupt central governance supported by foreign infidels. This 
narrative in both conflicts became reality to many rural Pashtuns who viewed foreign 
troops as occupiers and insolent to their culture—particularly, imposing controversial 
western norms such as equal rights for women. Under both insurgencies, grievances were 
similarly focused on a corrupt political regime imposing secular, immoral rules that were 
in opposition to traditional values. 
The second and third indicators of the independent variable focus on a structure 
that fails to provide employment, economic and political opportunities for women. The 
indicators reflect positive rankings for Afghanistan and negative rankings for Iraq and Sri 
Lanka. Generally, Iraq and Sri Lanka had structures providing women access to 
                                                 
400. Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); 
Thomas H. Johnson, “Democratic Nation Building in the Arc of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential 
Election in Afghanistan,” in Critical Issues Facing the Middle East: Security, Politics, Economics ed., 
James A. Russell, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 125–146. 
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education, jobs, and the political process.  In comparison, while Afghanistan had laws 
offering female participation in these institutions, the social code, having a stronger role 
than the central government, had established structures inhibiting women’s access to the 
same institutions.  In the three cases we find a variety of development indicators 
providing relative insight to each conflict region.  Table 4 displays overall development 
indicators in each conflict region.  
Table 4.   Comparison of Conflict Regions 
 Sri Lanka401 Iraq Afghanistan 
Level of Freedom402 








Political Rights403  
(on scale of 1-7, with 1=most free, and 
7=least free) 
4 6 5 
Civil Liberties404  
(on scale of 1-7, with 1=most free, and 
7=least free) 
4 6 6  
 
Regime Type405  
(ranked from full democracy to 
authoritarian out of 167 countries, 
1=most democratic, 167=least 
democratic) 
57/167  112/167 135/167 
Failed State Index406 
(ranked out of 60 countries; 1=most 
failed, 60=least failed) 
22 6 7 
Corruption Perception Index407 
(out of 180 countries; 180=worst) 
92 178 176 
Human Development Index (HDI)408 
(out of 182 countries ranked; 182=lowest)
102 Not available 181 
                                                 
401. These indices are within the last five years and thus in the case of Sri Lanka, are not the best 
reflection of conditions that brought Tamils to resist discrimination on the part of Sinhalese. These issues 
are developed in detail in Chapter III. 
402. “Freedom in the World 2009,” Freedom Watch.  
403. Ibid. 
404. Ibid. 
405. “Index of Democracy 2007,” The Economist Intelligence Unit.  
406. “Failed State Index 2009,” Foreign Policy June 22, 2009. 
407. “Corruption Perception Index 2008,” Transparency International. 
408. UNDP, “Human Development Index 2009.” 
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Gender Related Development Index 
(GDI) as compared to HDI409 
(the greater the gender disparity in basic 
human development, the lower the GDI 
relative to HDI; out of 155 countries, 
155=worst disparity) 
36 Not available 155 
Female life expectancy at birth (in years, 
2004)410 
(out of 190 countries ranked; 190=lowest)
77.9 
(18 / 190) 
71.8 43.5 
(189 / 190) 
Adult Literacy Rate (females, 2004)411 
(out of 145 countries ranked; 145=worst) 
89.1% 





(145 / 145) 
Combined Primary, Secondary and 
Tertiary gross enrollment in schools, 
female to male ratio (2004)412 
(out of 175 countries ranked; 175=worst) 
69.9% 





(175 / 175) 
 
 
In most of the categories above, Afghanistan and Iraq duplicate each other, 
whereas Sri Lanka reflects a higher level of development.  In terms of freedom, political 
rights, civil liberties and democracy, Afghanistan and Iraq score very low whereas Sri 
Lanka scores higher. Comparing these indices for Sri Lanka with the case study displays 
some variance in Tamil perceptions and the overall level of development.  The case study 
indicated that Tamil economic and political opportunities were severely restricted when 
Sinhalese took power and subsequent years following. Within twenty years of Sinhalese 
taking power, the government developed a system of ensuring Tamil separation from Sri 
Lanka.  Tamil participation in state jobs, education, businesses, and military recruitment 
all declined significantly.  Over time, LTTE exploited these grievances and rallied 
women to participate in the organization.  One problem with these indices is that they do 
not reflect Tamil economic and political situations, but are reflective of Sri Lanka as a 
whole.  While these numbers are supportive of the argument, the more relevant indicators 
are those expressed at the qualitative level in the Sri Lanka case.   
                                                 





Afghanistan and Iraq have similar rankings in the above table, but Iraq’s recent 
history under Saddam Hussein reflected a secular society where women were given equal 
rights to participate in government and private institutions.  The sudden change in 
government structure post–2003 created a system where these institutions were severely 
weakened.  The emergence of sectarian and religious cleavages has restricted women’s 
participation in economic and political endeavors, but to a lesser extent than Afghanistan. 
The fourth and fifth indicators of the independent variable focus on responses to 
grievances, namely whether structural processes increase female support or participation 
in insurgent organizations and if women are being recruited into these organizations.  The 
indicators reflected positive results in Iraq and Sri Lanka and negative results in 
Afghanistan.  In Iraq and Sri Lanka, victimization, a lack of security and development 
opportunities, and the close proximity of the conflict to daily life, generally inspired 
women to create networks that were supportive of the insurgency.  These networks 
recruited within ethnic or sectarian communities were directly affected by the conflict.  
Becoming a part of these women’s groups gave women opportunity and space that was 
otherwise limited by the structural constraints of conflict and ethnic differentiation.  
Women joined these groups as a reaction to violence experienced by an “other” identity.  
By supporting male fighters or volunteering themselves, women became witnesses 
practicing political freedom through the identity of reactive, and sometimes violent, 
politics. 
Gender–related indices provide a compelling comparison among the three cases.  
Afghanistan is ranked among the lowest in the world in all four categories related to 
gender development, whereas Iraq and Sri Lanka are ranked in the middle or higher on 
the scale.  This presents a significant finding in relation to gender development and 
female participation in conflict.  In societies where opportunity and agency for women is 
limited, their involvement in insurgent organizations is also limited.  The Afghanistan 
case has shown that the strict cultural identity of Pashtunwali mixed with elements of 
Islamic fundamentalism has limited the role of women in both the anti-Soviet jihad and 
during the Taliban resistance against GIRoA.  These structural factors have had a critical 
influence in the low development rankings scored for Afghanistan.  On the other hand, 
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while Iraq is not ranked among the other nations, the scores it acquires are substantially 
higher than Afghanistan and nearly match Sri Lanka, particularly in female life 
expectancy and literacy.  These higher scores match the structural conditions in Iraq that 
have historically given women a relatively greater position in their society and the ability 
to participate in insurgent organizations.  If space is provided to women in the public 
sphere, it becomes easier for insurgent groups to establish a position for women in the 
group, especially one that involves violent political action. 
This proposition developed that grievances toward the governing structure were 
existent in all cases, but were present in different contexts, i.e. ethnic, sectarian and 
traditionalist / religious.  It also indicated that political and economic opportunities for 
women were present in Iraq and Sri Lanka, but generally absent in Afghanistan.  Finally, 
the proposition indicated that in these countries where the dependent variable was present 
(Iraq and Sri Lanka), there was also a combination of grievances, political and economic 
opportunities and women’s support and participation with insurgent organizations as well 
as an active effort to recruit them into the organization.  Where the dependent variable 
was not present (Afghanistan), grievances were present, but political and economic 
opportunities were generally absent, as well as female support and recruitment with 
insurgent organizations. Therefore, a sufficient cause for the absence of female suicide 
bombers has been a strict culture restricting female participation in Afghan society and 
insurgent organizations. 
C. PROPOSITION III 
The third proposition is concerned with whether the martyrdom ideology arises as 
an individual, organizational and societal identity that embraces female participation.  
The independent variable of this proposition is the presence of a sub-culture of 
martyrdom with women’s involvement. Indicators include cultural narratives, discourses 
and propaganda that venerate women as martyrs, individual women or organizations 
openly endorsing martyrdom, an effort to reframe the traditional role of women in 
combat from one that is supportive of male actions to one that actively participates in 
political violence, and legitimate authority figures endorsing female martyrdom 
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operations. Table 4 outlines the results developed in each case study.  Iraq and Sri Lanka 
were found to have positive results for all indicators, while Afghanistan had negative 
results. 
Table 5.   Proposition III 
Propositions Variable Indicators Iraq Sri Lanka PDPA GIRoA 
Use of female suicide 




use of female 
suicide bombers. 
 
Societal support of female 
suicide bombers Y Y N N 
Cultural narratives, 
discourses and propaganda 
that venerates women as 
martyrs 
Y Y N N 
Individual women or 
women’s organizations 
openly endorse martyrdom 
Y Y N N 
Traditional rules defining 
the role of women are 
temporarily relaxed or 
adjusted 
Y Y N N 




women, then there 
will be a higher 
propensity for 
women to engage 
in suicide missions. Independent 




Legitimate leaders endorse 
female participation in 
martyrdom operations 
Y Y N N 
 
In the three case studies we find that LTTE, AQI, Mujahedeen and QST all 
utilized and enhanced an existing martyrdom identity.  They all used intellectual leaders, 
cultural themes and historical narratives to mobilize segments of the population to 
support the insurgency and the group’s underlying values.  However, where the ideology 
of martyrdom diverges is in the explicit use of female operatives.   
The first indicator looks at cultural narratives, discourses and propaganda that 
venerate women as martyrs.  In the case of the LTTE, their use of female martyrs became 
the example for insurgent groups around the world to follow. There were short-term, 
tactical incentives to using female bombers, which the group took advantage of.  There 
were also long-term incentives as the group harnessed existing societal grievances and 
expressed them through female bombers.  The cult of martyrdom was an individual, 
organizational and societal reaction to years of Tamil frustration. This ritual act provided 
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a connection to the past that made female participation seem like a continuation of a once 
lost Tamil existence. They compared women to ancient goddesses within Tamil and 
Hindu culture, giving the act of martyrdom and its representative a god-like quality. 
LTTE implemented holidays, cemeteries and memorials for women that sacrificed their 
lives and used them as examples for young and old to follow.  
The second indicator includes individual women or organizations openly 
endorsing martyrdom. This indicator was positive in Iraq and Sri Lanka and negative in 
Afghanistan.  As developed in the case study, there is a lack of female organizations 
supportive of the insurgency in Afghanistan. A critical component of any female 
martyrdom campaign is the organization of women in support of the cause.  Unlike Sri 
Lanka and Iraq, Afghanistan lacks a sufficient women’s movement that is supportive of 
the Taliban and their insurgency. While the LTTE had a well-leveraged and entrenched 
female soldier movement and Al Qaeda had a small, but localized and intense movement 
in Iraq, the Taliban lack any sufficient female movement and are highly discouraging of 
such.  The anti-Soviet mujahedeen had some women integrated into their movement as 
foot soldiers, similar to what the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may have in 
Afghanistan today, but neither have allowed women to participate in martyrdom 
operations in Afghanistan and the Taliban have not shown interest incorporating women 
in the organization.413  For anti-Soviet mujahedeen, well-disciplined units did not utilize 
suicide-bombing operations, preferring sophisticated guerilla attacks that encouraged 
survival for subsequent attacks. Since men did not encourage suicide operations 
themselves, women were not authorized either.  An Afghan woman taking this kind of 
action would require substantial support from her kinship network lest she dishonor the 
family by acting outside the traditional social structure, in which case it is unlikely she 
would have Taliban support. Iraq and Sri Lanka had a much less rigid kinship structure 
and a more fluid identity based upon ethnic and sectarian ties.  
                                                 
413. An Uzbek woman with the IMU was killed in 2009 in Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan.  
She was found with an automatic rifle and ammunition slung across her chest.  See: “Militants, including 
woman, killed in Afghan ambush-summary,” Earth Times, August 28, 2009. 
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The third indicator looks at the effort to reframe the traditional role of women in 
combat from one that is supportive of male actions to one that actively participates in 
political violence. This indicator was positive in Iraq and Sri Lanka and negative in 
Afghanistan.  In both LTTE and AQI cases, restrictions were loosened as the 
organization needed more recruits and society perceived greater oppression from the state 
and its institutions. The roles of women in both cases were temporarily redefined so that 
these violent acts could be undertaken.  In both cases, rhetoric is an important tool to 
elegantly convey the relevance of female martyrdom to the cause. 
The LTTE use of religion in their struggle has been similar to Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations’ use of jihad.  Like LTTE, AQI and affiliated groups have 
constructed a sophisticated ideological framework behind female martyrdom so that it 
may be considered acceptable to participants, supporters and spectators alike.  AQI’s use 
of martyrologies has been equally prolific but more technologically advanced due to the 
global nature of the resistance movement that requires a “virtual” arena for jihadists to 
tap into.  
Each insurgent group has generally invoked martyrdom along gender specific 
lines. Women are supporters of men who are the foundation of resistance fighters, but 
when necessary, women will be called upon to protect the “womb” of the nation.  Thus a 
woman must fulfill her “motherly duty” to protect the young and vulnerable. Whereas all 
groups utilized women in supportive roles, and the LTTE and AQI preceded their use of 
female suicide bombers by first giving women supportive assignments, the Afghan 
insurgents generally restricted women from participation greater than combat support and 
they have yet to sponsor female suicide bombers.  In many ways, martyrdom is an 
extension of one’s role in society.  To Pashtun insurgents, the role of women in 
Afghanistan is generally to remain at home and support and encourage their husbands 
and family in jihad.414  
Women’s agency is not supportive of female martyrdom in Afghanistan. The 
structure of Pashtun society discourages female martyrdom because their agency is 
                                                 
414. Audrey C. Shalinsky, “Women’s Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (November 1993): 661–675. 
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generally controlled by the role they play in the family.  Women are obligated to care for 
sons and daughters, husbands and other family members, lest they risk losing the honor 
of the family.  Upholding this honor is the most critical role a rural woman has.  It is 
generally the role of men to take part in violent jihad or obtain vengeance, with the 
obligation transferring to women if there are no male members in the family able to carry 
vengeance out. However, women are generally not encouraged to sacrifice themselves 
and those cases where they have (such as Malalai), it is generally used to inspire men to 
fight.  In Afghanistan, women are obligated to support the martyr, and through this 
support, she is venerated.415  Still, unlike the insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Iraq, Pashtun 
women generally do not have a distinguishing and unified opposition to another ethnic or 
sectarian group.  Their support for the anti-Soviet jihad has been distinguished as anti-
invasion or anti-occupation.  Today, Pashtun women cannot be identified as opposed to 
any particular ethnic or sectarian group in Afghanistan and are generally supportive of 
the role the United States is playing in Afghanistan, particularly in providing opportunity 
for women outside traditional tribal structures.    
The fourth indicator includes legitimate authorities endorsing female martyrdom. 
This indicator was positive in Iraq and Sri Lanka and negative in Afghanistan.  The Iraq 
and Sri Lanka studies showed that various organizations and leaders in society helped 
create and endorse narratives defining women’s engagement in martyrdom.  These 
figures, whether charismatic leaders, religious figures or cultural icons, provided the 
necessary authoritative stamp for a dangerous tactic.  Part of the calculus involved with 
incorporating this risky tactic is ensuring it meets societal approval.  While women in Sri 
Lanka and Iraq had conservative gender relations, neither was as strict as those in 
Afghanistan.  The structures that define male and female relations in Afghanistan are so 
rigid, that it makes approaching a woman outside of the clan, particularly difficult for 
Taliban, Al Qaeda or another group.  Approaching a woman for recruitment could 
potentially dishonor the family and tribe and thus insurgent groups are less likely to do 
so. Suicide attacks are already discouraged upon and wholly considered illegitimate in 
Afghan society, so a female bomber would be even more unpalatable and ultimately 
                                                 
415. Audrey C. Shalinsky, “Women’s Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad,” 674. 
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counter-productive to Taliban propaganda. Female suicide bombing can be a liability for 
insurgent groups attempting to prove their legitimacy to the public, particularly when 
women have such a sacred and hallowed role in the public sphere and the target of these 
attacks turn out to be Pashtun men.  Finally, a female suicide bombing campaign has 
never been endorsed by legitimate authorities in mujahedeen or QST circles due to the 
strict cultural boundaries between men and women. 
This proposition developed that those countries where the dependent variable was 
present (Iraq and Sri Lanka), there was also a combination of positive indicators from the 
independent variable including cultural narratives, discourses and propaganda that 
venerates women as martyrs, individual women or organizations openly endorsing 
martyrdom, an effort to reframe the traditional role of women in combat from one that is 
supportive of male actions to one that actively participates in political violence, and 
legitimate authority figures endorsing female martyrdom operations. Where the 
dependent variable was not present (Afghanistan), these indicators were also not present. 
Therefore, the pronounced absence of a female culture of martyrdom in Afghanistan has 
been a sufficient cause of their low propensity in the Afghan insurgency. 
D. SUMMARY 
This thesis argues there are clear tactical and material advantages to using female 
suicide bombers.  All the organizations looked at in the three case studies had similar 
material motivations for using this tactic, however they did not all choose to use female 
suicide bombers. Since the Afghan Taliban has not implemented a female suicide bomber 
campaign this thesis sought to understand what factors influenced Taliban military 
decisions outside of tactics.  It was assumed that realist strategies provide limited 
explanatory power for why a group decides to use this tactic, and that a constructivist 
approach looking at structural conditions affecting the agency of sub-state organizations 
provides a better explanation for the emergence of this tactic.  
Afghanistan provides a unique environment for studying the intersection of 
structures, agency and organizations and how these relate to the absence of a female 
martyrdom campaign in this region. There are three primary findings from this analysis 
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that together, sufficiently explain the low propensity for female suicide bombers in 
Afghanistan.  First, a permissive social and geographic environment in Afghanistan gives 
insurgents freedom of mobility and resistance; second, the power of a strict culture 
restricts female participation in Afghan society and insurgent organizations; and third, the 
pronounced absence of a female culture of martyrdom to open space for women to 
participate in insurgent actions and narratives.  
 While martyrdom operations are a weapon for insurgent groups, they are also 
social constructs inspired by surrounding circumstances, values and ideology.  
Organizations certainly choose their tactics based on the incentives they will bring, thus a 
rationalist model is applicable; however, more is at stake than just material gains.  
Organizations are re-crafting the idea of who they are—equal opportunity martyrs—
which in turn, influences their identity and associated behavior.  While Al Qaeda has 
represented a small, but substantial pattern in bringing women into the insurgent mix, and 
LTTE has been one of the foremost examples of this, Taliban have not.  Taliban, like 
their mujahedeen counterparts of the 1980s, have structured their organization to ensure 
women have a limited role in insurgent activity.   
While constructivism provides an excellent method for understanding the 
evolution of insurgent tactics, it can also provide the context for understanding how those 
groups may evolve toward non-violent, political options.  As identities evolve based upon 
culture and history, norms and understandings can influence agency toward non-violent 
approaches.   
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The implications in this thesis are significant toward understanding the current 
conflict in Afghanistan as well as future insurgencies the United States may become 
involved with.  Determining the propensity of social group evolution toward female 
suicide terrorism is a difficult, but essential task.  While insurgent groups are relegated by 
the structure of culture, religion and other social constructs in society, the threat is always 
apparent that they may break social codes for material incentives. The thesis provides a 
framework for understanding how a constructive understanding of past conflicts proves 
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fruitful for understanding current and future insurgent tactics.  But it draws short of 
predicting whether the Taliban or associated groups in Afghanistan will utilize female 
suicide bombers.  Like most constructivist models, it fails to address uncertainty and how 
fringe groups may adopt this tactic regardless of the social structures determining agency.  
It also fails to address the level at which structures unsuccessfully influence individuals, 
organizations and society.  How much of a permissible environment do insurgents need 
without being sufficiently threatened?  How strong do economic or political institutions 
need to be to override traditional social structures such as Pashtunwali?  How influential 
does a culture of martyrdom need to be for women to engage in suicide terrorism?  These 
are questions that future research can help address. 
Future research could also focus on modeling the potential of a female suicide 
bomber campaign with a game theoretical approach, measuring the payoffs of 
implementing such a campaign.  Also, a thorough study of women’s networks in 
Afghanistan would provide useful background for future engagement efforts.  Afghan 
women are just as vulnerable to becoming suicide bombers if space is opened for their 
participation in insurgent organizations.  Finally, assessing the weight of particular 
structures and their relative impact in each insurgency could provide a useful framework 
when assessing the evolution of violence in a conflict. 
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